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INTRODUCTION
The states' provision of governmental incentives to encourage in-
dustrial development within their borders has long been a feature of
American political and economic life. These incentives have assumed
a wide variety of forms, ranging from tax abatements and credits to
below-market leases and outright cash subsidies. Today, every state
provides tax and other economic incentives as an inducement to local
industrial location and expansion.' Scarcely a day passes without
some state offering yet another incentive to spur economic develop-
ment,2 often in an effort to attract a particular enterprise to the state.3
1 See Mark L. Nachbar et al., Income Taxes: State Tax Credits and Incentives, Tax Mgmt.
(BNA) No. 1180 (Jan. 26, 1996); Mark Taylor, Note, A Proposal to Prohibit Industrial Reloca-
tion Subsidies, 72 TEx. L. REV. 669, 679 (1994).
2 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 §§ 6651-6659 (West 1995) (reimbursing taxpay-
ers for local property taxes paid on new business machinery and equipment).
3 See, e.g., 1993 Ala. Acts 93-851 (the so-called "Mercedes-Benz legislation"), discussed




The debate over. the efficacy and wisdom of state business devel-
opment incentives is intense and important.4 Arrayed against the per-
sistent pleas that financial incentives are essential to a state's
economic growth is a large body of evidence that incentives have little
effect on industrial location decisions.5 In addition, one must weigh
the perceived economic benefits associated with such incentives-ad-
ditional jobs and investment-against the economic dangers they may
engender-misallocation of resources and inefficient selection of
beneficiaries. 6 Opposition to state tax incentives has spawned at least
one proposal for a sweeping federal prohibition on their use.7
Our purpose is not to enter this fray; instead, it is to consider the
thorny legal questions these incentives raise under the Federal Consti-
tution.8 The most perplexing question arises under the dormant
commerce clause: how is a constitutionally benign incentive designed
to attract industry to a state to be distinguished from an unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory incentive designed to do the same thing? This
question reflects a palpable tension in the Supreme Court's decisions.
On the one hand, the Court has sustained (or implicitly approved)
programs adopted by states-particularly in the form of subsidies-
intended to encourage business activities inside their borders. On the
other hand, the Court has invalidated (or implicitly condemned) state
programs-particularly in the form of tax incentives-intended to ac-
complish precisely the same result.
The Court's rhetoric reveals this tension. The Court has ob-
served that " '[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not or-
4 See Walter Hellerstein, Selected Issues in State Business Taxation, 39 VAND. L. RE-.
1033, 1084-38 (1986).
5 SeeJames A. Papke, Intedurisdictional Business-Tax Cost Differentials: Convergence, Di-
vergence, and Significance?, 9 ST. TAx NoTES 1701 (1995) (casting doubt on proposition that
general tax incentives can have a decisive impact on investment location decisions); Rich-
ard D. Pomp, The Role of State Tax Incentives in Attracting and Retaining Business: A View from
New York, 29 TAx NOTEs 521, 525 (1985) (concluding, after extensive review of the litera-
ture, that business tax incentives play only an insignificant role in attracting or maintaining
in-state firms and probably result in a needless loss of state revenue). But see William J.
Barrett IV, Note, Problems with State Aid to New or Expanding Businesses, 58 S. CAL_ L. REv.
1019, 1024-25 (1985) (citing FORTUNE study showing practical importance of business
incentives).
6 See WiLLiAm ScHwEKxE ET AL., BIDDING FOR BUSINEss 35 (1994) (noting the weight of
scholarly opinion against using development incentives to attract new industry); Taylor,
supra note 1, at 678-92 (concluding that industrial relocation subsidies are undesirable
from an economic and political standpoint).
7 See Nathan Newman, Proposition 13 Meets the Internet: How State and Local Government
Finances Are Becoming Roadkill on the Information Superhighway, 9 ST. TAx NOTES 927, 933-34
(1995) (proposing federal prohibition on "subsidy abuse" by local governments in compe-
tition for business).
8 Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 626 (N.C. 1996) ("To date,
courts in forty-six states have upheld the constitutionality of governmental expenditures




dinarily run afoul' of the negative Commerce Clause."9 But the Court
has also held that at least some subsidy programs offend the Com-
merce Clause anti-discrimination principle. 10 The Court has declared
that its decisions "do[ ] not prevent the States from structuring their
tax systems to encourage the growth and development of intrastate
commerce and industry."'" The Court, however, has also disapproved
state tax measures designed to achieve that very objective on the
ground that they "foreclose[] tax-neutral decisions"1 2  and
"'provid[e] a direct commercial advantage to local business.' "13
In this Article, we explore the ill-defined distinction between the
constitutional carrot and the unconstitutional stick in state tax, sub-
sidy, and related cases. Part I examines the restraints that the Com-
merce Clause imposes on state tax incentives. It canvasses the general
principles limiting discriminatory state taxation, explores the Court's
decisions addressing state tax incentives, and proposes a framework of
analysis for adjudicating the validity of such incentives. Part I con-
cludes by considering the constitutionality of a variety of state tax in-
centives within our suggested framework and also under alternative
approaches that courts might utilize.
Part II examines the restraints that the Commerce Clause im-
poses on state subsidies. It begins with a consideration of the Court's
seminal case in this field, West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy.14 After
demonstrating that West Lynn Creamery does not jeopardize ordinary
business subsidies, Part II considers the constitutionality of subsidies
along two dimensions. First, it looks at subsidies in terms of their in-
tended beneficiaries, focusing on whether it matters for Commerce
Clause purposes that the subsidy targets a particular firm rather than a
general class of businesses. Second, it evaluates whether the particu-
lar form the subsidy takes-for example, a cash grant, a property
transfer, or a user fee waiver-alters the constitutional calculus in ap-
plying the dormant commerce clause. Part II concludes that neither
the target nor the form of the subsidy ordinarily makes a difference.
Rather, discriminatory subsidies, unlike discriminatory tax breaks, are
almost always constitutional.
9 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2214 n.15 (1994) (alteration in
original) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
10 See West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2211-14 (invalidating Massachusetts milk-pro-
ducer subsidy program, closely connected with the state's milk tax). Part IIA, infra, dis-
cusses the West Lynn Creamery decision at length.
11 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977).
12 Id. at 331.
13 Id. at 329 (quoting Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358
U.S. 450, 458 (1959)).
14 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
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In Part III, we consider the theoretical underpinnings of the
strong tax-break/subsidy distinction that permeates this field. We sug-
gest that this distinction resonates with the law's deep regard for con-
siderations of form. We observe, in particular, that the distinction
may grow out of the same "cautionary function" that helps explain
many rules that require use of specified formal structures to achieve
legally enforceable results in the private-law context. 15
I
STATE TAX INCENTIVES
A. State Tax Incentives as State Tax Discrimination:
General Principles
The prohibition against state taxes that discriminate against inter-
state commerce has been a fundamental tenet of the Court's Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence from the very beginning. 16 The concept
of discrimination, however, is not self-defining, and the Court has
never precisely delineated the scope of the doctrine that bars discrimi-
natory taxes. Nonetheless, the central meaning of discrimination as a
criterion for adjudicating the constitutionality of state taxes on inter-
state business emerges unmistakably from the Court's decisions: a tax
which by its terms or operation imposes greater burdens on out-of-
state goods, activities, or enterprises than on competing in-state
goods, activities, or enterprises will be struck down as discriminatory
under the Commerce Clause.
State tax incentives, whether in the form of credits, exemptions,
abatements, or other favorable treatment 1'7 typically possess two fea-
tures that render them suspect under the rule barring taxes that dis-
criminate against interstate commerce. First, state tax incentives
single out for favorable treatment construction, investments, or other
activities that occur within the taxing state. For example, when South
Carolina afforded BMW a sales tax exemption on all machinery ac-
15 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941). In an
appendix to this Article, we briefly explore the remedial and procedural implications of
the rules we have advanced.
16 See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
17 In this Article, we use the term "tax incentive" to embrace any provision designed
to encourage new or expanded business activity in the state, which (1) seeks to induce the
taxpayer to take action it might not otherwise take if the tax were constructed according to
generally accepted principles of sound tax policy (economic neutrality, administrability,
and equity) and (2) is not an inherent part of the tax structure. Accordingly, the typical
business expense deduction in an income tax or sale-for-resale exemption in a retail sales
tax is not a "tax incentive" as that term is ordinarily understood, because such a deduction
or exemption is an essential structural feature of an income tax or a retail sales tax. If the
deduction or exemption were granted on a more favorable basis to in-state than to out-of-
state activity, however, it might lose its character as an essential structural feature of the tax
and would therefore amount to a "tax incentive." See infra part I.D.l.b.
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quired for the company's new multi-million dollar facility, the State
did so only because BMW located that facility in South Carolina. In-
deed, if state tax incentives were not limited to in-state activities, they
would hardly be worthy of the appellation "state" tax incentives.
Second, state tax incentives, as integral components of the state's
taxing apparatus, are intimately associated with the coercive machin-
ery of the state. They therefore fall comfortably within the universe of
state action to which the Commerce Clause is directed. Although
"[t] he Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to
give its residents an advantage in the marketplace,"' 8 it plainly applies
to "action of that description in connection with the State's regulation of
interstate commerce."19 And the Court has recognized in scores of cases
that state tax laws affecting activities carried on across state lines are
"plainly connected to the regulation of interstate commerce."20
B. State Tax Incentives as State Tax Discrimination: Case Law
The Court's treatment of state tax incentives suggests that the
constitutional suspicion surrounding such measures is well justified.
Over the past two decades, the Court has considered four taxing
schemes involving measures explicitly designed to encourage eco-
nomic activity within the state.2' In each case, the Court invalidated
the measure. Moreover, the Court did so with rhetoric so sweeping as
to cast a constitutional cloud over all state tax incentives.
1. Boston Stock Exchange
In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,22 the Court con-
sidered a New York stock transfer tax that included an incentive
18 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
19 i (emphasis in original).
20 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1354 n.9
(1994); see also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 455 (1978) ("a tax is a power-
ful regulatory device"); Wailing v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 455 (1886) ("A discriminating
tax... is, in effect, a regulation in restraint of commerce among the States .... ").
21 See New Energy Co. of nd. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988); Bacchus Imports, Ltd.
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Westinghouse EIec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984); Bos-
ton Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). During this time frame, the
Court has considered many other cases involving allegations of state tax discrimination.
None, however, involved measures deliberately designed to encourage business location or
expansion within a state, even though, in effect, they may have encouraged in-state busi-
ness operations. See, e.g., Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 114 S. Ct. 1815 (1994) (strik-
ing down statewide use tax on goods purchased outside the state insofar as use tax
exceeded sales tax on goods purchased within state); Oregon Waste Sys., 114 S. Ct. 1345
(1994) (striking down a tax on in-state disposal of out-of-state waste, which was higher than
the tax on in-state disposal of in-state waste); American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner,
483 U.S. 266 (1987) (striking down flat highway taxes, which imposed higher per mile
burden on interstate than upon intrastate trucks).
22 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
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designed to assist the New York brokerage industry. The transfer tax
applied to "all sales, or agreements to sell, or memoranda of sales and
all deliveries or transfers of shares or certificates of stock" in New
York.23 Because the "'bulk of stock transfers ... funnels through New
York,' 24 New York's stock transfer tax applied to the lion's share of
stock transfers, regardless of where the stock sale occurred. In order to
encourage nonresident stock sellers and sellers of large blocks of stock
to effectuate their sales through New York-rather than out-of-state
brokers, New York amended the statute to offer these sellers a tax
break. In lieu of the tax that had previously applied uniformly to the
transfer of securities through a New York stock transfer agent without
regard to the situs of the sale, New York provided a reduced stock
transfer tax for these sellers if they made their sales through New York
brokers.
The Court found that this reduction in tax liability, designed to
encourage in-state business activity, offended the Commerce Clause
nondiscrimination principle. Prior to the statute's amendment, "the
New York transfer tax was neutral as to in-state and out-of-state sales" 25
because, regardless of where the sale occurred, the same tax applied
to all securities transferred through a New York transfer agent. The
amendment, however, "upset this equilibrium"26 because a seller's de-
cision as to where to sell would no longer be made "solely on the basis
of nontax criteria."27 Instead, a seller would be induced to trade
through a New York broker to reduce his or her transfer tax liability.
By providing a tax incentive for sellers to deal with New York
rather than out-of-state brokers, the State had, in the Court's eyes,
"foreclose[d] tax-neutral decisions."28 Moreover, New York had done so
through the coercive use of its taxing authority. As the Court noted,
"the State is using its power to tax an in-state operation as a means of
'requiring [other] business operations to be performed in the home
State.' "29
Because tax incentives, by their nature, are designed to "foreclose
tax-neutral decisions" by bringing "tax criteria" to bear on business
decisionmaking, courts could easily interpret Boston Stock Exchange to
mean that a constitutional infirmity afflicts every state tax incentive.
Perhaps for this reason, the Court was moved to note that its "decision
23 N.Y. Tax Law § 270.1 (McKinney 1966).
24 Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 327 n.10 (quoting PUBLIC PAPERS OF GovERNoR NEL-
SON A. ROCKEFELLER 558 (1968)).
25 Id. at 330.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
28 Id. (emphasis added).




... does not prevent the States from structuring their tax systems to
encourage the growth and development of intrastate commerce and
industry. °30 The Court did not explain, however, how states could ef-
fectively pursue this objective under the constraints of the reasoning
in Boston Stock Exchange. If a state may not "use discriminatory taxes to
assure that nonresidents direct their commerce to businesses within
the State,"31 and "discriminatory taxes" include those that reduce the
effective tax rate when taxpayers conduct economic activity inside
rather than outside the state's borders, the effectiveness of tax policy
as a means "to encourage the growth and development of intrastate
commerce and industry" would be severely curtailed.32
2. Bacchus
In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,33 the Court confronted a Com-
merce Clause challenge to an exemption from Hawaii's excise tax on
wholesale liquor sales for certain locally-produced alcoholic bever-
ages. It was "undisputed that the purpose of the exemption was to aid
Hawaiian industry."34 The exemption for one of the beverages at is-
sue-a brandy distilled from the root of an indigenous Hawaiian
shrub-was intended" 'to "encourage and promote the establishment
30 Id. at 336.
31 d at 334-35.
32 The Court drew upon the reasoning of Boston Stock Exchange to invalidate a state tax
in Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981). Maryland v. Louisiana is not a "tax incen-
tive" case in the sense of the cases discussed in the text, however, because the provisions at
issue were designed to insulate local business from the economic impact of a new exaction
rather than to encourage new or expanded business activity in the state. The case never-
theless reinforces the teachings of the tax incentive cases that a state may not impose a tax
on specified activities and then provide a credit against or reduction of the tax if the tax-
payer engages in other local activities. In Maryland v. Louisiana, the Court held that Louisi-
ana's First-Use Tax on natural gas, which applied to gas extracted from the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) and subsequently "used" in Louisiana, unconstitutionally discrim-
inated against interstate commerce because various credits and exclusions available only to
local interests effectively immunized local interests from the tax. The Court's condemna-
tion of the First-Use Tax credit against the state's severance tax, which is paid only by those
who sever gas in Louisiana, would similarly condemn any such credit specifically designed
to encourage economic development in the state:
On its face, this credit favors those who both own OCS gas and engage in
Louisiana production. The obvious economic effect of this Severance Tax
Credit is to encourage natural gas owners involved in the production of
OCS gas to invest in mineral exploration and development within Louisi-
ana rather than to invest in further OCS development or in production in
other States.
Id- at 756-57 (footnote omitted). By thus denouncing the levy's inducement for firms to
shift business activities into the state, Maryland v. Louisiana (like the cases discussed in the
text) renders constitutionally suspect the whole range of state tax incentives. See also Halli-
burton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963) (invalidating use tax that en-
couraged taxpayers to locate their activities in the taxing State).
33 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
34 Id. at 271.
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of a new industry."' "35 The exemption for the other beverage-pine-
apple wine-was "'intended "to help" stimulate "the local fruit wine
industry."' "36
These lofty purposes, however, could not sanctify a tax incentive
that unmistakably defied the prohibition against taxes that favor in-
state over out-of-state products. The Court explained that, however
legitimate the goal of stimulating local business might be, "the Com-
merce Clause stands as a limitation on the means by which a State can
constitutionally seek to achieve that goal."3 7 The means the State
chose in Bacchus-taxing out-of-state but not in-state products-could
not have been more offensive to the Commerce Clause's nondiscrimi-
nation principle. It was "irrelevant to the Commerce Clause inquiry
that the motivation of the legislature was the desire to aid the makers
of locally produced beverage rather than to harm out-of-state
producers."38
The Court in Bacchus recognized that "a State may enact laws pur-
suant to its police powers that have the purpose and effect of encour-
aging domestic industry"3 9 and even declared "that competition
among the States for a share of interstate commerce is a central ele-
ment of our free-trade policy ... ."40 The Court also stated, however,
that "the Commerce Clause limits the manner in which States may
legitimately compete for interstate trade."41 But beyond reiterating
the ban on discriminatory taxation and applying it to strike down the
Hawaii tax, the Court offered no new counsel on how far the Com-
merce Clause prohibition extends.
3. Westinghouse
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully42 provides particularly useful in-
struction regarding the constitutionality of state tax incentives because
the case involves the most common form of tax incentive, an income
tax credit. Westinghouse arose out of New York's response to Con-
gress's provision of tax incentives for American corporations to in-
crease their exports. In 1971, Congress accorded preferred status to
any entity _hat qualified as a "Domestic International Sales Corpora-
35 Id. at 270 (quoting In re Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 656 P.2d 724, 730 (Haw. 1982)
(quoting S.LH. 1960, c. 26, Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 87, in 1960 Senate Journal, at
224)).
36 Id (quoting In re Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 656 P.2d 724, 730 (Haw. 1982) (quoting
S.L.H. 1976, c. 39, Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 408-76, in 1976 SenateJournal, at 1056)).
37 IRd at 271.
38 Id, at 273.
39 Id at 271.
40 Id. at 272.
41 Id.
42 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
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tion" (DISC).43 Under the federal tax laws, DISCs were not taxable on
their income, and their shareholders were taxable only on a portion
of such income. If New York had incorporated the federal DISC legis-
lation into its corporate income tax, it would have suffered a substan-
tial loss of revenue.44 On the other hand, if New York had sought to
tax DISC income in full, it risked discouraging the manufacture of
export goods within the state.45
With these conflicting considerations in mind, New York enacted
legislation that did two things. First, the legislation provided that a
DISC's income should be combined with the income of its parent for
state tax purposes. Second, in an effort to " 'provide a positive incen-
tive for increased business activity in New York State,' "46 the legisla-
tion granted a partial credit for the parent against the tax on the
income attributable to the DISC. The parent's maximum credit was
determined by applying seventy percent of the parent's tax rate to the
parent's share of the DISC income, as apportioned to NewYork by the
parent's business allocation percentage. 47 (In substance, this lowered
the effective tax rate on DISC income taxable by New York to 30% of
the otherwise applicable rate.) The maximum credit figure, however,
was then adjusted to reflect the DISC's "New York export ratio"4 8-
the ratio of the DISC's receipts from New York export shipments to its
receipts from all export shipments. For example, if 100% of the
DISC's exports were shipped from New York, the parent could claim
the full credit and in effect pay 30% of the otherwise applicable rate
on the DISC income. If, however, only 50% of the DISC's exports
were shipped from New York, the parent could claim only one-half of
the maximum credit and would pay taxes on DISC income at 65% of
the applicable rate.
It was this latter aspect of the credit-its limitation by reference
to the DISC's New York export ratio-that proved to be constitution-
ally fatal. The New York State Tax Commission contended that "mul-
tiplying the allowable credit by the New York export ratio... merely
ensures that the State is not allowing a parent corporation to claim a
43 I.R.C. §§ 991-997 (1994). In 1984, Congress largely repealed the DISC legislation
and replaced it with special provisions governing new entities it described as "Foreign Sales
Corporations" (FSCs). I.R.C. §§ 921-927 (1994).
44 Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 392.
45 Id. at 392-93.
46 Id. at 393 (quoting NEwYoRK STATE DIVISION OF THE BUDcr, REPORT ON A. 12108-
A AND S. 10544 (May 23, 1972), reprinted in Bill Jacket of 1972 N.Y. Laws, ch. 778, at 18).
47 A corporation's New York business allocation percentage, which is employed to
determine the amount of a multistate taxpayer's income that is fairly attributable to New
York, is determined by taking the average of the ratio of the taxpayer's property, payroll,
and receipts in New York to its total property, payroll, and receipts wherever located. N.Y.
Tax Law § 210(3) (a) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1996).
48 Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 394.
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tax credit with respect to DISC income that is not taxable by... New
York."49 The Court responded:
This argument ignores the fact that the percentage of the DISC's
accumulated income that is subject to New York franchise tax is de-
termined by the parent's business allocation percentage, not by the
export ratio. In computing the allowable credit, the statute requires
the parent to factor in its business allocation percentage. This pro-
cedure alleviates the State's fears that it will be overly generous with
its tax credit, for once the adjustment of multiplying the allowable
DISC export credit by the parent's business allocation percentage
has been accomplished, the tax credit has been fairly apportioned
to apply only to the amount of the accumulated DISC income taxa-
ble to New York. From the standpoint of fair apportionment of the
credit, the additional adjustment of the credit to reflect the DISC's
New York export ratio is both inaccurate and duplicative.50
Although this analysis of the propriety of reducing the credit by
reference to the DISC's New York export ratio may seem technical, it
lies at the heart of Westinghouse and is critical to understanding West-
inghouse's implications for the constitutionality of state income tax in-
centives. In effect, the Court was saying that New York had provided
the only kind of DISC income tax credit it could constitutionally offer
when it lowered the effective tax rate on accumulated DISC income
apportioned to New York.51 In other words, the credit had to be ap-
portioned to New York on the same basis that the DISC income was
apportioned to New York, so that the effective New York tax rate on
DISC income, though lower than the effective New York tax rate on
other income, would not vary depending on the amount of the tax-
payer's DISC activity in New York.
When New York took the additional step of limiting the credit by
reference to the DISC's New York export ratio, it was tying the credit
to New York activities in a manner that no longer corresponded even-
handedly to the DISC income being taxed. Rather, the effective New
York tax rate on the DISC income being taxed (i.e., the DISC income
apportioned to New York by the parent's business allocation percent-
age) varied directly with the extent of the taxpayer's New York DISC-
related activities. The greater the percentage of a DISC's export ship-
ments from New York, the greater the relative credit 52 for taxes paid
49 Id. at 399.
50 Id. at 399 (citation omitted).
51 New York had accomplished this objective by providing a credit against 70% of the
tax otherwise due on the DISC income, thereby reducing the effective tax rate to 30% of
the original rate.
52 One would expect the absolute amount of credit to increase as DISC-related activity
in New York increased even under an evenhanded crediting scheme, such as described in
the preceding paragraph, simply because more DISC-related income was taxable by New
York, and therefore there would be more DISC-related income tax available for the credit.
1996]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
upon DISC income within New York's tax power, and the lower the
effective New York tax rate on such income. The lower the percent-
age of a DISC's export shipments from New York, the lower the rela-
tive credit for taxes paid upon DISC income within New York's tax
power, and the higher effective New York tax rate on such income.
New York thus released its grip on DISC income within its taxing
power only to the extent that DISC-related activities were carried on
in the state. It kept its grip firmly upon DISC income within its taxing
power to the extent that DISC-related activities were carried on
outside the state.
After examining the operation of New York's DISC credit
scheme,5 3 the Court in Westinghouse found that New York's effort to
encourage export activity in the state suffered from constitutional in-
firmities similar to those that had disabled New York's earlier effort to
encourage brokerage activity in the state.54 Like the reduction in tax
liability offered to sellers of securities who effectuated their sales in
New York, the reduction in tax liability offered to exporters who effec-
tuated their shipments from New York" 'creates... an advantage' for
firms operating in New York by placing 'a discriminatory burden on
commerce to its sister States.' "55 It was "irrelevant"56 to the constitu-
tional analysis that the earlier tax incentives the Court had considered
"involved transactional taxes rather than taxes on general income,"57
because a State cannot "circumvent the prohibition of the Commerce
Clause against placing burdensome taxes on out-of-state transactions
by burdening those transactions with a tax that is levied in the aggre-
gate.., rather than on individual transactions."58 Nor did it matter
"[w] hether the discriminatory tax diverts new business into the State
or merely prevents current business from being diverted elsewhere";59
The unacceptable feature of the New York scheme was that the proportional amount of
credit-i.e., the credit allowable per dollar of DISC-income being taxed-increased or de-
creased according to the extent of DISC-related activity in New York. Westinghousme 466
U.S. at 400-01.
53 The Court explicated the effect of the DISC credit scheme in detail, employing,
among other things, a series of hypothetical examples demonstrating that "similarly situ-
ated corporations, each operating a wholly owned DISC, would face different tax assess-
ments in New York depending on the location from which the DISC shipped its exports."
Westinghouse 466 U.S. at 400-02 n.9.
54 See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (discussed supra
part I.B.1).
55 Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. 318, 331
(1977)).
56 Id at 404.
57 Id-
58 Id.
59 Id- at 406.
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it was "still a discriminatory tax that 'forecloses tax-neutral
decisions.' "60
Moreover, the New York DISC credit had one particularly prob-
lematic effect not encountered in the Court's previous tax incentive
cases: the credit decreased when the taxpayer increased its DISC-re-
lated activities elsewhere, even if the taxpayer's New York DISC-re-
lated activities remained unchanged.61 The Court in Westinghouse
described this as "the most pernicious effect of the credit scheme."62
As the Court explained, "not only does the New York tax scheme 'pro-
vide a positive incentive for increased business activity in New York
State,' but also it penalizes increases in the DISC's shipping activities
in other States."63
4. New Energy
The Court's most recent encounter with a state tax incentive, New
Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach,6 involved an Ohio tax credit designed
to encourage the in-state production of ethanol (ethyl alcohol). Etha-
nol, which is typically made from corn, can be mixed with gasoline to
produce a motor fuel called "gasohol." Ohio provided a credit against
the state's motor fuel tax for each gallon of ethanol sold as a compo-
nent of gasohol, but only if the ethanol was produced in Ohio or in a
state that granted similar tax benefits to Ohio-produced ethanol.
In New Energy Co., the Court had little difficulty concluding that
this tax incentive failed to satisfy the strictures of the Commerce
Clause. It observed that "[t]he Ohio provision at issue.., explicitly
deprives certain products of generally available beneficial tax treat-
ment because they are made in certain other States, and thus on its
face appears to violate the cardinal requirement of nondiscrimina-
tion."65 The Court gave short shrift to the State's arguments in sup-
port of its disparate treatment of in-state and out-of-state products.
The Court had previously rejected a "reciprocity" defense to a
statute that discriminated against out-of-state products, observing that
a state "may not use the threat of economic isolation as a weapon to
force sister States to enter into even a desirable reciprocity agree-
60 Id. (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977)).
61 This reduction in the credit resulted from the fact that the credit allowable per
dollar of DISC income subject to tax varied according to the relative amount of DISC-re-
lated activity in New York. See supra note 51.
62 Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 401 n.9.
63 Id at 400-01 (quoting NEw YORK STATE DIVISION OF THE BUDGET, REPORT ON A.
12108-A AND S. 10544 (May 28, 1972), rprinted in Bill Jacket of 1972 N.Y. Laws, ch. 778, p.
18).
64 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
65 Id. at 274.
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ment."66 As for the claim that Ohio could have achieved the same
objective by way of a cash subsidy, the Court responded that the Com-
merce Clause does not prohibit all state action favoring local over out-
of-state interests, but only such action that arises out of the state's reg-
ulation of interstate commerce. 67 While "[d] irect subsidization of do-
mestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition...
discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does."68
C. State Tax Incentives as State Tax Discrimination: Analysis
1. Giving the Court's Language Full Sway
What, then, does the case law teach us about the constitutionality
of state tax incentives under the Commerce Clause? A literalistic fo-
cus on key passages in the Court's opinions might suggest that "all
state inducement programs are likely to be unconstitutional." 69 After
all, it is the rare state tax incentive that results in "tax-neutral deci-
sions"70 made "solely on the basis of nontax criteria,"71 because the
very purpose of tax incentives is to use the tax system to encourage
favored forms of business enterprise. Of course, the tax incentives
struck down by the Court did not fail merely because they encouraged
certain forms of commercial activity. The problem was that the chal-
lenged tax measures were not "neutral" as to in-state and out-of-state
business activities. 72 But this refinement of the tax-neutrality princi-
ple to focus on where business activity occurs does not narrow its practi-
cal impact because almost every tax incentive is designed to induce
business activity only within the taxing state.
Consider state income taxes. Almost no state income tax incen-
tive-and there are hundreds of them across the country-meets the
Court's ostensible requirement of strict geographic neutrality. Ala-
bama, for example, provides an income tax credit for new investment,
but only if it occurs in Alabama.7 3 Alaska provides an income tax
credit for investment in gas-processing and mineral-development facil-
ities, but only if they are built in Alaska.74 Arizona provides an income
tax credit for taxpayers that increase research activities in Arizona.75
66 Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 379 (1976).
67 New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278.
68 Id. We consider the distinction between taxes and subsidies in detail infra parts II
and III.
69 Barrett, supra note 5, at 1049.
70 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977).
71 Id.
72 Cf Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 330 ("Prior to the 1968 amendment, the New
York transfer tax was neutral as to in-state and out-of-state sales.... Section 270-a upset this
equilibrium.").
73 ALA. CODE § 41-23-24(e) (1991).
74 ALAsKA STAT. § 43.20.042 (1990).
75 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-1168 (Supp. 1995).
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Arkansas provides an income tax credit for any motion picture pro-
duction company that spends more than a specified amount on film-
ing or producing a motion picture in Arkansas.76 California provides
an income tax credit for qualified equipment placed in service in Cali-
fornia.77 Colorado provides an income tax credit for investment in
qualifying property used in Colorado.78 Connecticut provides an in-
come tax credit for investment in certain new manufacturing facilities
in Connecticut. 79 Delaware provides an income tax credit for invest-
ment in qualified new business facilities in Delaware.80 Florida pro-
vides an income tax credit for investments in Florida export finance
corporations. 81 Georgia provides an income tax credit for business
enterprises that increase employment by five or more in designated
counties in Georgia.82 The list goes on and on.8 3
By providing a tax benefit for in-state investment that is not avail-
able for identical out-of-state investment, these incentives skew a tax-
payer's decision in favor of the former. Each such incentive-in
purpose and effect-"diverts new business into the State. '84 Put an-
other way, these incentives deprive out-of-state investments "of gener-
ally available beneficial tax treatment because they are made in ...
other States, and thus on [their] ... face appear[ ] to violate the car-
dinal requirement of nondiscrimination." 85
A similar analysis jeopardizes almost every sales and property tax
incentive designed to encourage economic development in the taxing
state. Yet most states offer just such incentives. Some states provide
sales and use tax exemptions (or credits or refunds) for sales of prop-
erty purchased for construction of new or improved facilities within
the state; others give favorable sales or use tax treatment to property
purchased in connection with the relocation or expansion of a busi-
ness in the state; still others provide sales and use tax exemptions for
property used in an enterprise zone in the state.8 6 Similarly, a
number of states provide property tax incentives for new or expanded
facilities in the state.8 7
76 ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-4-206 (Michie 1992).
77 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23649 (West Supp. 1996).
78 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 39-22-507.6 (1994).
79 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-217e (West 1993 & Supp. 1996).
80 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 2011(a) (1985).
81 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.188 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
82 GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-40(e) (Supp. 1996).
83 One could continue to proceed alphabetically through the states with similar exam-
ples. See [1] Multistate Corp. Inc. Tax Guide (CCH) 1 180 (1995); Nachbar et al., supra
note 1, passim.
84 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 406 (1984).
85 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988).
86 See generally [1] Multistate Sales Tax Guide (CCH) 1 975 (1994) (listing tax incen-
tives used by states to encourage new industry).
87 See [2 All States] State Tax Guide (CCH) 1 20-200 et seq. (1995).
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Given the near universality of state sales taxation in this coun-
try,8 8 and the true universality of local property taxation, sales or prop-
erty tax breaks for investment within the state or locality probably play
some role in many taxpayers' business location decisions. All other
things being equal, a rational taxpayer will allocate resources in a
manner that maximizes after-tax profits; hence the taxpayer will steer
investments toward those states that offer such tax benefits. Sales and
property tax incentives, like income tax incentives, are therefore sub-
ject to attack on the ground that they offend the "free trade" purposes
of the Commerce Clause89 by inducing resources to be allocated
among the states on the basis of tax criteria.
2. Alternative Readings of the Court's Opinions
a. The Justification for a More Restrained Approach
The astonishing implications of a literalistic reading of the
Court's pronouncements give us pause. Nonetheless the four cases in
which the Court has considered and struck down state tax incentives
make it clear that the Court's rhetoric cannot be dismissed as empty.
In its decisions, the Court revealed a willingness to subject a wide array
of fiscal measures to exacting scrutiny, striking down sales, income,
and transaction taxes. The Court likewise showed no mercy to any
form of tax break, invalidating rate reductions,9" exemptions, 91 and
credits.92 Moreover, the four opinions were written by Justices whose
attitudes toward the dormant commerce clause span the spectrum
from the highly protective "free trade" views of Justice White (Boston
Stock Exchange and Bacchus) to the more moderate views of Justice
Blackmun (Westinghouse) to the "unabashed hostility" ofJustice Scalia
(New Energy).93 Even more significantly, the Justices acted in these
cases with an extraordinary degree of consensus. There was not a sin-
gle dissent on the merits of the Commerce Clause issue in any of the
Court's four state tax incentive decisions.94 In short, these cases and
the doctrine they espouse must be taken seriously.
88 Forty-five states and the District of Columbia impose a retail sales tax. [2 All States]
State Tax Guide (CCH) 1 60-100 (1995).
89 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 403 (1984); Boston Stock Exch. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977).
90 Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. 318, discussed supra part I.B.1.
91 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984), discussed supra part I.B.2.
92 Westinghouse, 466 U.S. 388, discussed supra part I.B.3; New Energy Co. of Ind. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988), discussed supra part I.B.4.
93 See Walter Hellerstein, Justice Scalia and the Commerce Clause: Reflections of a State Tax
Lauyer, 12 CAnRozo L R-v. 1763, 1763 (1991).
94 Boston Stock Exchang 429 U.S. 318, Westinghouse, 466 U.S. 388, and New Energy, 486
U.S. 269, were unanimous decisions, and the three-member dissent in Bacchus, 468 U.S.
263, rested exclusively on the ground that the Twenty-first Amendment removed Com-
merce Clause restraints from state regulation and taxation of intoxicating liquors.
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With that fact in mind, we nevertheless believe that these opin-
ions can and should be read less expansively than their literal lan-
guage permits. Our view rests in part on an instinctive sense that
virtually all state tax incentives cannot really be unconstitutional. Such
incentives, after all, constitute long-standing, familiar, and central fea-
tures of every state's taxing system. Even more important, a somewhat
narrower interpretation of the Court's opinions is, in our judgment,
more consonant with accepted dormant commerce clause policy and
the core rationales of the incentive decisions themselves. We recog-
nize that one may question any effort to cabin the language of the
Court's opinions, given that the Court itself has never displayed con-
cern with their broad rationale. But because an unrestrained reading
of the Court's tax incentive opinions would cut a lethal swath across
state tax regimes, we believe, like others,95 that a serious effort to offer
a more moderate alternative is warranted.
There is another justification for heading toward a middle-
ground position: a number of the Justices themselves have indicated
that the Court's broadest pronouncements should not be read for all
they might be worth. Justice Stevens, for example, wrote the Court's
opinion in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,96 in which the Court inval-
idated a business development "tax-rebate"97 and broadly reaffirmed
Bacchus. Yet in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,98 Justice Stevens de-
clared that:
[Iun my judgment,... [the Commerce] Clause [does not] inhibit a
State's power to experiment with different methods of encouraging
local industry. Whether the encouragement takes the form of a
cash subsidy, a tax credit, or a special privilege intended to attract
investment capital, it should not be characterized as a "burden" on
commerce.
99
Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist-who has shown no reluctance to
join the Court in invalidating previously challenged tax incen-
tives' 00-has suggested that at least in some contexts "tax breaks" may
be treated like subsidies for purposes of the dormant Commerce
Clause.10' If Justices of the Court who have written and joined the
95 See Philip M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to State
Tax Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REY. 879, 928-37 (1986).
96 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
97 Id. at 2213.- The West Lynn Creanmery opinion is considered in detail infra part II.
98 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
99 1d. at 816 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
100 Indeed, ChiefJustice Rehnquist's sole dissent from the Court's tax incentive cases
was in Bacchus, where hejoinedJustice Stevens's opinion which did not dispute the Court's
Commerce Clause analysis but argued that the Commerce Clause had been displaced by
the Twenty-first Amendment. See supra note 94.
101 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 349-52 (1992) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Thomas may also oppose sweeping invalidation
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Court's key opinions in this field believe that those opinions permit at
least some varieties of business-incentive tax breaks, then we should
too. The more difficult question concerns what forms of tax relief con-
stitute permissible means of attracting and retaining local business
operations.
b. The In-State Favoritism/State-Coercion Rationale
In our judgment, two core principles, which we identified at the
outset of this discussion, 102 underlie the Court's state tax incentive de-
cisions and should guide their proper interpretation and future appli-
cation. First, the provision must favor in-state over out-of-state
activities; second, the provision must implicate the coercive power of
the state. If, but only if, both of these conditions are met, courts
should declare the tax incentive unconstitutional.
All four of the Court's tax incentive decisions fall comfortably
within this analytical framework. First, in each of the four cases, the
State favored in-state over out-of-state activities: in-state over out-of-
state sales in Boston Stock Exchange in-state over out-of-state production
in Bacchus and New Energy; and in-state over out-of-state exportation in
Westinghouse. Second, in each of the four cases, the coercive power of
the State gave the tax incentive its bite. In Boston Stock Exchange, tax-
payers would pay higher stock transfer taxes to the taxing state unless
they engaged in in-state sales. In Bacchus and New Energy, taxpayers
would pay higher liquor wholesaling or motor fuel taxes to the taxing
state unless they sold products manufactured locally. In Westinghouse,
taxpayers would pay higher income taxes to the taxing state unless
their DISCs shipped their exports from within its borders.
That the result of each of these cases is the same under our in-
state-favoritism/state-coercion approach reveals that it provides no
panacea for state taxing authorities. Indeed, many tax incentives will
fail to survive scrutiny under this reading of the Court's tax incentive
of business tax incentives, given their openly declared skepticism regarding the dormant
Commerce Clause and their avowed intention to honor only the strict holdings of the
Court's past Commerce Clause decisions. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson
Lines, Inc., 115 S. CL 1331, 1346 (1995) (ScaliaJ., concurring in thejudgment) (asserting
that facial neutrality is the most the Court can demand of a state to establish compliance
with the dormant commerce clause (citing Amerada Hess Corp. v. NewJersey Dep't of the
Treasury, 490 U.S. 66, 80 (1989) (Scalia,J., concurring); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washing-
ton State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor, who joined the Court's opinions in Westinghouse and
New Energy, and dissented in Bacchus only on Twenty-first Amendment grounds, see supra
note 94, also appears to be sympathetic to at least some state tax incentives. See Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 72 n.1 (1982) (opinion concurring in thejudgment) ("a State might
enact a tax credit for citizens who contribute to the State's ecology by building alternative
fuel sources or establishing recycling plants") (discussing legitimate state purposes under
Equal Protection Clause).
102 See supra part I4
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decisions.1-3. At. least-one significant category of tax incentives, how-
ever, should escape invalidation: those tax incentives framed not as
exemptions from or reductions of existing state tax liability but rather
as exemptions from or reductions of additional state tax liability to
which the taxpayer would be subjected only if the taxpayer were to
engage in the targeted activity in the state. In our judgment, such
incentives neither favor in-state over out-of-state investment (except in
a sense that should be constitutionally irrelevant) nor do they rely on
the coercive power of the state to compel a choice favoring in-state
investment.
A real property tax exemption for new construction in a state, for
example, favors in-state over out-of-state investment only if one takes
account of the taxing regimes of other states and assumes that a tax
would be due if the property were constructed in such other state.
But the Court generally has refused to consider other states' taxing
regimes in determining the constitutionality of a state's taxing stat-
utes. As the Court has explained, "[t]he immunities implicit in the
Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power of a State can
hardly be made to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on the
shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States at a
particular moment.'u0 4 If a state's taxing statute must stand or fall on
its own terms, a real property tax exemption for new construction in a
state would pass muster because no additional tax liability could be
presumed to result from new construction outside the state. By con-
trast, each of the tax measures at issue in the Court's tax incentive
cases resulted in differential tax liability that was created entirely by
the state's own taxing regime, depending on whether the taxpayer en-
gaged in in-state or out-of-state activities.
Moreover, insofar as the Court has looked to other states' taxing
regimes to determine their constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause, it has done so only to assure that the tax is "internally consis-
tent." Under the Court's internal consistency doctrine, 10 5 a tax must
not impose a greater burden on interstate commerce than on intra-
state commerce on the assumption that the levy is imposed by every
state.10 6 As the Court has explained, "[t]his test asks nothing about
103 We consider more systematically in part I.D infra what particular taxes will and will
not survive scrutiny under this mode of analysis.
104 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467
U.S. 638, 644-45 (1984) (asserting that the validity of West Virginia's tax laws cannot be
made to depend on the laws of the other 49 states).
105 See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1338 (1995)
(noting that the internal consistency test has been used for over a decade to assess threats
of malapportionment).
106 See generally Walter Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections on an
Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 138 (1988).
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the degree of economic reality reflected by the tax, but simply looks to
the structure of the tax at issue to see whether its identical application
by every State in the Union would place interstate commerce at a dis-
advantage as compared with commerce intrastate."10 7 A property tax
exemption for new construction in a state would pass the internal con-
sistency test because one would have to assume that every other state
offered the same exemption. Under this assumption, every new con-
struction, wherever undertaken, would result in precisely the same
property tax consequence: it would not be taxed at all.
Beyond the lack of constitutionally significant favoritism for local
over interstate commerce, a property tax exemption for new construc-
tion does not implicate the coercive power of the state, at least not in
a way that can fairly be characterized as "the State's regulation of in-
terstate commerce."108 By adopting such an exemption, the state is
saying, in effect: "Come to our state and we will not saddle you with
any additional property tax burdens. Moreover, should you choose
not to accept our invitation, nothing will happen to your tax bill-at
least nothing that depends on our taxing regime."
The state's posture in such circumstances stands in contrast to its
posture in the tax incentive cases the Court has confronted in the
past. In each of those cases the state was saying, in effect:
' You are already subject to our taxing power because you engage in
taxable activity in this state. If you would like to reduce your tax
burdens, you may do so by directing additional business activity into
this state. Should you decline our invitation, we will continue to
exert our taxing power over you as before, and your tax bill might
even go up."10 9
These two messages are very different. The latter, but not the
former, reflects a use of the taxing power to coerce in-state business
activity.
We recognize that our suggested reading of the Court's tax incen-
tive decisions is not above criticism. Apart from any doubts one may
have with regard to finding limiting principles in the Court's tax in-
centive opinions," 0 one may question whether the limiting principles
we have suggested are intellectually defensible. Two major criticisms
come to mind. First, one can argue that there is no basis in the
Court's decisions for distinguishing tax incentives involving invitations
to engage in additional in-state activity from tax incentives that utilize
"existing" tax liability to coerce in-state activity. In our opinion, how-
ever, the Court's own language supports the coercion-based analysis
107 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1338 (1995).
108 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
109 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
110 See supra part I.C.2.a.
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we have offered. The Court has declared that states may "structur[e]
their tax systems to encourage the growth and development of intra-
state commerce and industry.""' What a state may not do, by con-
trast, is to "us[e] its power to tax an in-state operation as a means of
'requiring [other] business operations to be performed in the home
State.' 1112 Our coercion-centered analysis, we believe, accommodates
both of the high Court's directives.
Second, one might say that there is no functional difference be-
tween the "carrot" of offering relief from additional tax liability attrib-
utable to activity in which the state is inviting the taxpayer to engage,
and the "stick" of threatening maximization of existing tax liability
attributable to activity in which the taxpayer already is engaged. For
example, if one's ex ante assumption is that the taxpayer has engaged
in none of the activity that gives rise to tax liability in cases like Boston
Stock Exchange, Bacchus, Westinghouse, or New Energy, the analysis we sug-
gested above ought to dictate a different result in those cases. For
example, if the taxpayer in Boston Stock Exchange was contemplating
the sale of stock with transfer through a non-New York agent, or if the
taxpayers in Bacchus and New Energy had never made any taxable
wholesale liquor sales in Hawaii or taxable motor fuel sales in Ohio, or
if the taxpayer in Westinghouse had not previously engaged in income-
producing activity in New York, then one could articulate the state's
appeal to the taxpayers in those cases in the following terms:
"Come to our state and we will not saddle you with any additional
tax burdens or at least not with the same tax burdens that we would
ordinarily impose upon taxpayers engaging in such activity. More-
over, should you refuse our invitation, nothing will happen to your
tax bill-at least nothing that depends on our taxing regime."
This, of course, is the state position that we characterize as not "coerc-
ing" in-state activity, because the taxpayer is not already subject to the
state's tax power. Thus, our argument may prove too much by vindi-
cating (at least in substantial part) the very taxing regimes the Court
struck down in its tax incentive decisions.
Put another way, the distinction between selectively forgiving
taxes otherwise due if a taxpayer engages in in-state activity and dis-
claiming the right to impose any taxes on a "virgin" tax base a state is
seeking to attract may be a distinction that turns entirely on whether a
particular taxpayer has previously engaged in some taxable activity in
the state. This may be too thin a distinction to carry the constitutional
weight we are asking it to bear.
11 Boston Stock Exch. v State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977).
112 Id. (emphasis added) (brackets in original) (citation omitted).
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This criticism has some merit, and should and does enter into the
analysis of the constitutionality of particular tax incentives.113 How-
ever, we reject it as a blanket objection to our approach because it
ignores and distorts the real-world context in which tax incentives op-
erate and, therefore, must be evaluated.'1 4 It is theoretically possible
that a generally coercive tax incentive may, as to a particular taxpayer,
be noncoercive. Conversely, a generally noncoercive tax incentive
may, as to a particular taxpayer, be coercive. But these exceptions
should not be permitted to swallow the rule, which ought to reflect
the expected impact of the tax incentive on most taxpayers.
Consider Bacchus. It is theoretically possible that some liquor
wholesalers, with no previous sales in Hawaii, were induced by the ex-
emption for locally-produced liquor to enter the Hawaii market to
make exempt liquor sales. If that were the principal effect of the stat-
ute, it might not offend our proposed constitutional standard." 5 It
seems much more likely, however, that the exemption affected few, if
any, liquor wholesalers in this fashion. And obviously no liquor whole-
salers took any account of the exemption to the extent they estab-
lished operations in the state prior to the exemption's adoption.
Once there, however, liquor wholesalers were subject to tax and were
also "arm-twisted" by the taxing scheme to channel their sales in the
direction of locally-manufactured products. Consequently, we believe
that the challenged Hawaii statute involved, in essence, an exemption
from an existing tax liability.
By way of contrast, consider a sales tax exemption for equipment
purchased in connection with the construction of a new in-state facil-
ity. It is theoretically true that a buyer potentially subject to a sales tax
could purchase a large item of equipment and only then feel "co-
erced" by the availability of a tax exemption to build a new factory to
house the equipment in the would-be taxing state. If that were the
principal effect of the statute, it would offend our proposed constitu-
tional standard. But in the real world such a sequence of events is
farfetched. Usually, the buyer will decide before it buys its equipment
where the facility will be located and, hence, where the equipment will
be used. Consequently, whatever influence the exemption exerts is
almost certain to be felt before, rather than after, sales tax liability
113 See infra part I.D.
114 It is a central tenet of the Court's contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence
that the validity of state taxes should be determined on the basis of their practical eco-
nomic impact. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
115 Even under this unlikely assumption, however, the exemption in Bacchus would fail
to pass muster if the condition of qualifying for the exemption-selling property produced
in the state-were considered to be independent of the location or use of the property
with respect to which the exemption was granted. See infra notes 206-15 and accompanying
text.
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attaches. In these circumstances, it makes no sense to characterize
the tax exemption as coercive; instead, as we have suggested, the state
simply offers the prospective buyer/developer an invitation to do busi-
ness in the state, while threatening it with no adverse effects if it
chooses not to do so.116
In short, the determination as to whether a tax incentive is coer-
cive should depend on its "practical or economic effect" 117 and on
" 'economic realities.' "118 Basing the analysis on the remote possibil-
ity that a generally coercive tax incentive may be noncoercive in a few
instances or that a generally noncoercive tax incentive may be coer-
cive on occasion would allow the tail to wag the dog. It would also
defeat the notion that "commerce among the States is not a technical
legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of
business."" 9
In the end, we remain convinced that there is something to the
distinction we have delineated here. 2 0 Perhaps this distinction is best
captured by focusing on the nature of the constitutional injury alleged
116 With respect to the real-world impact of sales taxes, it also is worth noting that in
light of the virtually universal exemption from sales taxation of property purchased in one
state for out-of-state use, sales or use tax liability ordinarily attaches, if at all, only in the
state in which the property is ultimately used. 2JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HEL.ER-
STEIN, STATE TAXATION 1 18.02[1] (1992); see infra text accompanying notes 203-05. In
other words, there is ordinarily no tax cost at all in State A associated with buying property
in State A for use in State B; in such circumstances, State A will impose no sales tax, but
State B will impose a use tax. See generally HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTIN, supra, 1 16.01 (dis-
cussing use taxes generally).
117 Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 262 (1989).
118 American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 295 (1987) (quoting
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
119 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905).
120 After much reflection, we have identified only one plausible way in which our gov-
erning "coercion" principle might be fruitfully refined. Under this refined approach, even
ostensibly coercive conditions tied to in-state activities would be sustainable if they concern
promotion of "aesthetics," the remediation of externalities, or other essentially non-com-
mercial government objectives. See Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemp-
tion to the Dormant Commerce Clause 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 469-70 (1989). It might be said
that such forms of tax relief do not involve "business incentives" at all so that the rules
proposed here as to business incentives simply have no application.
In a related dormant commerce clause context, one of the authors has suggested that
the pursuit of such noncommercial purposes may shield otherwise impermissible condi-
tions placed on receipt of a government benefit from constitutional challenges. See id.; see
also United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31 (1995) (a developing commercial/
noncommercial distinction in the "affirmative" Commerce Clause context). Under this
approach an income tax credit for installing pollution abatement equipment within the
state probably would be permissible. But-to pose a more difficult case-what about con-
ditioning an income tax exemption on expanding operations in a targeted depressed area
to reduce not only localized unemployment, but also visual blight and burgeoning crime?
Cf. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-53 (1986) (refusing to apply
strict First Amendment content-discrimination rule where an adult-movie theater restric-
tion is designed to address "secondary effects" of such activity, including deterioration of
the "quality of urban life").
CORNELL LAW REVEEW
in the two different contexts. In the situation addressed by the Court
in its tax incentive decisions, the alleged injury is the greater tax that
the taxpayer will pay in the taxing state if, instead of engaging in the
targeted activity within the state, it conducts that activity in other
states. When, on the other hand, there is no preexisting tax base that
the state is offering to reduce (but rather only a potential tax base that
the state proposes to tax at lower than ordinary rates or not at all), the
alleged injury is the greater tax the taxpayer will have to pay in other
states based on the presumed existence of a tax on the targeted activity
in such states. We know of no principle, however, that requires
remediation of this sort of "injury" under the dormant commerce
clause.' 2'
The authors are firmly of the view that any condition on tax relief driven by the aim of
generally increasing in-state jobs, or (worse yet) generally increasing in-state business activ-
ity, would not be shielded from attack by this limiting principle; otherwise the suggested
"exception" would swallow our controlling rule. Beyond saying this much, we believe that
consideration and elaboration of this principle is properly deferred to forums other than
this already lengthy Article.
121 This point is reinforced by considerations of causation and standing. The taxpayer
who challenges a tax incentive on the ground that its choice to engage in activity outside
the incentive-granting state has a tax cost (in the form of foregone reduction of tax liabil-
ity) within that state is complaining of an identifiable injury caused by the state's taxing
regime. The taxpayer is therefore stating a claim that falls within familiar boundaries-the
defendant has caused it injury by denying it a right: the alleged right to a tax benefit for
engaging in certain activity irrespective of the situs of such activity. By contrast, the tax-
payer who challenges a tax incentive on the ground that its choice to engage in activity
outside the incentive-granting state has a tax cost based on the assumption that it will pay
taxes in other states is not complaining of an identifiable injury caused by the incentive-
granting state's tax regime. Rather, the taxpayer is complaining of an injury allegedly
caused by an actor other than the incentive-granting state. Consequently, the taxpayer's
suit is subject to the objection that standing to sue for constitutional purposes exists only if
the injury alleged "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not
injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court."
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976); see also Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 736 (1981). Cf. Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 95, at 937.
This analysis explains why a challenge to a state tax incentive that does not involve a
claim of right to a reduction of existing tax liability is unlikely to be successful. Consider a
taxpayer that wishes to challenge a State A real property tax exemption for new construc-
tion in State A. Assume that the taxpayer has a preexisting taxable facility in State A.
Further assume that the taxpayer has just constructed a new, taxable facility in State B,
which would have qualified for the exemption if constructed in State A. Because State A
has not offered anyone a reduction in existing property taxes for constructing a new facility
in State A, a court is unlikely to find that the taxpayer has stated a cause of action against
State A under the Commerce Clause based on the fact that, prior to State A's offering of
the tax exemption, the taxpayer engaged in taxable activity in State A. Moreover, the tax-
payer's State A tax liability clearly was unaffected by the fact that it constructed a facility in
State B. Indeed, insofar as there is any substance to the taxpayer's complaint that State A
has treated it unfairly vis-1-vis other State A taxpayers who have constructed new in-state
facilities, the claim would appear to implicate equal protection rather than Commerce




For all of these reasons, the line between "coercive" and "nonco-
ercive" tax incentives is meaningful and comports with longstanding
principles of the Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. At
the least, in our opinion, analysis of tax incentives built on the coer-
cive/non-coercive distinction makes far more sense than a free-wheel-
ing doctrine based on only the vague admonition that a state may not
"foreclose[ ] tax-neutral decisions."' 22
c. The Penalizing-Activity-in-Other-States Rationale
Our state-coercion principle does not provide the only way to
limit the scope of the Court's state tax incentive decisions. Motivated
by the same concern we have voiced-that an unrestricted reading of
the tax incentive decisions would have a devastating impact on the
existing pattern of state tax incentives-two observers have suggested
another way to confine the Court's holdings. 123 In their view, the
Court's opinions comport with the principle that "a state tax incentive
that focuses exclusively on a taxpayer's in-state activities does not have
the sort of negative impact on interstate commerce with which the
[C]ommerce [Cllause is concerned." 124 From this perspective, "the
key to finding a tax incentive unconstitutionally discriminatory ap-
pears to be a reliance by the state tax provision on both a taxpayer's
in-state and out-of-state activities in determining the taxpayer's effec-
tive tax rate."125 Thus, the critical inquiry is whether the incentive
creates "penalties for out-of-state activities."1 26
Under this approach, the decision in Boston Stock Exchange rests
on the fact that the tax incentive "tied the effective rate of tax not only
to the New York activity with which the state identified the taxable
moment, but also to whether another activity (i.e., sale on an ex-
change) took place in New York or in another state."127 Similarly,
Westinghouse is viewed as a case in which the unconstitutional evil was
not showing favoritism toward in-state investment, but rather assessing
"penalties for out-of-state activities."' 28 Accordingly, it may be argued
that "[t]here is no indication . . . that these cases require a state to
offer incentives regardless of the state in which the desired activities
occur; the cases indicate only that the effective tax rates must not be
tied to out-of-state activities."' 29
122 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977).
123 Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 95, at 928, 931-32, 935.
124 Id. at 928-29.
125 Id. at 929.
126 Id. at 936.
127 Id at 930.
128 Id. at 936.
129 Id at 933.
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Although this penalty analysis provides a basis for limiting the
scope of the Court's tax incentive decisions, we believe that, as a
mechanism for distinguishing constitutional from unconstitutional
tax incentives, it is not as useful as the coercion-based analysis we have
proposed. 130 First, the penalty analysis fails to draw a meaningful line
between a tax incentive that penalizes out-of-state activity and one that
merely rewards in-state activity. For example, it is unclear why Boston
Stock Exchange should be placed in the former category rather than the
latter. New York, after all, was not trying to penalize those who uti-
lized out-of-state brokers, but only to reward those who used in-state
brokers. In these circumstances, it seems fair to say that New York's
"state tax incentive .. focuse[d] exclusively on a taxpayer's in-state
activities."131
Second, the Court already has declared in no uncertain terms
that the Commerce Clause brooks no distinction between laws that
"benefit" in-state activity and laws that "burden" out-of-state activity.' 32
To us, this principle leaves no room for a rule that tries to distinguish
instead between "rewards" and "penalties."
Third, and most significantly, the penalty-based analysis falters
because it focuses on only one of the two core principles underlying
dormant commerce clause restraints on discriminatory state taxa-
tion-whether the tax incentive favors in-state over out-of-state activi-
ties. It does not address the other critical aspect of the Court's
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence-whether the incentive is
effectuated by the coercive power of the state. In this respect, the
proposed "penalty" analysis would fail to strike down tax incentives
that, in ourjudgment, should be invalidated. For example, the propo-
nents of the penalty-based analysis suggest that the following illustra-
tion of a tax incentive would pass constitutional muster:
[I]f an out-of-state business investing one million dollars in a state is
entitled to the same investment .credit that an in-state business
would receive if it likewise decided to invest one million dollars in
the state, and no reduction in the credit results from out-of-state
investment, then the credit does not have a negative discriminatory
impact on protected commerce.' 33
We disagree. If the taxpayer is subject to state income tax (and
thus within the coercive power of the state), and the opportunity to
reduce that income tax is conditioned on making an in-state invest-
ment, then it makes no difference that an in-state business would be
treated in the same way or that the taxpayer's credit is not reduced by
13O See supra part I.C.2.b.
131 Tatarowicz v. Mims-Velarde, supra note 95, at 928-29.
132 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1984).
133 Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 95, at 936.
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out-of-state investment (as it was in Westinghouse). The critical point is
that the state is using its coercive taxing power to skew an existing tax-
payer's investment decision: the state will reduce the taxpayer's in-
come tax liability only if it makes an in-state investment.
The fact that the in-state taxpayer's decision would be as skewed
as the out-of-stater's decision does not render the incentive constitu-
tional. The Commerce Clause precludes discrimination against inter-
state commerce, not just discrimination against out-of-state
taxpayers.' 34 Moreover, it makes no difference that there may be no
reduction in the credit should the taxpayer make an out-of-state in-
vestment. Although the Court in Westinghouse indicated that the
"most pernicious effect of the credit scheme" 13 5 was that the credit
declined as out-of-state activity increased, 36 this was plainly not the
only effect of the credit that the Court found objectionable. The clear
thrust of the opinion was that any provision that reduces the tax-
payer's "effective [in-state] tax rate"' 37 as the taxpayer engages in
more in-state activity violates the Commerce Clause. 138
In short, despite our sympathy with efforts to limit the scope of
the Court's state tax incentive decisions, we do not believe that either
the decisions themselves, or the underlying purposes of the Com-
merce Clause, fairly support the proposition that "a state tax incentive
that focuses exclusively on a taxpayer's in-state activities does not have
the sort of negative impact on interstate commerce with which the
[C]ommerce [C]lause is concerned."'3 9
134 Indeed, in Boston Stock Exchang4 the tax incentive discriminated in favor of nonresi-
dent taxpayers as compared to similarly situated resident taxpayers. 429 U.S. 318, 324-28
(1977). It should be noted, however, that the incentive favored only those nonresidents
that engaged in specified in-state activity. Id.
135 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 401 n.9 (1984).
136 See id. at 400-01.
'37 Id. at 401 n.9.
138 Id. at 403-07.
139 Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 95, at 928-29.
Notably, the reported state judicial and administrative decisions involving challenges
to provisions that may be characterized as state tax incentives take a view of the Court's
state tax incentive decisions that is much more like our coercion-based approach than the
more restrictive penalty-based approach. See Sprint Communications Co. v. Kelly, 642 A.2d
106, 113-18 (D.C.) (property tax exemption for personal property used by a telecommuni-
cations company to produce taxable gross receipts and a sales tax exemption for property
purchased by a telecommunications company for use in producing services subject to gross
receipts tax discriminates against interstate commerce), cert. denied, 115 S. C. 294 (1994);
Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco v. McKesson Corp., 524 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1988)
(tax preference for alcoholic beverages made from citrus fruits and other agricultural
products grown primarily, though not exclusively, within the state discriminates against
interstate commerce), rev'd on other grounds, 496 U.S. 18 (1990); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1984) (corporate income tax credit for fuel
taxes limited to Florida-based air carriers discriminates against interstate commerce), ap-
peal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Russell Stewart Oil Co. v. Department of Revenue, 529
N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 1988) (tax preference for gasohol made from products used by almost all
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
D. State Tax Incentives as State Tax Discrimination:
Specific Implications
The question remains as to how the existing pattern of state and
local tax incentives fares under the modes of analysis we have identi-
fied above. The answer depends on the type of tax incentive at issue
and the particular analytical construct that a court employs to evaluate
it. In this Section, we assess the constitutionality of various types of
state tax incentives under both our and others' proposed frameworks
for constitutional analysis.
in-state producers but few out-of-state producers discriminates against interstate com-
merce); Comptroller of the Treasury v. Armco, Inc., 521 A.2d 785 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1987) (exemption from state corporate income tax for DISC dividends which conditioned
at least 50% of the net taxable income of the DISC as being subject to taxation in the state
discriminates against interstate commerce); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State ex reL Al-
len, 315 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1982) (tax reduction for gasohol produced in state discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce); Northwest Aerospace Training Corp. v. Commissioner
of Revenue, [2 Minn.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 202-603 (Minn. T.C. Apr. 4, 1995) (exemp-
tion for receipts from leases of flight equipment if lessees annually made three or more
flights into or out of the state discriminates against interstate commerce); Giant Indus.
Ariz., Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 796 P.2d 1138 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (gasoline
excise tax deduction for ethanol-blended gasoline manufactured exclusively within the
state discriminates against interstate commerce); AT&T v. New York State Dep't of Taxa-
tion and Fin., 637 N.E.2d 257 (N.Y. 1994) (deduction for access charges paid by long-
distance telephone companies to local telephone companies, which is reduced only for
interstate long-distance companies by their state apportionment percentage, discriminates
against interstate commerce); RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. City of NewYork Dep't of Fin.,
643 N.Y.S.2d 865 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (accelerated depreciation deduction limited to in-
state property discriminates against interstate commerce); Burlington Northern, Inc. v.
City of Superior, 388 N.W.2d 916 (Wis. 1986) (exemption from occupation tax on iron ore
dock operators, when iron ore is taxed under occupation tax on local mineral producers,
discriminates against interstate commerce), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987); Wisconsin
Dep't of Revenue v. NCR Corp., [1990-93 Transfer Binder Wis.] St. Tax Rptr. (CCH)
203-412 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane City Apr. 20, 1993) (deduction for dividends received from
subsidiaries limited to subsidiaries more than 50% of whose income was taxable by the
state discriminates against interstate commerce); Beatrice Cheese, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't
of Revenue, [1990-93 Transfer Binder Wis.] St. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 203-396 (Wis. Tax App.
Comm'n Feb. 24, 1993) (accelerated depreciation deduction limited to in-state property
discriminates against interstate commerce); cf. Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders &
Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, 901 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. La. 1995) (property tax exemption
for new manufacturing establishments, limited to taxpayers maintaining 80% in-state work
force and using 80% in-state materials, discriminates against interstate commerce). But see
Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State, 690 P.2d 177 (Colo. 1984) (gasoline tax reduction for
certain gasohol that benefitted only in-state producers is a permissible incentive for devel-
opment of fuel-grade alcohol industry) (post-Bacchus); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Department of
Treasury, 488 N.W.2d 182 (Mich.) (deduction for capital acquisitions, which was limited by
percentage of taxpayer's property and payroll in the state, is a legitimate incentive for
encouragement of in-state business), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1014 (1992); Williams Cos. v.
Director of Revenue, 799 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1990) (restricting right to file consolidated state
tax return to affiliated groups of corporations that derive more than 50% of their income
from sources within the state does not discriminate against interstate commerce), cert. de-
nied, 501 U.S. 1260 (1991). The Sprint case is discussed infra note 193; the Northwest Aero-
space case is discussed infra note 215; the AT&T case is discussed infra note 153; and the
Beatrice case is discussed infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
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1. Income Tax Incentives
a. Credits
The most common form of state tax incentive in this country is
the income tax credit. As the litany of income tax credits described
above indicates, 40 virtually all such credits tie the tax benefit offered
by the state to specific in-state activity. The in-state activity may consist
of investing in in-state property, hiring in-state employees, or ex-
panding in-state facilities. Accordingly, under the broadest reading of
the Court's state tax incentive decisions, these credits cannot survive
scrutiny because they fail the test of strict "tax neutrality" articulated
by the Court in Boston Stock Exchange and its progeny.141
State income tax credits similarly fail to pass muster under the
narrower reading of the Court's tax incentive decisions that we have
embraced. Such credits violate the two principles that we have identi-
fied as central to the Commerce Clause analysis of the validity of state
tax incentives: First, they favor in-state over out-of-state activity be-
cause income tax credits are almost invariably confined to the former.
Second, they implicate the coercive power of the state, because the
taxpayer can reduce its state tax bill only by engaging in in-state
activity.142
140 See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
141 See supra part I.B; Joel Michael, The Constitutionality of Minnesota's Business Tax Cred-
its AfterWestinghouse Electric Corp., 4J. ST. TAX'N 163, 170-79 (1985); W. Eugene Seago &
Wayne M. Schell, Tax Credits and the Commerce Clause After Westinghouse Electric Corpora-
tion, 3J. ST. TAx'N 101, 111-12 (1984); cf Woodrow H. Berry, Does the Virginia Coal Tax
Credit Violate the Commerce Clause, 13 J. ST. TAx'N 1 (Spring 1995) (gross receipts tax
credit).
Many state tax credits are in fact limited to qualifying activities that take place in par-
ticular locations within a state (e.g., enterprise zones). It might be argued that such credits
do not discriminate against interstate commerce because they deny tax benefits to in-state
as well as out-of-state activity that is not conducted within the specified in-state location.
This argument, however, cannot be maintained in light of cases holding that discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce is not rendered constitutionally acceptable because some
intrastate commerce is subject to the same discrimination visited upon interstate com-
merce. See C &A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1682 (1994) (hold-
ing that a town ordinance requiring all solid waste from the town be processed at the town
transfer station unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce); Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 n.4 (1951) (holding that an ordinance requiring
all milk sold in the city be pasteurized within five miles of the city unconstitutionally dis-
criminates against interstate commerce); cf United Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v.
Mayor and Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222-23 (1984) (remanding case concerning
an ordinance requiring contractors and subcontractors working on city projects to have a
minimum of 40% of their workers be city residents to determine if the ordinance violates
Privileges and Immunities Clause).
As the Court declared in Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981), "[w]e need
not know how unequal the [t]ax is before concluding that it unconstitutionally
discriminates."
142 We note one qualification-albeit a narrow one-of the rule we have set forth in
the text. The presence of discrimination, as we have defined it, triggers a "virtually per se
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The constitutionality of the vast majority of income tax credits in
this country cannot be persuasively defended unless one adopts the
view that tax incentives for in-state activity are constitutional so long as
they do not penalize out-of-state activity143 by raising the in-state tax
bill when local activity remains constant but out-of-state activity in-
creases. 144 Because most income tax credits merely reward in-state ac-
tivity by reducing the taxpayer's income tax bill and do not impose a
tax cost on out-of-state activity (aside from the opportunity cost of
foregoing a reduction in in-state income tax liability), most income
tax credits will survive scrutiny under the penalty-based approach. For
the reasons advanced above, however, we do not believe that such a
limited conception of Commerce Clause restraints on state tax incen-
tives is warranted. 145 In particular, we do not see how credits for in-
state activities can pass muster when the Court in Boston Stock Exchange
struck down a tax precisely because it afforded a tax reduction for
conducting business activity in the state.146
b. Deductions
Income tax deductions limited (or granted on more favorable
terms) to in-state activities are functionally indistinguishable from in-
come tax credits confined to in-state activities. 147 They therefore
stand or fall according to the analysis set forth above.
A controversy in Wisconsin over income tax deductions restricted
to in-state property is illustrative. In keeping with its general conform-
ity to the Internal Revenue Code in determining taxable income, Wis-
consin adopted the federal depreciation rules. In particular, the
Wisconsin statutes permitted depreciation deductions for property lo-
cated in Wisconsin to be taken according to the favorable federal Ac-
rule of invalidity." Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345,
1351 (1994) (emphasis on "virtually" added); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt,
504 U.S. 334, 344 n.6 (1992). It is thus open to states to argue that a given tax incentive is
permissible, even though discriminatory, because it offers the only effectively available
means of advancing a specific and compelling local interest of government. See Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138, 146 (1986); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,
274, 278-80 (1988). One could argue, for example, that a very limited and carefully tai-
lored income tax credit designed to address extremely severe unemployment in a specifi-
cally targeted locale might meet this standard. See ScMV-KE Er AL., supra note 6, at 45
("[T] ax subsidies that result in increased employment in areas of relatively high unemploy-
ment may actually increase total local or national welfare."). In our view, however, this
strict scrutiny test will be met only in unusual cases.
143 See supra part I.C.2.c.
144 As was the case in Westinghouse See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
146 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 330-31 (1977).
147 We recognize, of course, that for purposes other than those under consideration
here, there may be significant differences between deductions and credits (e.g., their im-
pact on the progressivity of a tax).
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celerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) 1 4 8 applicable to business-
investment property. For the tax years in question, however, acceler-
ated depreciation was not available for property located outside Wis-
consin; instead, such property had to be depreciated according to the
slower (and, therefore, less favorable) methods provided by an earlier
version of the federal law.' 49
The limitation of ACRS depreciation to in-state property might
well be viewed as designed "to encourage the growth and develop-
ment of intrastate commerce and industry."150 Relying on Boston Stock
Exchange and Westinghouse, however, the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Com-
mission concluded that providing lower effective income tax rates to
taxpayers who made in-state rather than out-of-state investments vio-
lated the Commerce Clause prohibition against discriminatory taxa-
tion.' 5 ' The Commission found a "clear parallel"' 52  to the
discrimination the Court condemned in Westinghouse because "the
Wisconsin depreciation deduction statutes at issue are obviously
'designed to have discriminatory economic effects' on corporations
locating depreciable property outside the state by taxing such corpo-
rations more heavily than those locating such property in the state." 53
148 I.R.C. § 168 (1994).
149 I.R-C. § 167 (1994).
150 Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 336.
151 Beatrice Cheese, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, [1990-93 Transfer Binder
Wis.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 203-396 (Wis. Tax App. Comm'n Feb. 24, 1993).
152 Id. at 15,706.
153 I1. (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 88, 406-07 (1984)). Accord,
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. City of New York Dep't of Fin., 643 N.Y.S.2d 865 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1995). Following a similar logic, the court in AT&T v. New York State Dep't of Tax'n
and Fin., 637 N.E.2d 257 (N.Y. 1994), struck down New York's requirement that long-
distance telephone companies apportion the deduction from their taxable gross receipts
for access charges paid to local telephone companies in the same manner that they appor-
tion their gross receipts for New York tax purposes. Under the state scheme, long-distance
carriers that were unable to account directly for their New York revenues were required to
apportion their gross receipts based upon the ratio of their New York property to their
total property. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text for a description of state
income tax apportionment formulas. As a consequence, an interstate long-distance carrier
which owned property both inside and outside of New York would have received only a
proportionate deduction for access charges paid to local telephone companies in the state.
In contrast, local long-distance carriers (providing phone service, say, between New York
City and Albany) would have received a deduction for 100 percent of their access charges.
The court observed that "the statute has the practical and real effect of treating differently
long-distance carriers similarly situated in all respects except for the percentage of their
property located within New York State," AT&T, 637 N.E.2d at 259, and that it "plainly
creates a direct commercial advantage to intrastate long-distance carriers." Id. If New York
had permitted long-distance carriers to deduct all access charges, regardless of where in-
curred, it could have required the taxpayer to apportion the deduction to NewYork,just as
the base was apportioned to NewYork. The vice in the statute was that the only deduction
allowed was for in-state access charges. By reducing the deduction available to interstate
carriers, the state effectively created a discriminatory tax incentive. Indeed, in this respect
the case had the "most pernicious effect" of a state tax incentive identified in Westinghouse,
466 U.S. at 401 n.9, because it penalized out-of-state activity: as a carrier expanded its
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The favorable depreciation deduction for investment in Wiscon-
sin property would likewise fail to pass muster under the more fo-
cused reading of the Court's state tax incentive decisions that we have
delineated above. The Wisconsin depreciation deduction violated
both guiding principles we believe should govern Commerce Clause
analysis of the validity of state tax incentives. First, it favored in-state
over out-of-state activity. Second, it implicated the coercive power of
the state, because the taxpayer could obtain the maximum reduction
in its preexisting Wisconsin tax bill only by engaging in in-state
activity.
The Wisconsin depreciation scheme would pass muster only if
one embraced the view that, so long as state tax incentives for in-state
activity do not penalize out-of-state activity, they are constitutionally
acceptable.154 The Wisconsin depreciation scheme passes this test be-
cause a taxpayer's Wisconsin tax does not increase as a result of its
investment in out-of-state property.
c. Apportionment Formulas
There is one category of income tax incentives that appears to
enjoy smooth sailing under the Court's precedents, although it is not
obvious why this should be so. 155 Most states employ a three-factor
formula based on property, payroll, and sales to apportion income
among the states for tax purposes.1 56 As originally conceived, the
three-factor formula gave equal weight to each of these factors.'5 7
Under this mode of apportionment, a taxpayer's income is attributed
to the state by a percentage determined by averaging the ratios of the
taxpayer's property, payroll, and sales within the state to its property,
payroll, and sales everywhere. 158 In recent years, however, there has
been a decided trend toward adoption of apportionment formulas
that give additional significance to the sales factor, often by doubling
investment in property outside New York-even if its activity in New York remained con-
stant-its New York access fee deduction would decline.
154 See supra part I.C.2.c.
155 See Michael, supra note 141, at 190-91.
156 [1] Multistate Corp. Inc. Tax Guide (CCH) 1 146 (1995) (indicating apportion-
ment formulas of each state).
157 1 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERsTEIN, supra note 116, 1 8.06.




its weight in the determination of the apportionment percentage 59
and, in one instance, by eliminating the other factors altogether 60
The jiistification typically offered for giving additional weight to
the sales factor in income tax apportionment formulas is that it will
stimulate local economic development. Specifically, providing extra
weight to the sales factor-encourages a multistate taxpayer with sales
spread throughout the nation to locate its property and payroll within
the state on the theory that the extra weight given to the sales factor
will reduce the percentage of the taxpayer's income assigned to the
state.' 6 ' As a key economic advisor to the Governor of Georgia re-
cently observed in explaining the state's adoption of a double-
weighted sales factor, the legislation "offer[s] economic incentives for
business expansions and locations here .... By promoting the activi-
ties of firms that have a physical presence-property and labor-in
Georgia, [the legislation] should clearly have a stimulative effect."' 62
Something the Governor's advisor did not say, but which is equally
true, is that giving additional weight to the sales factor increases the
Georgia apportionment percentage for multistate taxpayers with sales
spread throughout the nation (including Georgia) but whose prop-
erty and payroll are located in other states.
The evils of an income tax apportionment formula that accords
disproportionate weight to the sales factor, in the context of the wide-
spread adoption of an equally-weighted three-factor formula, are not
hard to discern. Indeed, they have already been described by Justice
Powell in his critique of the extreme version of such a formula-
159 Under a three-factor formulawith a double-weighted sales factor, a taxpayer's in-
come is attributed to the state on the basis of a percentage determined by adding up the
taxpayer's property factor, its payroll factor, and twice its sales factor and dividing the total
by four. Of the 46 taxing authorities (45 states and the District of Columbia) with corpo-
rate net income taxes, roughly half now employ apportionment formulas that give more
weight to the sales factor than to other apportionment factors. [1] Multistate Corp. Inc.
Tax Guide (CCH) 1 146 (1995).
160 NEB. RaV. STAT. §§ 77-2734.05, 77-2734.16 (1990).
161 To be sure, the "reduction" may be relative rather than absolute. If the taxing
scheme has its intended effect of drawing property and payroll into the state, the decrease
in the apportionment percentage attributable to the additional weighting of the sales fac-
tor may be more than offset by the increase in the apportionment percentage attributable
to the larger property and payroll factors. Nevertheless, such an absolute increase in the
apportionment percentage is likely to be offset by the reduction in the taxpayer's appor-
tionment percentages in other states.
162 Georgia Dep't of Revenue, Passage of House Bill 50 Revamps Corporate Apportionment
in Ga., No. 17 GA. REvENUE Q. No. 1 at 1 (1995) (quoting Dr. Henry Thomassen, eco-
nomic advisor to Governor Zell Miller). Expressing similar sentiments, politicians and busi-
ness groups in Massachusetts and Michigan have supported legislation to change their
three-factor formulas with a double-weighted sales factor to a single-factor sales formula.
See Massachusetts: GovernorLaunches Drivefor Single Sales Factor, 9 ST. Tax NOTES 748 (1995);
Massachusetts: House Speaker Warms to Single Sales Factor, 9 ST. Tx NOTES 895 (1995); Michi-
gan: Single Sales Factor Bill Creates Controversy, 9 ST. Tax NOTES 896 (1995).
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Iowa's single-factor sales formula-which ignores property and payroll
altogether:
Iowa's use of a single-factor sales-apportionment formula-though
facially neutral-operates as a tariff on goods manufactured in
other States... and as a subsidy to Iowa manufacturers selling their
goods outside of Iowa. Because 44 of the 45 other States which im-
pose corporate income taxes use a three-factor formula involving
property, payroll, and sales, Iowa's practice insures that out-of-state
businesses selling in Iowa will have higher total tax payments than
local businesses. This result follows from the fact that Iowa attrib-
utes to itself all of the income derived from sales in Iowa, while
other taxing States-using the three-factor formula-are also taxing
some portion of the same income through attribution to property
or payroll in those States. 163
Justice Powell went on to explain:
This surcharge on Iowa sales increases to the extent that a business'
plant and labor force are located outside Iowa. It can be avoided
altogether only by locating all property and payroll in Iowa; an Iowa
manufacturer selling only in Iowa will never have any portion of its
income attributed to any other State. And to the extent that an
Iowa manufacturer makes its sales in States other than Iowa, its over-
all state tax liability will be reduced. Assuming comparable tax
rates, its liability to other States, in which sales constitute only one-
third of the apportionment formula, will be far less than the
amount.. . of sales in Iowa, where sales are the exclusive mode of
apportioning income. The effect of Iowa's formula, then, is to pe-
nalize out-of-state manufacturers for selling in Iowa and to subsidize
Iowa manufacturers for selling in other States.' 64
Justice Powell's characterization of Iowa's taxing regime suggests
that it should fail to pass muster under the Court's state tax incentive
decisions. The Iowa scheme "forecloses tax-neutral decisions" 165 by
offering a reduction in state tax liability to manufacturers who locate
their property and payroll in Iowa. Furthermore, it "penalize [s] out-
of-state manufacturers for selling in Iowa' 6 6 . if they do not yield to
Iowa's pressure and locate their property and payroll there. 67 Justice
Powell, however, made his critique of the Iowa formula in dissent.
Is the Court's rejection of Justice Powell's analysis in Moorman
Manufacturing Co. v. Bait'68 incompatible with the Court's state tax
incentive decisions? Not if they are given a proper reading. Indeed,
163 Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1978) '(Powell, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted).
164 Id. at 284 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
165 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977).
166 Moorman, 437 U.S. at 284 (Powell, J., dissenting).
167 Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 400-01 (1984).
168 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
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Moorman pointedly supports our central assertion: that the broad pro-
nouncements of the Court's tax incentive decisions neither can nor
should receive a literal interpretation.
In Moorman, the Court declined the taxpayer's invitation to hold
that Iowa, rather than states which had adopted the three-factor
formula, "was necessarily at fault in a constitutional sense" 169 for caus-
ing the multiple taxation that allegedly resulted from the coexistence
of the three-factor and single-factor formulas. There was no proof in
the record as to precisely where the taxpayer earned its income.
Thus, invalidation of the Iowa formula would have had to rest on "the
importance of avoiding any risk of duplication in the taxable income
of an interstate concern" 170 in light of the existing pattern of other
states' taxing statutes. But the "only conceivable constitutional basis"
for so holding "would be that the Commerce Clause prohibits any
overlap in the computation of taxable income by the States."' 7 '
Whatever the merits of such a rule as a matter of national policy, the
Court concluded that the power to establish unifonn rules for the di-
vision of income lay with Congress, not the Court. It therefore re-
fused to constitutionalize the three-factor formula.
Notwithstanding the legitimate criticisms that may be leveled
against the Court's tolerance of Iowa's single-factor sales formula,172
the formula does not offend the two core values that underlie the
Court's state tax incentive decisions. First, a single-factor sales
formula does not favor in-state over out-of-state activities, 173 unless
one takes account of the taxing statutes of other states. As we have
pointed out above, however, the Court has generally refused to con-
sider other states' taxing regimes in determining the constitutionality
of an individual state's taxing statute.174 Moreover, insofar as the
Court has taken account of the possibility of multiple taxation by as-
certaining whether a tax passes the "internal consistency" test,175
Iowa's taxing statute dears that hurdle with flying colors. If every state
imposed a single-factor sales formula, the interstate enterprise would
be subject to taxes no more burdensome than those imposed upon
competing local enterprises. Rather, both intrastate and interstate
firms would be subject to tax on neither more nor less than one hun-
dred percent of their income.
169 Moorman, 437 U.S. at 277.
170 Id.
171 1d. at 278.
172 See 1 HELLERSrN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 116, 1 8.08[2] [b].
173 Indeed, Justice Powell himself recognized that Iowa's single-factor sales formula
was "facially neutral." Moorman, 437 U.S. 267 at 283 (Powell, J., dissenting).
174 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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Second, a single-factor sales formula does not implicate the.coer-
cive power of the state by linking a reduction in the state's taxes to the
conduct of in-state activity. Even assuming a taxpayer has existing in-
come-producing activity within a state that has adopted a single-factor
sales formula, the taxpayer's relocation of its property and payroll to
the state offers no assurance that its in-state liability will be reduced. 176
Indeed, if the taxpayer's in-state and out-of-state sales remain con-
stant, shifting the taxpayer's property and payroll into the state will
have no effect on the percentage of the taxpayer's income assigned to
the state. The single-factor sales formula provides a lure to the multi-
state taxpayer not because it is coercive in any way, but because it capi-
talizes on the tax systems adopted by other states. This fact may
render the single-factor sales formula problematic; however, it does
not render the formula unconstitutional under the Court's tax incen-
tive decisions.
Finally, the single-factor sales formula does not "penalize[ ] in-
creases in... activities in other States,"177 as did the tax incentive the
Court condemned in Westinghouse. Indeed, it does just the opposite.
Although increases in property and payroll in other states have no
impact on the percentage of the taxpayer's income attributed to the
state, increases in sales to other states will reduce that percentage.
The only "penalty" associated with the single-factor sales formula is
that attributable to the different configuration of other states' appor-
tionment formulas.
In short, Moorman demonstrates that the states remain free to
"structur[e] their tax systems to encourage the growth and develop-
ment of intrastate commerce and industry"'78 insofar as state income
tax apportionment formulas are concerned. The adoption of an in-
ternally consistent apportionment formula that lowers the relative in-
come tax cost of doing business in the state by effectively assigning
income to other states, and which does not penalize out-of-state activ-
ity except by reference to "internally inconsistent" assumptions made
about other states' tax regimes, is precisely the type of state tax incen-
tive the Court has approved. 179 Functionally, a state adopting such a
176 See supra notes 159-60.
177 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 401 (1984).
178 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977).
179 See Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 385-86 (1991). In
Trinova, the taxpayer sought to attack Michigan's Single Business Tax, which is a form of
value-added tax, on the ground that Michigan's use of a sales factor in the three-factor
formula employed to apportion the tax discriminated against interstate commerce. The
gravamen of the taxpayer's argument was that the use of a sales factor to apportion a tax
base comprised largely of labor and capital favored Michigan businesses over out-of-state
businesses, because it had the effect of attributing the local business's Michigan labor to
other states (based on its non-Michigan sales) while assigning the out-of-state business's
labor and capital to Michigan (based on its Michigan sales). In rejecting this argument,
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formula does nothing differently from what it does when it establishes
an attractive tax climate in which to operate, e.g., one with low rates, a
narrow base,-or generous deductions for expenses wherever incurred.
Although such formulas may not comport with sound notions of
where income is earned,180 may give rise to duplicative taxation, and
may maximize the revenues of particular states, 18' they do not exact a
price under the state's own taxing regime for failing to engage in in-
state activity.
2. Property Tax Incentives
In contrast to income tax incentives, many property tax incentives
willpass constitutional muster unless one reads the Court's state tax
incentive opinions as condemning any tax provision that tilts business
decision-making toward in-state investment. Under this criterion,
property tax incentives would fail to survive scrutiny, because they are
tied to in-state investment and thus preclude business decisionmaking
"solely on the basis of nontax criteria."18 2 Under our more circum-
scribed view of the Court's decisions, however, property tax incentives
should withstand Commerce Clause review if they do not favor in-state
over out-of-state investment and do not implicate the coercive power
of the state.
Property tax incentives that offer an exemption or abatement for
new investment in the state (without collateral requirements discrete
from the use or location of the property itself'8 3) will survive scrutiny
under these criteria. They do not favor in-state over out-of-state in-
vestment, if one assumes-as one ought to' 84-that other states have
adopted taxing regimes similar to the one in question. 185 Nor do they
implicate the coercive power of the state, because a taxpayer does not
reduce its otherwise applicable in-state property tax liability by acquir-
ing property in the state. Rather the taxpayer avoids only additional
the Court observed that "[i]t is a laudatory goal in the design of a tax system to promote
investment that will provide jobs and prosperity to the citizens of the taxing State." Id. at
385.
180 As the Court declared in General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S.
553, 561 (1965), "[tjhe standard three-factor formula can be justified as a rough, practical
approximation of the distribution of either a corporation's sources of income or the social
costs which it generates," whereas "the geographical distribution of a corporation's sales is,
by itself, of dubious significance in indicating the locus of either factor."
181 A single-factor sales formula will tend to maximize the revenues of a "market" state
like Iowa which has relatively more sales than property and payroll. Conversely, a single-
factor property formula will tend to maximize the revenues of an industrial state like Ohio
which has relatively more property than it has payroll and sales.
182 Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U.S. at 331; see supra part I.C.1.
183 See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.




in-state tax liability by acquiring the property in question, just as it
would had it acquired property in some other state.18 6
We do not suggest that all property tax incentives may be imple-
mented with constitutional impunity. Property tax incentives will be
in constitutional jeopardy within the adjudicative framework we have
proposed when they are tied to in-state activity apart from investment in
the property itself For example, property tax incentives limited to busi-
nesses that create a certain number of new jobs in the state, or that
make overall investments of a certain magnitude in the state, run
afoul of the principle that a state may not limit tax incentives to those
with a specified economic presence in the state' 87-at least when the
economic presence does not constitute the very tax base that the state
seeks to attract. Such property tax incentives improperly link the tax
benefit-exemption from local property taxes-to local activity dis-
tinct from the investment in the in-state property. Consequently, they
186 A recent Pennsylvania decision supports our thesis that property tax incentives of
this nature will pass muster under the Commerce Clause. In PPG Industries, Inc. v. Com-
monwealth, No. 2355 C.D. 1987, Pa. Commonwealth Ct., Nov. 3, 1995 (panel decision)
(unreported), reprinted in [2 Pa.] St. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 1 202-636, affd, Pa. Commonwealth
Ct., June 19, 1996 (unreported), reprinted in [2 Pa.] St. Tax Rptr. (CCH) 1 202-657, the
court sustained a capital stock tax exemption limited to "the capital stock of entities organ-
ized for manufacturing, processing, research or development purposes, which is invested
in and actually and exclusively employed in carrying on manufacturing, processing, re-
search or development within the state.. . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7602(a) (Supp.
1996). The taxpayer, only some of whose manufacturing activities were carried on in the
state, attacked the exemption on the ground that it discriminated against interstate com-
merce. Relying on Westinghouse and Boston Stock Exchange, the taxpayer argued that there is
a discriminatory effect upon multistate corporations with a low proportion of manufactur-
ing within Pennsylvania who are allegedly placed at a commercial disadvantage to those
businesses that conduct more of their manufacturing within the state.
The court rejected this argument on the grounds that the tax exemption was cotermi-
nous with the tax base and that there was no tax cost to the taxpayer in conducting eco-
nomic activity across state lines. As the court observed,
Once the capital stock is apportioned to ... Pennsylvania, then a manufac-
turing exemption applies to exempt property within the state that is related
to manufacturing within the state. Both the tax and the exemption is [sic]
based on in-state property and does not affect out-of-state property. The
fact that a proportion of the corporate headquarters is taxed is a result of
locating the corporate headquarters within the Commonwealth, not on lo-
cating some or most of the manufacturing out-of-state. Regardless of the
location of the manufacturing, nothing moving in interstate commerce is
measured or affected by the exemption.
Id. at 20,440. The court's decision is significant in that it refuses to extend the teachings of
cases like Westinghouse and Boston Stock Exchange beyond their proper limits.
Property tax incentives of the typed described in the text would also pass muster
under the view that tax incentives tied to in-state activity are acceptable as long as they do
not penalize activity in other states. See supra part I.C.2.c.
187 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756-57 (1981); Northwest Aerospace Training
Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, [2 Minn.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 202-603 (Minn. T.C.
Apr. 4, 1995).
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violate the rule that a state may not use its taxing power to coerce
taxpayers to engage in in-state activity.'88
In effect, these tax incentives say to the taxpayer that the state will
refrain from imposing taxes on the taxpayer's property only if, in ad-
dition to acquiring property in the state, the taxpayer invests a certain
amount of money in the state, or hires a certain number of employees
in the state, or conducts operations of a certain size in the state.
These incentives are distinguishable from those described earlier
which in effect say to the taxpayer that the state will not issue the
taxpayer a property tax bill if it acquires in-state property that meets
specified conditions regarding the use or location of the property
itself.
188 The Court's recent decision in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848 (1996),
illustrates this distinction. In Fulton, the Court struck down a North Carolina intangible
property tax that varied inversely with the corporation's presence in North Carolina. Prior
to the levy's repeal in late 1995, North Carolina imposed an intangible property tax on,
among other things, shares of stock owned by resident individuals and corporations and
on shares of stock having a business sims in the state. The tax was imposed at the rate of
0.25% of the fair market value of the stock. The value of the stock assessed under the tax,
however, was reduced by a percentage equal to the percentage of the corporation's income
subject to tax in North Carolina. This percentage was determined by the familiar three-
factor income apportionment formula of property, payroll, and sales. See supra notes 156-
58 and accompanying text.
Under this taxing regime, the stock of a corporation conducting all of its business in
North Carolina would not be subject to North Carolina's intangible property tax. Such a
corporation would have a 100% income tax apportionment percentage which would, in
turn, permit a 100% reduction in the value of the corporation's stock subject to tax in the
hands of its shareholders. Conversely, the stock of a corporation doing no business in
North Carolina would pay an intangible property tax measured by all of the stock's value.
Such a corporation would have a zero percent income tax apportionment percentage
which would, in turn, permit no reduction in the value of the corporation's stock subject to
tax in the hands of its shareholders.
North Carolina's intangible tax regime plainly discriminated on its face against inter-
state commerce. As the Court observed in Fulton, "A regime that taxes stock only to the
degree that its issuing corporation participates in interstate commerce favors domestic cor-
porations over their foreign competitors in raising capital among North Carolina residents
and tends, at least, to discourage domestic corporations from plying their trades in inter-
state commerce." Id. at 855. Indeed, the only disputed question in the case was whether
the facially discriminatory tax could be saved by the "compensatory" or "complementary"
tax doctrine. See genera/!y Walter Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitu-
tional State Tax Discrimination, 39 TAx LAw. 405 (1986). The Court held it could not.
Fulton, 116 S. Ct. at 855.
For our purposes, Fulton reveals the fault line between property tax incentives that will
survive or fail to survive Commerce Clause scrutiny. A tax exemption available to any tax-
payer which brings its property into the state will pass muster because it does not "discour-
age... corporations from plying their trades in interstate commerce," ii; it merely lowers
the cost of doing business in intrastate commerce. See PPG Industries, discussed supra note
186. By contrast, a tax exemption like that offered by North Carolina in Fulton will violate
the Commerce Clause because it demands not only that the taxpayer bring its corporate
stock into North Carolina (which any resident owner is deemed to do), but, in addition,
that the corporation conduct its business in North Carolina. It is this collateral require-
ment-tying the exemption to the corporation's activity in state-that condemns the in-
tangible property tax under the Commerce Clause.
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It might be argued that our proposed distinction between defen-
sible and indefensible property tax incentives is merely semantic.
Thus one might contend that property tax exemptions for property
constructed within the state for specified purposes (e.g., for new man-
ufacturing facilities) or in specified locations (e.g., in enterprise
zones) require some in-state activity "apart from the investment in the
property itself." It is true, of course, that property tax incentives that
offer an exemption or abatement for new investment in the state inva-
riably require some in-state activity "apart from the investment in the
property itself," namely, that the investment be for the legislatively
prescribed in-state purpose and no other. Nevertheless we believe
that there is a significant difference between relieving a taxpayer of a
property tax burden ordinarily associated with ownership of property
when the taxpayer acquires property under conditions that depend
on the use or location of the property itself, and relieving a taxpayer
of a property tax burden ordinarily associated with ownership of prop-
erty only because the taxpayer acquires property under conditions
that bear little or no relation to the use or location of the property
itself. In the former case, the taxpayer is required to engage in no in-
state activity that fairly can be characterized as independent of the
acquisition and disposition of the property. In the latter case, the tax-
payer is required to engage in in-state activity that it might undertake
even if it had never invested in the property (e.g., creating a certain
number ofjobs in the state or making in-state investments of a certain
magnitude).189
The distinction we suggest is hardly a stranger to the dormant
commerce clause field. Both the Court and commentators have sug-
gested the constitutional infirmity of "downstream restraints" placed,
on the recipient of a state-conferred benefit, including state subsi-
dies.190 We see no reason why the same sort of restriction should not
189 We recognize that the line we are drawing-between conditions that relate to the
use or location of property and other conditions independent of the use or location of the
property-may seem fuzzy at the edges. For example, one could maintain that condition-
ing a property tax exemption on the creation of ten new jobs in the state-a-condition we
would find constitutionally objectionable-is a condition of "use," namely, use in a busi-
ness that creates ten new jobs. How, one may ask, is such a condition different from a
requirement, for example, that the property be "used in a new manufacturing facility'-a
condition we would find constitutionally acceptable? Although reluctant to proffer a blan-
ket response to this question and others like it, we would submit that the answer lies in the
distinction suggested in the text: The requirement that property be used in a new manu-
facturing facility is intimately connected with the acquisition and disposition of the prop-
erty itself and involves no collateral conditions that could be fulfilled independently of the
physical use of the property. The requirement that property be used in a business that
creates ten new jobs imposes "downstream" conditions capable of satisfaction without re-
gard to the physical use of the property. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
190 See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96-98 (1984) (White,
J., plurality opinion); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1928);
[Vol. 81:789
1996] COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRAMNTS
apply as forcefully to state-conferred tax breaks. To be sure, the "in-
dependent activity" standard we have offered to flesh out the principle
in this ,context will engender some difficulties in application.' 91 But
this is hardly surprising because "it is an essential part of adjudication
to draw distinctions, including fine ones, in the process of interpret-
ing the Constitution."192
In any event, real-world property tax incentives seldom impose
any conditions other than those linked to the use or location of the
property itself'193 Accordingly, they will rarely breach the constitu-
tional limits we have proposed.
3. Sales and Similar Transaction Tax Incentives
Constitutional analysis of sales and similar transaction tax incen-
tives should track the analysis of property tax incentives that we have
offered.' 9 4 If one reads the Court's state tax incentive opinions as
condemning any tax provision that influences business decisionmak-
Coenen, supra note 120, at 463-73 (observing that market-participant exception to the dor-
mant commerce clause is confined to cases in which state does not impose "downstream
restraints" on in-state preferences); Walter Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the
Commerce Clause, and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 51, 79 (arguing
that state power to distribute state-owned resources does not extend to conditions on dis-
position that "independently burden interstate commerce").
191 See supra note 189; infra note 216.
192 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 679 (1970).
193 See [2 All States] State Tax Guide (CCH) 1 20-200 et seq. (1995). But compare
Sprint Communications Co. v. Kelly, 642 A.2d 106 (D.C.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 294 (1994),
where the District of Columbia violated the anticoercion principle when it granted a prop-
erty tax exemption for personal property used by a telecommunications company to pro-
duce receipts subject to the District's gross receipts tax, as well as a sales tax exemption for
property purchased by a telecommunications company for use in producing services sub-
ject to the gross receipts tax. Consequently, only companies with District property and
sales (a necessary condition to having District property and sales tax liability) could benefit
from the exemptions, and then could do so only when they channeled their services into
the intra-District market. As the court observed,
the District of Columbia may not enact a tax scheme whereby the only com-
pany that can fully benefit from the available exemptions is one that sells in
the District of Columbia only what it produces there, and does not afford
the same benefits to a company outside of the District that sells within it or
indeed to a District company that sells outside it.
Id. at 116-17; accord Op. Or. Att'y Gen. No. 8236 (Apr. 20 1995) (arguing that the enter-
prise zone property tax exemption is unconstitutional under Privileges and Immunities
Clause because it was conditioned on hiring a certain percentage of enterprise zone
residents).
194 By "similar transaction tax" we mean a tax that is imposed on, or with respect to, a
transaction or event associated with the transfer of personal property or services for a con-
sideration (or the use of such property or services) and that is measured by the sales price
or cost price of the property or services. Specifically, we mean to include compensating
use taxes; specialized excise taxes on the sale or use of fuel, alcohol, and tobacco; and
other taxes, regardless of their label, that in substance constitute retail sales taxes (such as
Illinois's retailers occupation tax, ILL. Rrv. STAT. ch. 35 120 et seq. (1993), and Arizona's
transaction privilege tax, ARIuz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-1301 et seq. (Supp. 1995)).
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ing, every sales or similar transaction tax incentive tied to the conduct
of in-state activity lies in the constitutional danger zone. 9 5 In our
view, however, sales and similar transaction tax incentives-like all
other tax incentives-ought to survive Commerce Clause scrutiny if
they do not simultaneously favor in-state over out-of-state activity and
implicate the coercive power of the state. Many sales and similar
transaction tax incentives will pass this test.
For example, sales and use tax exemptions, credits, or refunds for
property purchased for construction of new facilities in the state (or
for use in connection with the relocation of a business in the state, or
for use in an enterprise zone in the state) 196 are unobjectionable
under these criteria. They do not favor in-state over out-of-state activ-
ity, unless one indulges in the unwarranted assumption that other
states would tax the same transaction if it were effectuated in those
states.197
Nor do these tax breaks implicate the coercive power of the state.
A taxpayer does not reduce its in-state tax liability by purchasing prop-
erty for use within the state. It merely ensures that there will be no in-
state tax cost from engaging in the transaction, just as there would be
no in-state cost if it engaged in the transaction in some other state.
For this reason, such a sales tax incentive would also pass muster
under the view that tax incentives tied to in-state activity are accepta-
ble as long as they do not penalize activity in other states.' 98
There is, however, one aspect of the typical sales tax incentive
that arguably distinguishes it from the typical property tax incentive
and renders the former susceptible to attack under the Commerce
Clause. Although incentives associated with both sales and property
taxes are confined to property used within the state, the possibility
that the tax could apply to property used outside the state exists only
in the context of a sales tax. There is plainly no possibility that a prop-
erty tax could apply to real property used outside the taxing state,
since real property can be used (and hence taxed) only in a single
state. Nor can a property tax ordinarily apply to tangible personal
property used outside the taxing state, because constitutional "nexus"
strictures prohibit a state from taxing tangible personal property lo-
cated outside its borders. 99 By contrast, a state clearly would have the
195 See supra part I.0.1.
196 See generally [1] Multistate Sales Tax Guide (CCH) 1 975 (1994) (listing tax incen-
tives used by states -to encourage new industry).
197 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
198 See supra part I.C.2.c.
199 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 488-96 (1925); Union Refrigerator Transit Co.
v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 204-05 (1905). There is a limited exception to the statement in
the text: tangible personal property used in State A for part of the year and then trans-
ported to State B could be taxed in State A for the portion of the year it was located there.
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power to impose a sales tax on property purchased within the state for
use outside its borders.200
Because state sales tax incentives apply only to the sale of prop-
erty purchased for use within the state, it may be argued that such
incentives both discriminate on their face against interstate commerce
and violate the Commerce Clause's internal consistency test.20 1 If
every state exempted property purchased for in-state-but not for out-
of-state-use, then property purchased in State A for use in State B
would be subject to tax while property purchased in State A for use in
State A would not be.- This would amount to a paradigmatic violation
of the internal consistency principle and would plainly discriminate
against interstate commerce.202
This potentially serious problem is not a problem at all, however,
in light of the actual structure of sales tax regimes. Sales taxes are
levies confined to the final sale of a product for "use or consump-
tion"203 within the taxing state. In keeping with this design (as well as
the desire not to disadvantage local vendors with respect to their out-
of-state competitors), "[m] ost states exempt from tax all sales for de-
livery outside the state." 204 Because states generally do not tax the sale
of property for out-of-state use, there exists little risk of discrimination
against interstate commerce (or violation of the internal consistency
doctrine) when a state provides a tax break for the sale of certain
property intended for in-state use. In other words, because the state
taxes sales of goods only for intrastate use, there cannot possibly be a
discrimination against interstate commerce when sales for some, but
not other, intrastate uses are made tax-exempt.20 5
This does not mean that all sales and transaction tax incentives
are constitutionally unobjectionable. The Court's decisions in Boston
Stock Exchange, Bacchus, and New Energy-each of which involved a sales
or sales-like tax-establish that such incentives may well be vulnerable
to constitutional attack. Indeed, many sales and similar transaction
tax incentives are constitutionally suspect under the analysis we have
articulated above: specifically, those sales and similar transaction tax
exemptions, credits, or refunds that are tied to in-state activity apart
200 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1339 (1995).
201 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
202 American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 283-97 (1987).
203 JOHN F. DUE &JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL STRUCTURE
AND ADMINISTRATION 16 (2d ed. 1994).
204 Id at 271; see also 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 116, 1 18.02[1].
205 If there is discrimination in such a sales tax scheme, it is against in-state sales that




from the in-state use of the property or services with respect to which the tax is
imposed.206
Consider, for example: (1) the Arizona law that grants a refund
of transaction privilege taxes to motion picture companies that spend
more than $1 million per year in the state to produce one or more
motion pictures in the state;207 (2) the Arkansas exemption from sales
and use taxes of purchases of natural gas and electricity by steel mill
operators that invest over $120 million in an Arkansas steel mill;20 8 (3)
the Illinois exemption from sales and use taxes of purchases of certain
property used by businesses that make investments of at least $40 mil-
lion in the state or that create a minimum of 200 full-time equivalent
jobs in the state;20 9 (4) the Nebraska provision for refund of sales and
use taxes for certain businesses that increase employment by two full-
time employees in the state and that make specified minimum invest-
ments in the state;210 (5) the New Mexico credits for sales or use taxes
paid for purchases of qualified equipment incorporated into a manu-
facturing operation if the taxpayer employs one additional full-time
employee in the state for every $250,000 in value of qualified equip-
ment invested in the state;211 (6) the Oklahoma exemption from sales
and use taxes of purchases of tangible personal property by a qualified
manufacturer for incorporation into a new manufacturing plant in
the state if the total cost of construction exceeds $5 million and at
least 100jobs are created and maintained for at least 36 months in the
state;212 and (7) the South Dakota provision for a credit or refund of
contractors' excise taxes paid for construction of new or -expanded
manufacturing facilities, and for sales and use taxes paid for the
purchase of business equipment, if the project costs exceed $20
million.2 13
206 For example, assuming arguendo that the exemption at issue in Bacchus was not
invalid on the ground that it represented an exemption from existing tax liability, see supra
notes 115-16 and accompanying text, it might still be struck down on the ground that it
imposes "downstream" conditions on new investment in the state. One could argue that
the condition of the exemption in Bacchus--that the exemption applies only if one sells
property produced in the state-goes beyond the scope of acceptable conditions bearing
strictly on the in-state use of the property sold. Linking an exemption to the in-state use of
the property, which is intimately connected with the design structure of a sales tax directed
at in-state consumption, is a far cry from linking it to the in-state production of the prop-
erty, which bears no structural relationship to the tax being imposed and arguably imposes
a condition independent of those activities that give rise to the liability in the first place.
207 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1322.01 (Supp. 1995).
208 AR. CODE ANN. §§ 26-52-901 to 914 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995).
209 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 35, 1 120/if (1993).
210 NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-27,188 (1990 & Supp. 1994).
211 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9A-7.1 (Michie 1995).
212 OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1359(8) (Supp. 1996).
213 S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 10-45B-1 to 5 (Supp. 1995).
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All of these sales and similar transaction tax incentives share a
common constitutional defect: they link the tax benefit-reduction
of state sales or similar transaction tax liability-to in-state activity that
is independent of the use of the property or services with respect to
which the tax is imposed. Consequently, they offend the fundamental
principle that a state may not use its taxing power to coerce taxpayers
to engage in in-state activity. These tax incentives-like the income
tax credits and deductions we have discussed above214 -in effect tell
the taxpayer that the state will release its grip on the taxpayer's tax
dollars associated with transactions consummated in the state only if
the taxpayer invests a certain amount of money in the state, hires a
certain number of employees in the state, or conducts operations of a
certain size in the state.215 Such incentives are therefore distinguish-
able from the benign form of transaction tax incentives, which say to
the taxpayer that the state will not seek to establish a grip on the tax-
payer's dollars for transactions consummated in the state, so long as
the property or services on which the tax is imposed are dedicated to
the prescribed in-state use.
It might be argued, along the lines advanced above in the context
of property tax incentives, that the distinction we have drawn between
defensible and indefensible sales and transaction taxes lacks sub-
stance. One might contend, for example, that there is no real distinc-
tion between a sales tax exemption for property purchased for use in
new facilities in the state and a sales tax exemption for property
purchased for use in a facility that creates ten newjobs in the state. In
214 See supra parts I.D.1.a, I.D.l.b.
215 A recent Minnesota case is illustrative. In Northwest Aerospace Training Corp. v.
Commissioner of Revenue, [2 Minn.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 202-603 (Minn. T.C. Apr. 4,
1995), Minnesota provided an exemption from its sales and use tax on the receipts from
the lease of airflight equipment to airline companies that paid Minnesota's Flight Property
Tax. Only airlines that made three or more flights per year into or out of Minnesota were
subject to the tax. A lessor of flight equipment to federal agencies and miscellaneous third
parties challenged the exemption on the grounds that it discriminated against interstate
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. Sustaining the objection, the court cited
Boston Stock Exchange and Westinghouse, declaring-
All United States domestic airlines who pay the Flight Property Tax are
exempt from the sales tax when they rent airflight equipment. The Flight
Property Tax is paid by all United States domestic airline companies who
make three or more trips into or out of Minnesota during a calendar year.
Payers of the Flight Property Tax typically have employees and equipment
in Minnesota and lease airport facilities in Minnesota ....
A United States domestic airline must pay Flight Property Tax to es-
cape sales tax on rentals of airflight equipment. In effect, an airline is
forced to establish an economic presence in Minnesota to escape the tax. A
United States domestic airline which does not establish an economic pres-
ence in Minnesota is placed at a competitive disadvantage because it is
forced to pay the [lessor's] lease rate for use of flight training equipment
and a sales tax.
Id. at 14,630 (emphasis in original).
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each case, the taxpayer must engage in some in-state activity apart
from the taxable transaction itself. Accordingly, the argument goes,
the state in each case exerts its taxing power over the taxable transac-
tion (i.e., the sale) by coercing the taxpayer to engage in some dis-
crete in-state activity (use of the property in a new facility or use of the
property in a facility that creates ten new jobs).
Although it is true that there are conditions imposed upon tax-
favored in-state transactions that we have characterized as constitu-
tional apart from the naked act of making an in-state purchase, we
believe, as explained in the context of property tax incentives, that the
distinction we have drawn between the two categories of incentives is
meaningful. There is a significant difference between relieving a tax-
payer of a tax obligation ordinarily due upon a sale when the taxpayer
puts the property sold to a particular in-state use or employs it in a
particular in-state location and relieving a taxpayer of a tax obligation
ordinarily due upon a sale when the taxpayer engages in in-state activ-
ity that does not depend on the use or location of the property sold.
In the former case, the taxpayer is not required to engage in any in-
state activity that can be fairly characterized as independent of the
acquisition and disposition of the property itself. In the latter case,
the taxpayer is required to engage in in-state activity that it might un-
dertake even if it had never purchased the property (e.g., creating a




We have seen that state tax breaks that provide business incen-
tives run a serious risk of condemnation under the dormant com-
merce clause. 217 If, for example, a state entices a firm to build a new
local plant by offering it a credit against its income tax, the Court
might well invalidate the credit under authorities like Westinghouse
216 We recognize, as we did in the context of property tax incentives, see supra note
189, that the line we are drawing-between conditions that relate to the use or location of
property and other conditions independent of the use or location of the property-may
appear blurry in some contexts. Why, one may ask, is use of a property in a new facility any
more a condition of use than use of property in a new facility that creates ten new jobs?
Our response mirrors the response we offered in the context of property tax incentives: If
the condition can in substance be fulfilled without regard to the physical acquisition or
disposition of the property, it ought to be regarded as independent of use or location. In
our judgment, although the question is close, the requirement of use in a new facility falls
on one side of the line and the requirement of use in a new facility that creates ten new
jobs falls on the other.
217 See supra part I.
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Electric Corp. v. Tully.21 s What if, however, the state provides not a tax
break, but a monetary subsidy equal to the value of the credit?
Economists know that the real-world impact of such a subsidy
mirrors the effect of the credit.219 Thus, the firm that is relieved of
paying $10,000 in income taxes ends up with exactly as much cash in
the till as the firm that pays the full tax levy, but then gets a $10,000
subsidy check. This fact is of particular significance because the
Supreme Court has often said that "constitutionality under the Com-
merce Clause... depends upon... practical effect ' 220 and "economic
realities."22' Indeed, courts and commentators often characterize tax
benefits-whether in the form of exemptions, deductions, or cred-
its-as "subsidies."222
Do these realities mean that courts must treat cash bounties just
like tax breaks for purposes of the dormant commerce clause? Until
the Court's decision in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,223 the answer
to this question clearly was "no." In the wake of that decision, how-
ever, the answer has become more complex. Moreover, the issue has
gained increasing importance because non-tax benefits "are the fast-
est growing type of development incentive. 224
218 466 U.S. 388 (1984) (discussed supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text). See also
supra note 32 (discussing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981)).
219 See ROBERT L. HEILBRONER & LESTER C. THUROW, ECONOMICS EXPLAINED 173 (up-
dated ed. 1987) (discussing tax reductions and subsidies as alternative means to influence
the same activity); MichaelJ. Polelle, A Critique of the Market Participation Exception, 15 WHIT-
TIER L. REV. 647, 685 (1994) (asserting "lack of economic justification" for the "Court's
distinction between a tax credit and a subsidy" and lamenting the Court's failure to recog-
nize the "obvious subsidizing effect of the tax credit"); see also New Energy Co. of Ind. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (noting that Indiana's direct subsidy scheme was "no
less effective in conferring a commercial advantage over out-of-state competitors" than an
invalidated Ohio tax exemption); Fireside Nissan, Inc. v. Fanning, 30 F.3d 206,216 (1st
Cir. 1994) ("[We see no practical difference between the tax break offered to local liquor
producers in Bacchus... and a 'direct' cash subsidy to those same industries. .. ").
220 Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750
(1978). AccordWest Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2213 (1994); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
221 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
222 See, e.g., New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 277 (1988) ("[T]he emer-
gence of ethanol production on a commercial scale dates from enactment of the first fed-
eral subsidy, in the form of an exemption from federal motor fuel excise taxes . . .");
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272 (1984) (characterizing the Hawaiian li-
quor excise tax exemption as designed to "subsidize" local industry); Regan v. Taxation
With Representation, 461 U.S. 540,544 (1983) ("Both tax exemptions and tax-deductibility
are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system."); Richard B. Collins,
Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rtv. 43, 98-99 n.332 (1988) ("Tax
exemptions ... are sometimes called 'tax subsidies ... .' "); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme
Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. Rxv.
1091, 1193 (1986).
228 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
224 ScnWEKE ET Al., supra note 6, at 19.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
This Section of the Article explores the constitutionality of cash-
subsidy and other non-tax-based financial incentives designed to spur
business development. In Part II.A we ask whether West Lynn Creamery
itself mandates equivalent constitutional treatment of state tax breaks
and state subsidies. Having answered this question in the negative, we
show in Part II.B that both precedent and policy support the constitu-
tionality of state subsidies under the dormant commerce clause. In
Part II.C we ask whether this presumption of constitutionality attaches
when the state does not subsidize a general category of favored busi-
nesses, but instead channels benefits to a specifically targeted firm.
After finding that this presumption applies regardless of whom the
state favors, we ask in Part II.D whether constitutional results should
hinge on how subsidy awards are packaged. We focus on eight forms
of government benefits: (1) infrastructure improvements, (2) educa-
tional benefits, (3) below-market leases and land sales, (4) land give-
aways, (5) one-shot cash grants, (6) per-unit subsidies, (7) loan
forgiveness, and (8) user-fee waivers. We conclude that courts should
assess all of these programs under a unitary "anti-tariff principle" that
invalidates only close equivalents of the de facto tax-rebate program
involved in West Lynn Creamery itself. In contrast to our position on tax
incentives, we also conclude that courts, in applying this principle,
should uphold almost all state subsidies.
A. West Lynn Creamery and Subsidies
West Lynn Creamery arose out of an effort by Massachusetts to aid
its struggling dairy industry. To this end, the state imposed a tax on
milk dealers for all in-state sales of milk, whether or not the milk had
been produced in Massachusetts. 225 The state then placed all tax pro-
ceeds in a segregated fund and distributed the fund exclusively to op-
erators of in-state dairy farms.226 The Supreme Court struck down the
program, rejecting Massachusetts's argument that it embodied noth-
ing more than a constitutionally nondiscriminatory tax and a permissi-
ble expenditure of the state's own money.2 2 7 According to Justice
Stevens, who wrote for five Justices, the Massachusetts program effec-
tively gave local producers an unlawful "tax rebate"228 functionally in-
225 West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2210.
226 Id. Disbursements were based on each dairy farmer's percentage share of raw milk
production, subject to two qualifications. First, each farmer who produced more than
200,000 pounds of milk was deemed to have produced only 200,000 pounds. Second, no
farmer could collect subsidy payments that resulted in total payments beyond $15 per hun-
dred weight. See id at 2210 & n.8.
227 Id. at 2214-15.
228 Id. at 2213.
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distinguishable from the discriminatory tax exemption struck down in
Bacchus.2 29
West Lynn Creamery provides a vehicle for attacking all business
subsidy programs. Indeed, the two dissenters broadly read justice Ste-
vens's opinion as casting "doubt on the validity of state subsidies."230
justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, went even further, declaring
that "subsidies for in-state industry... would clearly be invalid under
any formulation of the Court's guiding principle."2 31 IfJustice Scalia's
reading of West Lynn Creamery were correct, that decision might well
signal the end of all state efforts to induce business development with
grants of cash or property. ButJustice Scalia's reading is wrong.
As Justice Stevens framed his West Lynn Creamery opinion, he was
well aware ofJustice Scalia's concem that the Court was writing a new
and bold chapter in the history of the dormant commerce clause. To
Justice Scalia's protestations, Justice Stevens thus offered a blunt re-
sponse: he declared explicitly that the Court was not ruling on the
constitutionality of ordinary state subsidies.2 32 Justice Scalia's rejoin-
der was that the Court's opinion in effect required invalidation of such
subsidies because the only "guiding principle" fairly drawn from the
decision was so "sweeping" that, under that principle, "every state law
which obstructs a national market violates the Commerce Clause."233
In actuality, Justice Stevens had suggested no such thing. Rather, he
carefully explained that the constitutional defect in the Massachusetts
program lay in its "coupling" of the in-state milk-producer subsidy
with a specific and simultaneously enacted tax.2 34 This close "con-
joining" of "a tax and a subsidy"235 mandated invalidation of "the en-
tire program-not just the contributions to the fund or the
distributions from that fund."2 36 In other words, the milk subsidy
transformed the Massachusetts milk program into a "tax rebate"
scheme 237 "most similar to the law at issue in Bacchus.''238 The rebate-
like character of the bounty, Justice Stevens explained, removed any
229 Id. Justice Stevens's opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
and Ginsburg. Bacchus is discussed supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
230 Id. at 2221 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent.
231 Id. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Justice Thomas joined
Justice Scalia's concurrence.
232 id at 2214 n.15.
233 Id. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring).
234 Id. at 2215.
235 Id. at 2214.
236 Id. at 2215.




need to consider the constitutionality of subsidy programs "standing
alone."23 9
As this brief review of West Lynn Creamery reveals, the Supreme
Court invalidated the Massachusetts program on narrow grounds that
do not require lower courts to treat run-of-the-mill subsidies like dis-
criminatory tax breaks. Suggestions to the contrary reflect inatten-
tiveness both to Justice Stevens's actual analysis and to the "maxim...
that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connec-
tion with the case in which those expressions are used."24°
B. The Teachings of Precedent and Policy on the
Constitutionality of Ordinary Subsidies
While Justice Stevens's opinion in West Lynn Creamery neither in
terms nor in principle invalidated all freestanding state subsidies, it
also did not declare their universal validity. Rather, Justice Stevens
observed-again, with more accuracy than his objecting colleagues
were willing to recognize24 1-that "[w]e have never squarely con-
fronted the constitutionality of subsidies."242 Justice Stevens then in-
vited renewed reflection on the subject by adding that "we need not
do so now.1243 His invitation was timely, given the recent explosion of
the use of subsidies to encourage local business development. 24  Elab-
orating a coherent constitutional theory of subsidies, however,
presents a formidable challenge, particularly because of the wide array
of government programs any such theory must take into account.245
Nonetheless, our own theory may be stated rather simply: In general,
courts should not treat state subsidies afforded to local businesses the
same as tax breaks that discriminate in their favor; rather, courts
should strike down only those subsidies that operate, like the program
in West Lynn Creamery, as discriminatory de facto rebates of an identifi-
able state tax. To be sure, it will sometimes prove difficult to decide
whether a state program fits into the "de facto tax rebate" category. 246
239 Id. at 2214.
240 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821).
241 See infra notes 281-90 and accompanying text.
242 West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2214 n.15.
243 Id.
244 See ScmvEKE ET A.., supra note 6, at 20 (Between 1983 and 1989, "total state grants
programs increased more than tenfold."); E.J. Dionne, Jr., Tax Breaks For Jobs Just Another
Form of Bribery, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 3, 1993, at D9 [hereinafter Dionne] ("State
governments all over the United States are engaged in bribery on a massive scale."); Chris
O'Malley & Kevin A. Drawbaugh, The State Subsidy Wars, Political Pressures Push Government
Into Give-away Game With Industry, INDIANAPOLIs NEWS, Feb. 16, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter
O'Malley] (reporting that state governments subsidized 394 private sector development
projects with tax or cash packages in 1988).
245 See infra part H.C.
246 For an illustration of the difficulties involved in making the "is-it-really-a-rebate"
inquiry, compare Sheehy v. Public Employees Retirement Div., 864 P.2d 762 (Mont. 1993)
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In general, however, courts should hesitate to apply this label in light
of both Supreme Court precedent and the important functional dif-
ferences between discriminatory tax breaks and most government
subsidies.
1. Supreme Court Precedent
Supreme Court precedent firmly supports the constitutionality of
state business subsidy programs as a general rule.247 Indeed, three
separate sources of authority underlie this conclusion: (1) West Lynn
Creamery itself; (2) pre-West Lynn Creamery subsidy cases; and (3) the
Court's decisions under the market-participant exception to the dor-
mant commerce clause.
a. West Lynn Creamery
In West Lynn Creamery, Justice Stevens's dissenting colleagues
charged him with wrongly "castling] doubt" on state business subsi-
dies by needlessly reopening the question of their validity.248 A look
at Justice Stevens's full (albeit abbreviated) treatment of the subject
exonerates him from this charge. That treatment reads as follows:
"We have never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies,
and we need not do so now. We have, however, noted that '[d]irect
subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul' of
the negative Commerce Clause."249
Justice Stevens's brief discussion sounds two themes: first, that
the Court has never spelled out a full-scale theory of how subsidy pro-
grams interact with the Constitution (which is true); and second, that
the Court's authorities nonetheless signal that "[d]irect subsidization
of domestic industry" is "ordinarily" constitutional (which is also
true). Read in this straightforward way, Justice Stevens's message is
hardly as controversial as his critical colleagues suggested; indeed, it is
not controversial at all. Rather, while Justice Stevens professed his un-
preparedness to write chapter and verse on the constitutionality of
state subsidies (an entirely appropriate choice given the judicial pref-
erence for not "formulat[ing] a rule of constitutional law broader
(payments made to state retirees deemed rebates for purposes of intergovernmental tax
immunity doctrine) with Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 1348 (Or. 1995)
(payments made to state retirees not deemed tax rebates), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569
(1995).
247 See Collins, supra note 222, at 98-100 (citing cases in which the Supreme Court
upheld protectionist subsidies); Regan, supra note 222, at 1193-94 (listing examples of state
actions that fall beyond the scope of the protectionist definition).
248 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2221 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).




than is required by the precise facts" presented 250), he simultaneously
acknowledged his impression that existing authorities generally sup-
port the validity of subsidies limited to in-state businesses. Given this
acknowledgement, West Lynn Creamery itself bolsters-rather than un-
dermines-the view that state subsidies "ordinarily" are constitutional.
b. Pre-West Lynn Creamery Subsidy Cases
The Court's earlier decisions offer even more potent aid to de-
fenders of state subsidy programs. In the most telling of these deci-
sions, New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach,25' the Court-while
striking down as discriminatory an Ohio tax exemption afforded to
sellers of ethanol produced in Ohio-saw fit to discuss Indiana's etha-
nol subsidy. The Court did not declare that subsidy constitutional;
indeed, it made clear that the Ohio tax exemption would fall "even if
the Indiana subsidy were invalid."252 The Court did, however, offer its
now often-cited utterance that "[d]irect subsidization of domestic in-
dustry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the Commerce Clause]
prohibition."253
New Energy does not stand alone. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp.,254 the Court upheld Maryland's imposition of stricter documen-
tation requirements on out-of-state auto demolishers, than on in-state
demolishers, seeking to take advantage of the state's inoperable-car-
processing subsidy program.2 55 Although this modification drove al-
most all business in processing Maryland-titled "hulks" to local
firms,256 the Court found that this change of fortunes resulted solely
from "market forces, including that exerted by money from the
state,"257 rather than from the sort of state action "with which the
Commerce Clause is concerned." 258 Maryland, the Court explained,
could have restricted its bounties "to domestic processors from the
start. '259 It made no difference, in the Court's view, that the state first
included out-of-staters in its program before adopting a new approach
that effectively subsidized only in-state firms.2 60
250 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring) (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S.
33, 39 (1885)).
251 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
252 Id. at 278.
253 Id.
254 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
255 It is interesting to note that the "state money initially was made available to licensed
out-of-state processors as well as those located within Maryland." Id. at 809. An amend-
ment in 1974 effectively "channeled" the benefits only "to domestic processors." Id.
256 Id. at 803 n.13.
257 Id. at 810.
258 Id. at 805.




Justice Stevens, who wrote a concurring opinion in Alexandria
Scrap, also saw no difference between the actual case and one in which
a state offered subsidies exclusively to in-staters from day one. For
Justice Stevens, Maryland's action was permissible because the Com-
merce Clause did not "inhibit a State's power to... encourag[e] local
industry" with, among other things, "a cash subsidy."261 In short, Jus-
tice Stevens-the author of West Lynn Creamery-believed a discrimina-
tory "subsidy to operators of [in-state] plants" to be constitutionally
unobjectionable.2 62
In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,263 six mem-
bers of the Court again turned to the subject of subsidies. The issue
was whether Alaska could condition sales of its timber on the buyer's
agreement to process it in the state. A majority of the Court re-
manded for further review,264 but two dissenting Justices (then-Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor) would have upheld the rule under
the market-participant principle first recognized in Alexandria
Scrap.2 65 The dissenters reasoned that Alaska was in effect channeling
state resources to the local timber-processing industry by charging
buyers of state-owned timber a below-market price to secure their
agreement to hire local processors.2 66 The Court should have upheld
this effort, according to the dissent, because "the State could accom-
plish that same result in any number of ways"267-for example by "di-
rectly subsidiz[ing] the primary-processing industry within the
State."268 The four-Justice plurality (which included Justice Stevens)
did not disagree. Instead the plurality found it "unimportant for pres-
ent purposes that the State could support its processing industry...
by direct subsidy."269
261 Id. at 816 (Stevens, J., concurring).
262 Id. at 815 (Stevens, J., concurring).
263 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
264 Id. Justices White, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens refused to apply the market-
participant doctrine and were prepared to strike down the Alaska processing requirement.
Justice Powell and ChiefJustice Burger preferred to remand for a determination whether
the Alaska requirement qualified for market-participant protection. Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor viewed the processing requirement as constitutional under the market-par-
ticipant exception. Justice Marshall did not participate in the case.
265 467 U.S. at 103 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a general treatment of the market-
participant doctrine, see infra notes 291-305 and accompanying text.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id. In making this assertion, the dissenters relied on Alexandria Scrap. In a subse-
quent dissenting opinion, Chief'Justice Rehnquist expressed a similar endorsement of state
power to subsidize local industry. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct.
2009, 2019 (1992) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) ("There seems to be nothing.., that
would prevent Alabama from providing subsidies... to domestic industries that generate
hazardous wastes.").
269 467 U.S. at 99; see also Polelle, supra note 219, at 676 (reading South-Central Timberto
teach that "Alaska could subsidize processing plants in Alaska").
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Only a month before it decided West Lynn Creamery,. the Court
touched again on the matter of subsidies in C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown.270 In an opinion penned by justice Kennedy (and
joined by four other Justices, including Justice Stevens), the Court
struck down a rule that required delivery of all solid waste generated
in the town to a newly built processing center.271 The majority noted
that the forced-use rule was in reality a "financing measure" that had
been put in place to induce the construction and operation of a
needed facility.2 72 In rejecting the town's contention that it had "no
other means to advance [this] interest,"273 the majority cited New En-
ergy in stating that: "[The town] maintains that special financing is
necessary to ensure the long-term survival of the designated facility. If
so, the town may subsidize the facility through general taxes or munici-
pal bonds."274 In a concurring opinion,Justice O'Connor fully agreed
with the majority's assertion that "the town could finance the project
by imposing taxes."275 And in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist andJustice Blackmun, Justice Souter did not question the town's
ability to provide "financing through a subsidy derived from general
tax revenues."276 In short, every opinion written in Carbone seemed to
accept the premise that state subsidization of a local business that was
competing with out-of-state firms was entirely permissible.2 77
This review reveals thatJustice Stevens-whose West Lynn Creamery
opinion supposedly casts a cloud over most state subsidy pro-
grams278-wrote orjoined opinions that endorse state subsidies in no
fewer than four separate cases: Alexandria Scrap, South-Central Timber,
New Energy, and Carbone. Even more important, nearly all of Justice
Stevens's colleagues seem to have signed on to the same position.
The Court's endorsement of subsidies in New Energy came in a unani-
270 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
271 Id. at 1680.
272 Id. at 1684.
273 Id. at 1683.
274 Id. at 1684 (emphasis added).
275 Id. at 1690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
276 Id. at 1701 (Souter, J., dissenting). In particular, Justice Souter found the town's
flow control rule permissible because of the practical, rather than constitutional, "limits on
any municipality's ability to incur debt or to finance facilities out of tax revenues." Id.
More generally, Justice Souter was prepared to uphold the local processing requirement
because it imposed costs only on local residents in the form of increased waste disposal
charges, id. at 1699, so that those costs were borne by "the very citizens who passed [the
law]." Id. This underlying sow-and-reap rationale applies no less strongly to justify the
power to augment plant revenues with subsidies drawn from local taxes than to justify the
power to fund the plant through forced use at stipulated fees. See generally Coenen, supra
note 120, at 473-76 (discussing in-state subsidies in the context of legislative expenditures).
277 See National Solid Waste Management Assoc. v. Williams, 877 F. Supp. 1367, 1380
(D. Minn. 1995) ("[T]he Supreme Court in Carbone identified general taxes as a less bur-
den[some] alternative for subsidizing waste processing.").
278 See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
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mous opinion,joined -by. five members of the current Court.279 And
eight Justices who sit on the Court today spoke approvingly of subsidies
in Carbone.280
Even though this judicial nose-counting signals that a broad ma-
jority of the Court sees no problem with typical subsidies, Justice Ste-
vens could fairly assert in West Lynn Creamery that the Court has not
"squarely confronted [their] constitutionality." 81 The principal opin-
ions in both New Energy and South-Central Timber, after all, spoke favor-
ably of subsidies in only the briefest dicta.2 82 The majority in
Alexandria Scrap approved a subsidy, but only after characterizing the
state in that case as "participating in the market"2 8 3 as "a purchaser" 84
of junk cars.28 5 Finally, the Court's endorsement of a power to subsi-
dize in Carbone could be given a narrow reading (for example, as ex-
isting only when subsidization provides the least restrictive alternative
for meeting a critical state financing need).286 Moreover, it is hard to
say that a controlling treatment of subsidies lurks in Carbone's single
sentence on the subject, especially when the constitutionality of subsi-
dies was not even at issue in the case.2 87 Most importantly, Carbone
does not say that the power to subsidize includes the power to discrim-
inate; it would be consistent with Carbone, for example, for the Court
to require the extension of any state subsidy presently awarded opera-
tors with in-state facilities to similarly situated out-of-state operators, at
279 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 270 (1988).
280 114 S. Ct. at 1679. Indeed, as in New Energy, the Court's endorsement of subsidies
was unanimous. OnlyJustice Breyer, who replaced Justice Blackmun following the Carbone
decision, has yet to write or join an opinion that supports the constitutionality of state
subsidies.
281 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2214 n.15 (1994).
282 New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278 ("Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not
ordinarily run afoul of [the Commerce Clause] prohibition."); South-Central Timber, 467
U.S. at 99 ("[It is] unimportant for present purposes that the state could support its
processing industry... by direct subsidy.").
283 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
284 Id. at 808.
285 See Collins, supra note 222, at 103-04 & n.360 (viewing Alexandria Scrap as a "pro-
curement" case and noting that "[p]assive subsidies may not enjoy the same immunity
from dormant commerce power scrutiny"). See also infra note 291 and accompanying text
(discussing possible characterization of subsidy cases unlike Alexandria Scrap as involving
market "regulation" rather than "participation").
286 Critics of subsidies might also read Carbone to distinguish between subsidies
designed to "ensure the long-term survival of the designated facility," C & A Carbone, Inc.
v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1684 (1994), and subsidies designed to increase
already-successful firms' market share. But recognizing such a distinction would require
the drawing of a most difficult line in the teeth of the Court's rejection of an essentially
identical distinction in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270-71 (1984) (finding
no difference between state efforts "to aid Hawaiian industry" and to encourage and pro-
mote the establishment of a new industry within the state).
287 See supra notes 270-77 and accompanying text.
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least if those out-of-staters pay state taxes.288 In any event, none of the
Supreme Court's authorities reveals a systematic effort to explain why
business subsidies typically are permissible or when exceptions to the
general rule approving them might come into play.2 8 9
In short, as Justice Stevens observed in West Lynn Creamery, the
Court has neither decisively nor comprehensively addressed the sub-
ject of subsidies. At the same time, the Court has so often and un-
hesitatingly approved "subsidization of domestic industry" that a
powerful body of Supreme Court precedent now suggests that courts
"ordinarily" must find such state action constitutional. 290 The body of
288 The observation in the text raises the question of how far any constitutional state
duty to subsidize extends. Out-of-state firms that compete with subsidized in-staters have a
far stronger claim to equal treatment if they have, by paying taxes, helped to create the
pool of funds out of which subsidy payments are made. See Coenen, supra note 120, at
425. In addition, payment by out-of-staters of state taxes indicates that such firms are in
some measure susceptible to the state's regulatory authority, and thus have a claim to take
the "sweet" with the "bitter." At the least, it should be clear that any prohibition on dis-
criminatory subsidization would not impose a duty on the state to subsidize every compara-
ble business in the nation. For example, a subsidy of Maine dairy farmers would not have
to go to every dairy farmer in California; at the least out-of-state dairy farmers seeking the
Maine subsidy would have to show that their product was being sold in Maine and thus in
competition with the product of subsidized farmers in the state. One advantage of the
"rebate-likeness" theory of subsidies we advance here is that it pretermits (essentially, if not
altogether) "standing" problems of this kind.
289 The lack of a "square confrontation" with subsidies also is revealed by the Court's
twice-offered observation that ordinary subsidies might be deemed state regulations for
dormant commerce clause purposes. See infra notes 294-95 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Reeves and New Energy cases). In addition, even the Court's broad declaration in
New Energy that subsidies "ordinarily are permissible" reveals the need to identify in some
systematic way those "non-ordinary" subsidies that fall outside the Court's protective rule.
Cf Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 895 (1985) (O'ConnorJ, dissenting)
(citingJustice Brennan's dissent in Alexandria Scrap for the proposition that "the Court has
divided on the circumstances in which the dormant [c]ommerce [c]lause allows
[subsidies]").
290 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988). See also Metropolitan
Life 470 U.S. at 895 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting) ("[A] State may provide subsidies or rebates
to domestic but not to foreign enterprises if it rationally believes that the former contrib-
ute to the State's welfare in ways that the latter do not."); White v. Massachusetts Council of
Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 221 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) (citing "the power of the State to limit to state residents the direct benefits of subsidy
programs supported with state funds" and "to prefer local businesses as providers of the
goods it purchases in the marketplace, and to prefer local residents as direct purchasers or
recipients of state-created bounty"); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1982) (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("[A] State may make residence within its boundaries more attractive by
offering.., direct distributions of its munificence"; "[t]hat is a healthy form of rivalry.").
Influenced by the Supreme Court's pronouncements, lower courts have opined that
subsidization of local business is constitutional. SeeFireside Nissan, Inc. v. Fanning, 30 F.3d
206, 216 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that "the Court has repeatedly affirmed the long-recog-
nized proposition that states may directly subsidize local industry as long as they do so
without burdening the ability of interstate competitors to sell their products in the state");
W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1984) (Illinois subsidy to
local coal-burning plants, and even local plants that only burn Illinois coal, would be
constitutional).
844
1996] COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRAINTS
pre-West Lynn Creamery precedent becomes even more impressive
when one considers the Court's post-Alexandria Scrap "market-partici-
pant" decisions.
c. The Market-Participant Cases
In a series of cases, the Court has deemed the Commerce Clause
anti-discrimination principle inapplicable when a state chooses not to
regulate commerce, but instead to enter the market to trade its own
resources.29 1 A state, for example, may freely favor its own residents
when it engages in activities such as buying printing services, 292 hiring
workers, 293 or selling state-made cement.294 In these cases, the Court
has neither embraced nor repudiated the view that the market-partici-
pant exception of its own force immunizes state subsidies from dor-
mant commerce clause attack.2 95 Yet even if the exception per se does
not reach subsidies, its underlying rationale supports development of
a principle that shelters subsidies as a general rule from constitutional
challenge.
A central justification for the exception is that state citizens
should be free to reap where they have sown;296 thus, just as state reve-
nues are principally derived from impositions placed by state residents
upon themselves, state residents-in keeping with both "equity and
291 For treatments of the market-participant exception, see Thomas K. Anson & P.M.
Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEx. L
RE,. 71 (1980); Coenen, supra note 120, at 395; Collins, supra note 222, at 43; Mark P.
Gergen, The Selish State and the Market, 66 Tj~x. L. REv. 1097 (1988); Jonathan D. Varat,
State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. Rav. 487 (1981).
292 See American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 409 U.S. 904 (1972), afg mem., 339 F. Supp.
719, 722-24 (1972).
293 See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208
(1983). But cf. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden,
465 U.S. 208, 221 (1984) (applying Privileges and Immunities Clause).
294 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980).
295 See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988) (noting that the
Court has "observed that subsidy programs unlike that of Alexandria Scrap might not be
characterized as proprietary" and emphasizing that the state in Alexandria Scrap was like "a
private purchaser of the auto hulks"); Reeves, 447 U.S. at 440 n.14 ("We have no occasion
here to inquire whether subsidy programs unlike that involved in Alexandria Scrap warrant
characterization as proprietary, rather than regulatory, activity."); Collins, supra note 222,
at 104 n.360 ("[T]he Court has consistently described the immunity to be for 'market
participants,' rather than for subsidies. Thus, the Court could readily distinguish a new
case involving passive subsidies.") (citation omitted); Polelle, supra note 219, at 684 n.112
(citing Reeves and New Energy for the proposition that "[Il]ately ... the Court appears to
have doubts about.., the subsidy version of the market participation exception"); see also
Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 1995) (CudahyJ., concurring)
(arguing that the exception forged in Alexandria Scrap "restricts permissible subsidies to
situations where a state is 'acting in the more general capacity of a market participant'"
and stating that "since first enunciated in Hughes, the market participant doctrine has been
narrowed to exclude many state actions that appear to be 'subsidy equivalents' ").
296 See Coenen, supra note 120, at 421-26 (discussing rationale and collecting other
sources).
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accepted notions of the nature of property"297-should be permitted
to direct the state's largess to their own advantage. This "return of
capital" rationale 298 applies no less strongly to outright cash subsidies
than to resident-favoring disposals of state resources in more ortho-
dox "marketplace" transactions.299 Indeed, if a state's right to
"limit[ ] benefits generated by a state program to those who fund the
state treasury" authorizes the state to make below-market sales of ce-
ment solely to local residents,300 it should authorize no less a restric-
tion to local residents of cash payments made directly from "the state
treasury" itself.301
In short, the view that our Constitution countenances state-made
business subsidies finds support in West Lynn Creamery itself,30 2 the
Court's prior treatments of subsidies,30 3 and an uninterrupted line of
market-participant decisions.30 4 Particularly when viewed as a whole,
these authorities lend strong support to the conclusion that "[d]irect
subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of the
negative Commerce Clause. °305
2. Policy
The case for differential treatment of discriminatory tax breaks
and subsidies finds support in more than Supreme Court precedent.
A host of commentators have defended the distinction on the basis of
history and policy,30 6 and have offered three justifications of particu-
lar significance. First, the distinction reflects the "important eco-
297 Id. at 423.
298 Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 291, at 89.
299 See Regan, supra note 222, at 1195-96.
300 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980).
301 Id. It may be possible to distinguish resident-favoring subsidies from resident-favor-
ing market-participant programs on the ground that the market-participant exception rests
in part on "the long recognized right of a trader... [to choose the] parties with whom he
will deal." Id. at 438-39 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)
(emphasis added)). This rationale, the argument goes, fails to justify cash subsidies be-
cause, in such cases, no trade occurs at all. But see infra note 395 and accompanying text.
However, another key rationale of the market-participant exception-that such programs
are unlikely to over-proliferate in light of their inherent costliness-applies with even
greater force to ordinary (and wholly uncompensated) cash subsidy payments. See
Coenen, supra note 120, at 434-35; Regan, supra note 222, at 1194. Thus it may even be
argued that the market-participant cases establish afortiori the constitutionality of outright
state subsidy programs.
302 See supra part II.B..a.
303 See supra part II.B.l.b.
304 See supra part II.B.l.c.
305 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2214 n.15 (1994) (internal
quotations omitted).
306 See Coenen, supra note 120, at 487-88; Collins, supra note 222, at 126-29; Gergen,
supra note 291, at 1152-53; Paul S. Kline, Publicly-Owned Landfills and Local Preferences: A
Study of the Market Participant Doctrine, 96 Dim,. L. REv. 331, 374 (1992); Regan, supra note
222, at 1110-25. But see Polelle, supra note 219, at 687-89 (questioning the distinction).
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nomic reality"307 that subsidy payments are inherently "expensive"30
and signal a cost "directly borne internally' by the state.30 9 In particu-
lar, because their "immediate expense is borne by the state treas-
ury"310 -and often caught up in the perennially controversial
budgeting process-" [s] ubsidies do not-distort local politics nearly as
effectively as do protectionist... taxes .... ,,1
Second, concerns about discriminatory taxation-and especially
taxation that targets political outsiders-resonate with deep themes in
American law. Chief Justice Marshall noted in a celebrated passage
that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy."312 No similar
champion has stepped forward to make the same claim about the
power to subsidize. Likewise, no idea played a more potent role in the
founding of our Republic than the notion that "[t]axation without
representation is tyranny. '3 13 Proclamations about "nonsubsidization
without representation" hardly strike the same chord. Thus,
profound "historical and psychological" considerations bolster the dis-
tinction between resident-favoring tax breaks and resident-favoring
subsidies. 314
Finally, the distinction springs from the origins of the Commerce
Clause itself, for the Clause grew out of concerns about abusive taxa-
tion-particularly the protective tariff315 Differing methods of finan-
cial "protection" afforded local industries may thus be placed on a
continuum that moves progressively away from this manner of ob-
structing commerce. At the endpoint of the continuum lies the tariff
itself, the quintessential form of state action that violates the Com-
merce Clause. 16 One step removed from the tariff is the tax exemp-
tion, deduction, or credit afforded only to resident payers of an
307 West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2221 (Scalia, J., concurring).
308 Regan, supra note 222, at 1194.
309 Collins, supra note 222, at 102.
310 Id.
311 Id.; accord Kline, supra note 306, at 374 ("[State subsidies] are visible, direct, and
recurring costs to the state checked through both the political process and the state
budget.") (foomotes omitted); see also SctwEKa ar pA.., supra note 6, at 52 ("[When policy-
makers use 'easy money,' like a... tax reduction, the more likely it is that the subsidy will
be abused.").
312 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
313 The phrase is generally attributed to James Otis. According to JOHN BARTLETr,
FANuLtx QUOTAMONS (Emily Morison Beck ed., 14th ed. 1968): "This maxim was the
guide and watchword of all the friends of liberty. Otis actually said: No parts of His Maj-
esty's dominions can be taxed without their consent." Id. at 446 n.4 (citation omitted).
314 Coenen, supra note 120, at 481.
315 See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 93 (12th ed. 1991) ("The national
commerce power, it was hoped, would put an end to... protective tariffs on imports from
other states.").
316 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 U.S. 2205, 2211 (1994); Guy v. Baltimore,




otherwise generally applicable tax. Such tax breaks may differ from
tariffs, particularly if they disadvantage some resident taxpayers.3 17
However, in cases like Bacchus Imports,318 the Court held that discrimi-
natory tax breaks are close enough to tariffs that they too violate the
dormant commerce clause.3 19 Another step removed from the tariff is
the resident-favoring tax rebate. Tax rebates differ from protective
tariffs and more common forms of discriminatory tax relief because
rebates return to taxpayers cash already in the state's coffers. In West
Lynn Creamery, however, the Court left no doubt that a tax rebate pro-
gram favorable to local industry fell within the orbit of the anti-tariff
principle.3 20
Beyond the tax rebate on the continuum lies the subsidy paid out
of the general revenues to favored producers. This form of govern-
ment program-involving neither tariff nor tax-appears to be
shielded from Commerce Clause concerns.321 Why? Because consti-
tutional interpretation properly depends, in part, on the proximity of
relation between a challenged practice and the practice at which the
Constitution's Framers took actual aim.3 22 The Framers' focused con-
cerns about commerce-stifling taxation thus support the strong line
past decisions have drawn between discriminatory tax breaks and dis-
criminatory subsidies. Put differently, ordinary subsidies are suffi-
ciently removed from the protective tariff on our constitutional
continuum that they need not be afforded identical constitutional
treatment.
C. Subdividing Subsidies (I): Looking at Who Gets the Subsidy
To say that subsidies are ordinarily constitutional is not to say that
they are always so. Subsidies, for example, may come with "down-
stream restraints" that create significant constitutional problems.3 23
317 For example, in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984), the state ex-
empted locally produced fruit wine, but not sake or other locally produced beverages,
from the state's wholesale liquor tax. 468 U.S. at 265. Such a law is less problematic (both
from an anti-protectionist and political-process perspective) than a straightforward tariff
placed only on non-locally produced fruit wine.
318 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
319 Id. at 271-73.
320 West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2213 (comparing the rebate scheme with the ex-
emption scheme struck down in Bacchus).
321 See Coenen, supra note 120, at 479-81.
322 Id. at 438 n.264.
323 This Article does not further pursue the subject of downstream restraints (except
to the extent discussed in the context of tax relief, see supra text accompanying notes 187-
93, 206-16) because one of the authors of this article already has written on the subject.
Coenen, supra note 120, at 468-70, 476-78. The Court approached the subject of down-
stream restraints (albeit outside the subsidy context) in South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1984) (plurality opinion). See also White v. Massachusetts
Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 221-22 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
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Subsidies may also become constitutionally suspect if they generate
large market distortions for very little cost 324 Finally, two other vari-
ables may affect the constitutionality of a subsidy award: First, who
receives the subsidy; and second, how the subsidy is structured. This
subpart considers the who-receives-the-subsidy question, leaving the
"how" question for the next subpart.
1. The "Ordinary" Business Subsidy
If business subsidies for domestic firms "ordinarily" are constitu-
tional, the question arises as to what comprises the "ordinary" business
subsidy. The standard subsidy program, like the standard business-
development tax incentive, is one that applies across the board to all
business firms or activities that fall into some favored category.325
This was the type of subsidy involved in New Energy,326 as well as the
type that would have been involved in West Lynn Creamery had the sub-
sidy stood alone. 327 Thus, under the authorities collected above, sub-
sidies that are generally applicable to a category of favored firms or
activities are, except in extraordinary cases, constitutionally
unobjectionable.
2. The Targeted New-Business Subsidy
With the growth of aggressive economic-development efforts, a
new brand of business subsidy has proliferated: the subsidy designed
to induce a targeted firm to operate within the subsidizing state. By
way of such subsidies, states or localities afford cash payments or other
non-tax incentives (or a mixture of cash and non-cash incentives) on a
single-shot basis to a particular firm to generate new in-state business ac-
tivity. Efforts to woo large projects built by Mercedes (in Alabama) 328
and BMW (in South Carolina) 32 9 exemplify this burgeoning form of
business-development incentive.330
The relevant constitutional question raised by targeted new-busi-
ness subsidies is whether courts should treat them less favorably than
traditional, generally applicable subsidy programs. Targeted new-
business subsidies do differ from more orthodox subsidies in signifi-
(emphasizing downstream-restraint restriction); Kline, supra note 306, at 380-83 (describ-
ing effects of downstream regulation).
324 See infra text accompanying note 460. This subject, like the subject of downstream
restraints, is discussed in Coenen, supra note 120, at 478-79.
325 See supra text accompanying notes 73-83, 86-87.
326 See supra text accompanying notes 251-53.
327 West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2214.
328 See, e.g., ScnwEKE Er At., supra note 6, at 43-44. See supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
329 See, e.g., O'Malley, supra note 244, at DI.
330 See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
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cant respects. On balance, however, there is no good reason to treat
targeted new-business subsidies less favorably than ordinary subsidies
under the dormant commerce clause.331 Indeed, there is a strong ar-
gument that the Court's receptiveness to orthodox subsidy programs
supports a fortiori the constitutionality of the single-shot new-business
bounty.
To begin with, on our continuum of strengthening claims of con-
stitutionality, the targeted subsidy falls even farther away from the pro-
tective tariff than does the generalized business subsidy.332 The
reason why is simple. The traditional protective tariff is not designed,
at least primarily, to attract new business; instead, it seeks to protect the
competitive positions of existing businesses from out-of-state competi-
tion.333 Put another way, if the ordinary business subsidy is far re-
moved from the paradigmatic protective tariff,334 the single-shot new-
business subsidy is very far removed. Indeed, by requiring the establish-
ment of new business operations in the subsidizing state, such boun-
ties may well serve to intensify the competitive environment in which
existing in-state producers operate.33 5
Three additional functional considerations confirm that courts
should be no less protective of targeted start-up subsidies than subsi-
dies that apply across the board to a group of in-state operators. First,
the act of exchanging a subsidy outlay for something that is discerni-
331 There is reason to believe that the Court agrees. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 879 (1985) ("[A] State's goal of bringing in new business is legitimate
and often admirable."); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1982) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) ("[A] State may make residence within its boundaries more attractive by offering
direct benefits to its citizens in the form of public services .... Through these means, one
State may attract citizens of other States to join the numbers of its citizenry."). In Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), the Court noted that "business development pro-
grams'-no less than "police and fire protection"--can be "restrict[ed] to state residents"
because "[s] uch policies, while perhaps 'protectionist' in a loose sense, reflect the essential
and patently unobjectionable purpose of state government-to serve the citizens of the
State." Id. at 442 (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens, in his concurrence in Alexandria
Scrap, approved of the ability of the states to "experiment with different methods of en-
couraging local industry," including the use of a "cash subsidy." Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 816 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). See generallyJOHN E. No-
wAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsrrruTioNAL LAWv § 8.9, at 299 (4th ed. 1991) ("[I]f a state
offers a company a cash bonus or tax exemption in exchange for the company locating a
factory in the state, its action can be upheld because the state is bearing the cost of produc-
ing some economic benefits for people in the state.").
332 See supra text accompanying notes 315-22.
333 A leading law dictionary, for example, defines "protective tariff" as: "A law impos-
ing duties on imports, with the purpose and the effect of discouraging the importation of
competitive products of foreign origin, and consequently of stimulating and protecting the
home production of the same or equivalent articles." BLAcK's LAw DIcrIONARY 1223 (6th ed.
1990) (emphasis added).
334 See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
335 See Dionne, supra note 244, at D9 (quoting Illinois Gov. Jim Edgar as saying that
local business people "were infuriated with the state for giving special breaks to individual
companies that were sometimes their fiercest competitors").
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bly new permits the state to claim that it has acted as "a purchaser, in
effect" of a valuable asset.3 36 The ability of the state thus to wrap itself
in the market-participant mantle finds particularly strong support in
Alexandria Scrap,337 where the Court deemed the state a "purchaser" of
wrecked cars that had no continuing value to the state or to anyone
else.338 If a state pays money for a firm's agreement to locate a new
plant within its borders, is it not even more clearly a purchaser of a
tangible, valuable asset? The reality is that the state, for all practical
purposes,339 acts just like the state in Alexandria Scrap in every new-
business subsidy case: it encourages desired business activities, per-
ceived to be in short supply, by "bid[ding] up their price."340 These
activities thus occur, as in Alexandria Scrap, "in response to market
forces, including that exerted by money from the State."3 41
Second, any state effort to spawn entirely new business operations
bolsters the claim that it has undertaken the sort of "experimentation
in things social and economic" that our constitutional tradition of fed-
eralism celebrates. 342 The state simply behaves more like a "labora-
tory" of local inventiveness when it spurs new business ventures than
when it acts to protect the old.3 43 This is not to say that state efforts to
channel subsidies in whole or in part to existing businesses trigger no
concerns about state autonomy.344 Those concerns, however, apply
with added force when the state acts in focused fashion to expand its
business base.
Finally, when a state considers the possibility of new business sub-
sidies, ordinary political processes should provide greater safeguards
against ill-advised and parochial decisionmaking than when a state en-
acts a subsidy of the ordinary sort. Clearly, this is true when an en-
tirely new business locates in the state because the managers and
workers of extant business operations will have influence in govern-
mental decisionmaking councils that is not possessed by the new-
336 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808 (1976).
337 See supra notes 254-69 and accompanying text.
338 Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 808-10; seeNew Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 277 (1988) (noting that the Court in Alexandria Scrap invoked "the analogy of the
State to a private purchaser of the auto hulks").
339 See supra text accompanying notes 220-21.
340 Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 806.
341 Id. at 810. Put somewhat differently, if Alexandria Scrap "can be taken to suggest that
a straightforward production subsidy for local producers is constitutionally permissible,"
Regan, supra note 222, at 1196, it follows a fortiori that new-business subsidies are
unobjectionable.
342 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting)).
343 See, e.g., souices cited supra note 331.
344 See infra text accompanying notes 354-63.
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comer.3 45 In addition, focused aid to new business operations may
heighten competitive pressures on other in-state businesses, resulting
in organized political opposition.346
There are arguments on the other side. For example, it may be
that political checks on excessive spending diminish in the targeted-
business subsidy setting because these "[i]ncentive packages are often
put together in secret without appropriate discussion among
lawmakers or the public."3 47 Targeted subsidies, moreover, may be
the product of contracts that lock local governments into ongoing
multi-year financial commitments, which consequently are neither re-
viewable nor revocable in the annual budget cycle.3 48 And subsidies
designed to attract a new plant may clash with deep constitutional
commitments to long-term maximization of the public good,349 espe-
cially if such subsidies typically result from the near-term "political re-
turn" that attends "attracting a large, high visibility project."3 5 0
345 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 1, at 684 (noting that "political pressures to subsidize
existing local industries may prevent the local government from properly evaluating such
long-term effects as the positive externalities") (foomotes omitted); see also European Compe-
tition Policy: Banned Aid, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 1994, at 75-76 (bemoaning "subsidy-sucking"
local monopolies with the "political weight" to crowd out more efficient "small and me-
dium-sized firms" that provide a "source of new employment").
346 See ScHwEKE Er AI-, supra note 6, at 35-36 ("[Ellements of the business community
are often among those opposed to aggressive inducements designed to attract industry ....
[B]usiness people become upset because special breaks given to certain companies pro-
duce an uneven playing field and, in effect, may penalize existing businesses."); O'Malley,
supra note 244, at D2 ("Subsidies increasingly are drawing complaints from existing busi-
nesses that want to know why newcomers should get help moving into town to compete
with going concerns."); see also Andrew Kolesar, Note, Can State and Local Tax Incentives and
Other Contributions Stimulate EconomicDevelopment?, 44 TAX LAw. 285, 307 (1990) (suggesting
that the "political backlash" resulting from the use of economic incentives may diminish
their importance).
347 SciiwKKE ET At., supra note 6, at 4 (citing John Hood, Ante Freeze: Stop the State
Bidding WarsforBigBusiness, 68 HERITAGE FOUND. POL'YREv. 62,66 (1994)). This dynamic
is especially troubling if, in fact, "[t]he power of corporate lobbyists and collusion between
state officials, legislators and businesses encourage the provision of subsidies." Id. at 9.
348 See supra text accompanying notes 307-11.
349 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 311-12 (1993). See generally
ScHwEKE ET AL, supra note 6, at 57 ("Although some states and localities can benefit even
from wasteful incentives, the nation as a whole loses if no new jobs are being created and
companies are moving from one place to another.").
350 ScHWFxE E" AL., supra note 6, at 34; see id. at 40 (" [T]he high visibility projects
seem to draw the media's attention.") (quoting NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S Ass'N, INVESTING IN
AMERirCA's ECONOMIc FUTURE: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1992)); id. at
82 ("[G]overnors must be prepared to withstand the political pressure that may result
when they announce that their state will not engage in a bidding war for a high-visibility,
high-impact project."); Barrett, supra note 5, at 1028 ("State leaders, because of their polit-
ical instincts, are usually guided by short-term considerations.").
Recent experience gives some credence to an argument against new-business subsidies
based on Commerce Clause concerns about interstate "retaliation." See, e.g., id. at 1026
("The competition for new business among the states has turned into a game of one-up-
manship, resulting in a vicious circle "that encourages balkanization."); see Taylor, supra
note 1, at 670 ("[Clities across the country engage in fierce bidding battles over prestigious
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These arguments, however, do not justify adoption of a more re-
strictive Commerce Clause rule for the targeted new-business subsidy.
Concerns about secret deal-making and multi-year commitments, for
example, apply only to a limited class of cases. Even when applicable,
moreover, these arguments do not undercut the core political-process
and "it's-not-like-a-tariff' justifications for distinguishing subsidies
from tax breaks.3 51 The "public good" argument suffers from the vice
of amorphousness and reliance on constitutional values at an unwork-
able level of generality. 52 On balance, the arguments for treating
targeted new-business subsidies less favorably than generally-applica-
ble subsidies undercut only modestly the very strong arguments for
affording targeted subsidies even morejudicial deference. 53 Such sub-
sidies accordingly should not carry any diminished presumption of
constitutionality.
3. The Targeted "Stay at Home" Subsidy
There is another sort of subsidy that the state can grant: the
bounty designed to retain a specific business already operating in the
state 3 54 In some ways, this form of subsidy is more problematic than a
new-business-attracting bounty. Recipients of "stay at home" subsidies,
after all, have a toehold in the halls of local policymaking not enjoyed
by courted outsiders.355 Maintaining the status quo also smacks less of
creative federalistic experimentation than does the retooling and ex-
pansion of the state's economic base.35 6 Perhaps most important, fun-
industrial projects in the hope of stimulating local growth and ensuring prosperity. In the
heat of this competition, state and local governments face tremendous pressure to grant
ever-increasing subsidies to corporations.") (footnotes omitted); Phil Primack, Study: Pref-
erential Tax Treatment Hurts Overal Eonomy, B. HERALD, Mar. 24, 1995, at 28 (quoting Ar-
thur Rolnick, co-author of a report by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, as saying
that corporate posturing for subsidies and tax breaks "is part of the game we are seeing
played across the country"); see also ScHwE, Er AL., supra note 6, at 38 (noting copycatting
of Kentucky industrial recruitment laws by other states in the region).
351 In particular, when a project requiring multi-year commitments is proposed, its
expense will likely induce close scrutiny by the public and local policymakers. See supra text
accompanying notes 309-10. Moreover, while the use of secret negotiations may reduce
political process checks to some degree, the public will eventually learn of deals negotiated
behind closed doors and will hold the public officials who made and approved them ac-
countable for their spending decisions.
352 See supra text accompanying note 322. Moreover, even if many subsidies may be
economically unwise and inefficient, "The Constitution does not require the States to sub-
scribe to any particular economic theory." CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S.
69, 92 (1987).
353 See supra notes 332-46 and accompanying text.
354 See, e.g., Kolesar, supra note 346, at 296-97 (discussing various "incentives [given] to
an existing business which is threatening to leave," and specifically focusing on New York
City's granting of incentives to maintain NBC's local operations); Taylor, supra note 1, at
682 (considering the efforts of Texas to retain General Motors plants).
355 See supra text accompanying note 345.
356 See supra text accompanying notes 342-43.
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neling money to existing in-state firms already engaged in economic
battle with out-of-state competitors involves, in a rather pure sense,
the sort of "economic protectionism" at which the Commerce Clause
takes aim.3 57
Even so, there are good reasons for including "stay at home"
bounties in the rule that "ordinarily" shields subsidies from dormant
commerce clause attack. To begin with, in the tax-relief context, the
Court has pointedly refused to distinguish between incentives af-
forded new and existing business operations.358 Considerations of au-
thority and symmetry thus favor like treatment of business-creating
and business-retaining subsidies.
Functional concerns also support applying a strong presumption
of constitutionality to targeted "stay at home" subsidies. First, the risk
that such subsidies will unduly proliferate if permitted is undercut by
the built-in "costs of exit" that normally anchor established businesses
in their current locations.3 59 Second, permitting targeted business-
creation subsidies,3 60 while outlawing targeted business-retention sub-
sidies, might well generate economically unjustified business reloca-
tions by forcing home states to compete on an uneven playing field.
Finally, the unequal treatment of targeted business-attracting and
business-retaining subsidies would open a judicial can of worms.
Courts would find themselves in the position of having to distinguish
between the two sorts of subsidies.3 61 Courts would also have to distin-
guish between "targeted" and "generally applicable" subsidies.362 On
balance, the best rule is also the simplest: all subsidies should receive
357 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978) (differenti-
ating between "'economic isolation' and protectionism" and unavoidable "incidental bur-
dens on interstate commerce"). Put somewhat differently, a subsidy aimed solely at
benefitting an existing operation-without exacting from it any new business in the form
of plant expansion, increased employment, or the like-lies close to the sort of state activ-
ity involved in the imposition of a true protective tariff. See supra note 333 and accompany-
ing text.
358 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 406 (1984) (declining to draw any
distinction between a discriminatory tax that "diverts new business into the State" and one
that "merely prevents current business from being diverted elsewhere"); see supra text ac-
companying notes 59-60.
359 See, e.g., Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984)
(noting "the physical and practical immobility of plaintiffs' processing plants"), afd by an
equally divided Court, 471 U.S. 81 (1985).
360 See supra part II.C.2.
361 What about, for example, cash payments made to a firm if it meets a certain
number-of-employees goal? What if the state's intent in granting the subsidy is both to
maintain and to increase employment by the subsidized firm? See Collins, supra note 222,
at 102 ("It would.., be difficult to separate subsidies that burden preexisting trade from
those that stimulate new trade.").
362 What about, for example, a subsidy afforded to an existing in-state plant pursuant
to an established state program that envisions subsidy grants to participants in a particular
business but also gives a governing board wide authority to deny subsidies to individual
applicants? What if the board has only narrow authority? A middle range of authority?
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COMMERCE CLAUSE RESTRAINTS
the same high level ofjudicial acceptance that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly signaled for "subsidization of domestic industry."3 63
D. Subdividing Subsidies (II): Looking at How the Subsidy
is Structured
The preceding discussion supports the conclusion that business
subsidies-whether afforded to targeted beneficiaries or to a class of
favored firms-generally should survive constitutional attack. West
Lynn Creamery; however, teaches that at least some business-supporting
subsidies run afoul of the Commerce Clause.364 As a result, it is neces-
sary to look with particularity at the various forms that state subsidy
structures can, and do, take. At least eight categories of benefits of-
fered by states seem sufficiently important to merit individual exami-
nation: (1) infrastructure improvements; (2) educational benefits;
(3) below-market leases and land sales; (4) land give-aways; (5) flat-
amount cash subsidies; (6) per-unit subsidies; (7) loan forgiveness;
and (8) user fee waivers. Although each of these forms of subsidy
differs from the others, all are properly subject to review under the
363 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); accord Collins, supra
note 222, at 104 ("On balance, the better rule is immunity for all subsidies. The rule is
simple to apply.. . ."). The case for uniform treatment of subsidies derives support, in
part, from the wide agreement that many such subsidies-even if directed at already ex-
isting firms-are economically sound. In particular, many subsidies are approved for pub-
lic-directed and profoundly important governmental goals, such as revitalization of
poverty-stricken neighborhoods, Taylor, supra note 1, at 706 n.232, attacking serious unem-
ployment, id. at 704, or aiding businesses in modernization programs. ScwEE Er AL,
supra note 6, at 48-49 (noting Michigan's implementation of"a program for helping manu-
facturing companies select and apply new technologies in the workplace"); id. at 61
(describing and endorsing the Kansas "high performance incentive program" which en-
courages simultaneous technology and workforce upgrading).
Some business-retaining subsidies can enhance public well-being by helping busi-
nesses that are in financial trouble, see, e.g., European Union: Mad Bull Disease, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 15, 1994, at 68 (advocating a subsidy, in an amount less than the state's liquidation
costs, likely to revitalize an imminently bankrupt business). Subsidies also can be used to
increase employment in underdeveloped areas-or at least to help ensure that conditions
of high unemployment do not get worse. See NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, Economic
Growth and Development Incentibes, in NGA PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL COOPERATION § 3.2.3
(1993) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES], reprinted in ScHWEYE r AL, supra note 6, app. A ("Using
subsidies to encourage investment in distressed areas of the state or to increase employ-
ment opportunities that bring the underclass into the economic mainstream are viewed as
legitimate development objectives."); Barrett, supra note 5, at 1034 ("Most would agree that
a government program that diverts industry from wealthy to poor states and thus improves
the economy of a depressed region or state is desirable."). In short, "it is constitutionally
and politically impossible to completely eliminate the use of development incentives. It is
also not advisable on other grounds, since some incentives may serve the public interest."
ScmvEKE Er AL., supra note 6, at 16. At the very least, this laundry-listing of a variety of
potentially "good" subsidies suggests why "[o] utright prohibition of the worst types of [sub-
sidies] ... may be... administratively unworkable .... " Id. at 49. See Gergen, supra note
291, at 1137 ("[Flormulating a simple rule that can distinguish wealth-creating subsidies
from those that are inefficient is virtually impossible.").
364 See supra part IA.
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same constitutional criteria. In particular, courts must ask whether
the distinctive features of each subsidy's structure render it sufficiently
"tariff-like" to fall victim to the dormant-commerce-clause prohibi-
tion.365 More specifically, courts should inquire whether the particu-
lar benefit so resembles a discriminatory tax rebate as to bring it
within the disqualifying principle of the West Lynn Creamery case.3 66
1. Infrastructure Improvements
Business-development subsidies do not always come in cash, and
one important form of non-cash aid is the provision of needed infra-
structure for a planned business facility.36 7 As a carrot to attract a
manufacturing plant, for example, the state may offer to expand
roads, to improve a nearby waterway, or to install needed sewer pipes
or wastewater treatment facilities. Do these forms of "subsidization"
run afoul of the dormant commerce clause? Almost certainly not.
The construction of publicly-owned facilities to spur private busi-
ness investment seems far removed from the tariff-centered concerns
that gave rise to the Commerce Clause.3 68 Building such improve-
ments is a quintessential form of government activity that creates as-
sets owned by the citizenry as a whole.3 69 States, moreover, choose
their capital projects for a rich variety of reasons that courts are ill-
prepared to evaluate, prioritize, and second-guess. 370 History offers
little aid to challengers of these projects: Hamilton and other com-
mercial expansionists of the constitutional period might well have wel-
comed the synergistic development of roads and comparable public
improvements along with private production facilities.37 1 The Court
365 See supra notes 315-22 and accompanying text.
366 See supra notes 227-32, 239, and accompanying text.
367 See Dionne, supra note 244, at D9 (reporting that in effort to keep the headquarters
of Sears, Roebuck & Co. in-state, Illinois officials spent $61 million to "build highways and
improve the prospective site").
368 See supra notes 332-35 and accompanying text.
369 See PRINcIPLES, supra note 363, at 81 (in which the National Governors' Associati6n
advocates subsidies in the form of "physical and social infrastructures," and urges that
"such investments may be tied to the location or expansion of an individual company...
[but] should be viewed as assets for other businesses that locate in the community"); Bar-
rett, supra note 5, at 1020 n.3 (noting that an infrastructure "expenditure, unlike a bribe, is
not objectionable as it leads to real improvements in state resources"); O'Malley, supra
note 244, at D2 (quoting Lt. Gov. Frank O'Bannon, who holds the view that "infrastructure
improvements... help everyone").
370 See Collins, supra note 222, at 101-02.
371 See ScnwEKE F- AL., supra note 6, at 47-48 ("State spending on... transportation
infrastructure... [has] traditionally been understood as helping to improve private sector
performance."). Cf Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707, 714 (1972) (noting that a "facility provided at public expense" can aid the "right
to travel" in keeping with constitutional purposes). Of course, "Hamilton believed that the
future of the United States depended on a large-scale expansion of industry and com-
merce." JOHN M. BLUM E" AL., THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 141 (1963). SeeAlexander Ham-
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has recognized that "[s] tates may try to attract business by creating an
environment conducive to economic activity, as by maintaining good
roads."372 If that is so, it seems logical that states should be able to lay
out road systems in the way that most successfully stimulates commer-
cial and industrial activity. In other words, states should be able to use
good roads to lure good firms. And if states may use good roads for
this purpose, they should be permitted to use good sewers and other
state-owned capital improvements as well.
2. Educational Benefits
States sometimes lure new businesses with pledges to provide or
pay for specialized worker training.373 This form of aid differs from
the provision of infrastructure, because workers' skills-unlike new
roads or sewer pipes-are not government-owned.3 74 By providing
state-of-the-art worker training, however, the local government imple-
ments its historic role as educator 375 and does so in a way tailored to
produce concretely valuable and potentially lasting benefits to mem-
bers of the local community.3 76 Worker training subsidies-perhaps
even more so than many infrastructure improvements-provide the
sort of "individual and collective good"377 that neutralizes the most
potent objections to "handout" subsidies that directly benefit only a
favored business recipient.3 78 For this reason, even staunch critics of
business development programs have expressed few qualms about
worker-training incentives.3 79 Courts should follow suit by finding this
form of subsidy constitutionally unobjectionable.
ilton, The Continentalist No. V. April 18, 1782, in SELECTED W'rIINGS AND SPEECHES OF
ALEXANDER HAmILTON 55 (MortonJ. Frisch ed., 1985) (arguing that "every man acquainted
with commercial history" recognizes that trade cannot properly regulate itself without the
"encouragements, or restraints of government.").
372 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2214 n.15 (1994).
373 See, e.g., Kolesar, supra note 346, at 287; ScHwEKE Er A., supra note 6, at 7 ("Non-tax
incentives, a growing form of inducement, include ... customized work training.").
374 See supra text accompanying note 369.
375 See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995) (noting the historical sover-
eignty of states "in areas such as ... education"); id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[I]t is well established that education is a traditional concern of the States.").
376 See supra text accompanying note 349.
377 SUNSTEIN, supra note 349, at 312.
378 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 363, at 81; ScHwEKE Er AL.., supra note 6, app. B at 83
("[I]ncentives... should be investments that accrue to the state and its citizens as well as
the business and that will remain if the business leaves. This means education, training,
and infrastructure as opposed to tax breaks and financing subsidies .... .") (quoting An-
drew Grose, Former Nev. Dev. Dir.).
379 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 363, at 81; ScHwEKE ET AL., supra note 6, app. B. at 83.
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3. Below-Market Leases and Land Sales
Governments are often landowners. Indeed, they may hold real
property for the sole purpose of later transferring it to private entre-
preneurs for expanded business development. What if a local govern-
ment sells or leases realty at a below-market cost in return for the
grantee's commitment to use it to launch a new business venture?380 Is
this form of subsidy constitutionally permissible?
The argument in favor of the constitutionality of below-market
land transfers begins with the Court's decision in Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake.38' In that case, the Court relied on the market-participant ex-
ception to the dormant commerce clause to reject a challenge to a
state's preference for its own residents in the sale of state-made ce-
ment. If a state "as a seller of cement, unquestionably fits the 'market
participant' label, '382 so too should the state as a seller of buildings
and land.3 83 Because the market-participant moniker applies so aptly
to this setting (and no exception to the exception appears to ap-
ply3 8 4), the state simply "is not subject to the restraints of the Com-
merce Clause."3 85
Indeed, Reeves should control afortiori in the below-market-land-
transfer cases. Why? Because in Reeves the Court was willing to coun-
tenance even outright discrimination between residents and non-resi-
dents in the making of cement-sale contracts.3 86 Ordinary land-
transfer subsidies do not involve any comparable "residents only" pol-
icy.3 8 7 Indeed, because state land-transfer preferences typically are
open to both erstwhile out-of-staters and established in-staters, it is dif-
ficult to say that they involve any discrimination against interstate
commerce at all.3 88 Moreover, in Reeves the state was hoarding a re-
380 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 1, at 675 n.41 (citing the use of "subsidized rent" as a
business incentive).
381 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
382 Id. at 440.
383 Kolesar, supra note 346, at 287 (noting that many states offer subsidized leasing,
among other creative "economic incentives outside the tax realm").
384 The Court, for example, has signaled that an exception to the market-participant
principle may apply when the state transfers natural resources or puts "downstream" condi-
tions on the buyer of state-sold property. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke,
467 U.S. 82 (1984); see generally Coenen, supra note 120, at 453-60 (natural resources), 468-
73 (downstream restraints). These exceptions, however, have no application to most busi-
ness development subsidies, including ordinary below-market realty transfers. See id. at 461
& n.384 (noting the inapplicability of any "natural resources" exception to typical land
transfers because all states include land). Nonetheless, if a land-transfer or other subsidy
were structured to require continued and future dealing with private in-state firms, it
would raise significant constitutional problems. See id. at 476-78.
385 White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983).
386 See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 442.
387 Id. at 441.
388 In particular, this is not a case in which the state's action "leav[es] no room for
investment from outside." C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994).
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source it could have made readily available for out-of-state use.3 89
Land, in contrast, cannot be shipped away.3 90 Because the Court in
Reeves countenanced even outright hoarding of a readily transportable
resource by way of state-made trades, it surely should countenance
state-made land transfers that cannot, and do not, involve hoarding at
all. For this reason, the constitutionality of bargain-price leases and
land sales seems uncontroversial3 91
Consider as well the "non-discriminatory" alternative to the ordinary below-market lease or
sale: the lessee, in exchange for the favorable terms of transfer, would promise merely to
initiate a business expansion somewhere in the United States. Is it really appropriate to say
that the failure to offer such terms constitutes "discrimination against interstate com-
merce"? To be sure, discrimination would be present if a state were to blatantly favor, in its
awards of favorable property transfers, businesses already incorporated or operating in the
state. But such a case is far-removed from the ordinary program of this kind, which gener-
ally involves leasing or selling realty to any firm or person in return for the mere promise
to use the transferred property for business operations.
389 Reeves, 447 U.S. at 433, 443-44.
390 See United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 526-27 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasiz-
ing this fact in defining scope of Congress's power to act under the Commerce Clause).
391 There is, as usual, a counter-argument. In Reeves, the Court noted that South Da-
kota had not "cut off access to its own cement altogether, for the policy does not bar resale
of South Dakota cement to out-of-state purchasers." Reeves, 447 U.S. at 444 n.17. Arguably,
this ability-to-resell feature helped interstate commerce enough (particularly when com-
pared with the option of having South Dakota cease all cement-producing operations) that
the Court was willing to tolerate South Dakota's favoritism of local businesses in its initial
sale of cement. The out-of-state resale option applicable to state-made cement, however,
cannot apply to state-made realty transfers precisely because land cannot be transported
and used outside the state. See supra note 390 and accompanying text. Critics of below-
market realty transfers thus may argue that Reeves does not constitutionalize below-market
land transfers on the ground that an important basis for the Court's decision in Reeves is
inapplicable in the land-transfer context. See also South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wun-
nicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96 (1984) (explaining that the Court in Reeves noted that "South Dakota
did not bar resale of South Dakota cement to out-of-state purchasers").
We find this argument unpersuasive. The discussion in Reeves of the resale option
(which was limited to a footnote) was not offered as an importantjustification for applying
the market-participant rule. The footnote instead was offered merely to bolster the Court's
explanation why it chose not to apply any exception to "the general rule of Alexandria
Scrap," Reeves, 447 U.S. at 447, based on the "hoarding" of resources which "by happen-
stance" are found in the state. Id. at 444. The Court's concern about a state's placing
conditions on a buyer's selection of its own trading partners is particularly understandable
given the Court's celebration in Reeves itself of "the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independ-
ent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." Id. at 438-39 (quoting United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). Conditioning a land transfer on a promise to
use the land to operate a new business, however, involves no such restriction. And it cer-
tainly does not involve the sort of "embargo" involved in restricting all resales of a trans-
portable state-made product to local residents. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979) (striking down a statute prohibiting the out-of-state sale of Oklahoma minnows).
Put differently, the sort of activity at issue in Reeves involved a risk of undue hoarding; thus,
in such a case, even if the state is a market-participant, courts may look at the degree to
which the state has constricted the outflow of goods. Standing alone, however, below-
market realty transfers do not, and cannot, involve hoarding, because land necessarily is
not subject to cross-border transfer. In short, because land transfers cannot involve hoard-
ing, Reeves's expression of concern about too much hoarding is beside the point in the
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The local government's claim to autonomy in this setting finds
support in an assortment of additional public policy concerns. There
is, for example, a judicial and social interest in avoiding problematic
inquiries into what is, and what is not, a "below-market" price. The
claim of autonomy is strengthened by each state's especially keen in-
terest in being able to define itself by controlling the use of lands
physically situated within its borders.392 And deployment of below-
market realty transfers (particularly as part of implementing indus-
trial-park, enterprise-zone, or comprehensive land-use plans) com-
ports with the Court's rooting of the market-participant exception in
the goal of encouraging "effective and creative programs for solving
local problems."393
4. Land Giveaways
What if the state-instead of selling land at a submarket price-
transfers land free of charge in return for the grantee's commitment
to place a facility on it?394 This gratuitous grant bears such an obvious
resemblance to the below-market sale that the cases seem indistin-
guishable. In particular, if a state may sell land for much less than its
market value, why should it not be able to make such a sale for a
"below-market price" of zero? A possible response to this question is
that application of the market-participant exception hinges in part on
the state's "appearance of 'participating in' .. . the market. '395 When
the government acts as a seller or lessor of property, it bears "similari-
ties" to "private businesses . . .in the marketplace." 396 Not so, the
argument goes, when the government collects no payments whatso-
ever for the transfer of its property. In such circumstances, the argu-
ment concludes, the government cannot be viewed as a market
participant.
Courts should reject this would-be distinction, for it is as thin as a
shadow. First, the state's likeness in appearance to a private trader is
only one-and not the most pertinent-factor considered when ap-
land-transfer context. See Fireside Nissan, Inc. v. Fanning, 30 F.3d 206, 215 (1st Cir. 1994)
(rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to law that permitted any existing dealer within 20
miles to object to a new car dealership, but only if the existing dealer was located in the
state "because Rhode Island's new car dealership law does not facially apply to interstate
commerce . . ").
392 See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 865, 389-90 (1926)
(asserting that local governments have inherent power to control the use of land through
zoning).
393 Reeves, 447 U.S. at 441.
394 See, e.g., O'Malley, suPra note 244, at D2 (reporting that officials in Illinois gave $10
million worth of free land subsidy to an automotive company).
395 Coenen, supra note 120, at 441 (emphasis added).
396 Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439 n.12.
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plying the market-participant principle.3 97 Second, there is a resem-
blance between the "land-giving" government and a private trader.
The government, after all, does not simply give its land away; instead,
like a private trader, it transfers its property-often by way of formal
contract-in return for the desired benefits that flow from securing a
productive business neighbor.3 98
Any force that remains in the "it doesn't look like a private
trader" argument is more than offset by a countervailing considera-
tion. The market-participant exception springs in part from the reali-
zation that such programs will not over-proliferate because of their
inherent costliness.3 99 It follows from this premise that land giveaway
programs provide an even stronger case for market-participant protec-
tion than below-market land transfers. Why? Because outright give-
aways are necessarily more costly-and thus less likely to be
undertaken-than those land transfers "for which state governments
receive some value in return."40°
For all of these reasons, courts should not distinguish land give-
aways from below-market land transfers when applying the dormant
commerce clause. As discussed above, the inherently in-state charac-
ter of land makes it difficult to say that any land-transfer program in-
volves discrimination against interstate commerce.40' But even if
courts detect a discrimination problem, they should apply the market-
participant exception to repel the dormant commerce clause attack.
397 See Coenen, supra note 120, at 443.
398 See Note, Legal Limitations on Public Inducements to Industrial Location, 59 COLUM. L
REv. 618, 623 (1959) [hereinafter Limitations] ("Typically, these transactions [involving
land or cash grants] purport to be contracts whereunder the industry promises to locate in
the community, to remain for a stated number of years, and to employ a minimum number
of workers."); cf.J.F. Shea Co. v. City of Chicago, 992 F.2d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating
that the city in White "was a market participant because it used its own funds" and "was a
party to the contract"); SCHwKE Er AL.., supra note 6, at 16 ("Incentives should take the
form of legally enforceable contracts between the government and the beneficiary com-
pany."). It may be argued that "buying" a favorable business location is not an activity that
occurs in the private "market" at all, so that the market-participant exception cannot apply
to it. The argument is strained, however, because private businesses do compete for busi-
ness locations seen to be in their best interest (for example, when shopping centers or
office buildings battle for high-profile or "anchor" tenants). In addition, in subsidizing
business decisions, the state is properly seen as "weighing in" with private market partici-
pants (such as local land sellers, construction firms, and the like) to generate local business
activity. This form of "participating in the market" by "bidding up the price" is exactly the
sort of activity that was authorized by the Supreme Court in Alexandria Scrap. See supra text
accompanying notes 254-62.
399 See Regan, supra note 222, at 1194 ("The very fact that spending programs involve
spending and are therefore relatively expensive as a way of securing local benefit makes
them less likely to proliferate than measures like tariffs."); see also supra text accompanying
notes 254-62.
400 Coenen, supra note 120, at 475.
401 See supra note 388 and accompanying text.
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5. Flat-Amount Cash Subsidies
If the Constitution countenances land grants conditioned upon
establishing local business operations, it should also tolerate the prac-
tice of awarding flat cash bounties offered to achieve the same end.40 2
The only difference between the two incentives lies, after all, in the
nature of the government asset bestowed. In one case, the state con-
veys a parcel of land; in the other, it delivers a package of dollar bills.
Some might argue that this distinction matters, because the cash sub-
sidy looks enough like a tax rebate to trigger the Commerce Clause
anti-tariff principle.40 3 According to this argument, tariffs and tax re-
bates have to do with money, because cash subsidies directed at local
businesses also involve money, they should be treated like discrimina-
tory tax breaks even if grants of land and other property are not.
Three reasons undermine the argument that monetary subsidies
are more problematic than land grants. First, the logic that underlies
this argument would require the rejection of all business-supporting
cash subsidies. We already have seen, however, that the invalidation
of all such subsidies would offend Supreme Court precedent4 04 and
hamstring salutary state experiments that pose no real threat to Com-
merce Clause values. 405
Second, political process considerations suggest that courts
should view cash grants at least as favorably as land grants. Local gov-
ernments that have an interest in expanding the local property tax
base (as all local governments do) have a strong built-in incentive to
move publicly owned "industrial park" land (which is not taxable) into
private hands (where it is taxable). Because the same is not true of
publicly owned cash, localities may well be less inclined to dole out
402 In fact, several states and localities have granted such bounties. See Taegan D. God-
dard, Job-buying Becomes Economic Civil War, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 12, 1994, at IB ("Fighting
for jobs, state governments are waging an increasingly fierce battle to attract corporate
investment. Their weapons include.., even direct subsidies."); see also Barrett, supra note
5, at 1019 & 1023 n.20 (citing use of "direct grants" and "outright grants"); Taylor, supra
note 1, at 675 n.41 (citing "outright cash" award). Probably the most dramatic cash give-
away program has been developed by Amarillo, Texas. In September, 1995, the city sent
out-i n Publisher's Clearinghouse-like fashion-$8 million "checks" to 1,350 corporations
in an attempt to stir up interest in siting operations in Amarillo. Under the Amarillo pro-
gram, firms will receive $10,000 for each local job they create up to a maximum of $8
million. See All Things Considered (National Public Radio, Sept. 20, 1995) (transcript on file
with authors).
It bears emphasis that cash subsidies (as well as other forms of subsidies) may run
afoul of state constitutional constraints even if permissible under the federal Constitution.
See, e.g., Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 626 (N.C. 1996) (reversing trial
court ruling invalidating, on state constitutional grounds, cash incentive awards made to
new or expanding businesses pursuant to statutory authority).
403 See supra notes 315-22 and accompanying text.
404 See supra part II.B.1.
405 See supra part II.B.2.
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cash on improvident projects than to transfer realty. As a result, from
a political-process perspective, the case for the constitutionality of
cash giveaways seems even stronger than for land grants.
Finally, the attempted distinction between land and cash misses
the point of the tariff prohibition the Commerce Clause imposes.
This prohibition bars any form of tariff, whether the importer must
pay it in money, widgets, or constructed homes.40 6 In other words,
the anti-tariff principle applies equally to cash and non-cash customs
duties. It follows that subsidies should fall outside (or inside) the or-
bit of this principle in equal measure whether awarded in cash or
other forms of property. In short, one-shot cash subsidies, no less
than one-shot land grants, should in general escape dormant com-
merce clause attack.
6. The Per-Unit Subsidy
States sometimes grant a flat-amount cash subsidy on a single-shot
basis in exchange for construction of a plant in the state. The per-
unit subsidy-as that term is used here-is a horse of a different color.
Assume, for example, that a state offers a five-year, one-penny-per-fil-
led-container subsidy to a soft drink company in return for its build-
ing of a bottling plant in the state. The per-unit subsidy differs from
the flat-amount cash payment because it has an ongoing, contingent
character. The subsidy may trigger the building of a local plant, but it
also encourages the plant's continued and expanding operation. This
feature of the per-unit subsidy renders it more akin to the protective
tariff than the one-shot payment because the continuing subsidy-like
the protective tariff-aims at retaining and supporting a business that
has established its operations in the state.407
Even more important, per-unit subsidies will in many cases resem-
ble tax breaks already held unconstitutional by the Court. Assume,
for example, that State A charges a 1% tax on all goods sold at whole-
sale within its borders. Assume also that State A provides a 1%-of-
wholesale-price cash subsidy for goods produced within the state by an
in-state company. It could be argued that the practical effect of the
subsidy is to relieve the in-state company, in discriminatory fashion, of
its entire wholesale tax burden in violation of the dormant commerce
clause.40 8 Support for this argument comes from West Lynn Creamery,
in which the Supreme Court struck down a state subsidy precisely be-
406 SeeWest Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2212 (1994) (citing a variety
of laws struck down because they had the "same effect as a tariff or customs duty-neutral-
izing the advantage possessed by lower cost out-of-state producers").
407 See supra text accompanying note 354.
408 See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
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cause it operated as a "tax rebate."40 9 To be sure, the State A subsidy
does not simply offset the wholesale tax, because the subsidy is paid
even on goods sold at wholesale outside the state, which are not sub-
ject to the State A wholesale tax at all. The subsidy's challenger will
argue, however, that this just makes the subsidy more objectionable
because it promotes local industry, at the expense of out-of-staters, to
an even greater degree than if the subsidy merely neutralized the ef-
fect of the State A wholesale tax.410
Is the State A subsidy unconstitutional under the principle of West
Lynn Creamery? Perhaps not. For example, unlike Massachusetts, State
A did not enact the tax and subsidy simultaneously as part of a unitary
program.41' Also, in contrast to the situation in West Lynn Creamery,
the State A subsidy does not come from an account carefully segre-
gated from the general revenues for the very purpose of effectively
refunding to domestic producers all taxes paid on sales of their
goods. 41 2 Indeed, the hypothetical State A tax and State A subsidy are
not related at all except in that the subsidy is based on the same
wholesale-price value that the state uses to compute the tax.
The State A hypothetical, however, may come close enough to
West Lynn Creamery to raise some judicial eyebrows. Consequently,
state policymakers should avoid this type of subsidy, and they should
have little difficulty doing so. Why? Because the only problem with
the hypothetical wholesale price subsidy is that it "lines up" so closely
with the wholesale revenues tax. To avoid this problem, the state
need only disconnect its mode of computing subsidy payments from
its mode of calculating its taxes. Instead of basing subsidies on whole-
sale prices, for example, State A might pay the in-state company
$10,000 for each month it turns out more than 60,000 units of prod-
uct. In making such refinements to its subsidy structure, the state
must avoid jumping from the frying pan into the fire. If, for example,
State A substituted for its wholesale-price subsidy a subsidy based on a
firm's total revenues, a court might deem that subsidy an unconstitu-
tional "rebate" of gross-receipts, or even income, tax payments.
Per-unit subsidies will raise many problems of this kind. To avoid
those problems, state lawmakers must take three precautionary steps.
First, they must appreciate that the Court found and condemned a
discriminatory defacto rebate in the West Lynn Creamey case. Second,
they must recognize that the contours of this anti-rebate principle re-
409 West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2213.
410 See id. at 2215.
411 See supra text accompanying notes 234-39.
412 In the view ofJustice Scalia, placement of the milk tax proceeds into a segregated
account was critical in rendering the tax-and-subsidy program unconstitutional. West Lynn
Creamery, 114 S. Ct at 2220-21 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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main undefined. Finally, in light of these realities, state lawmakers
must give wide berth to the anti-rebate restriction. They can do so by
carefully disassociating calculation of "per unit" subsidies from any ex-
isting tax base or mode of tax computation.
7. Loan Forgiveness
If a state can give a cash bounty to a firm for locating a new busi-
ness within its borders, the state also should be able to favor the same
business with a repayable loan. And if the state can seek to attract new
businesses with favorable lease or land-sale contracts, then surely the
state may also offer loans on favorable terms.413 And if a state may
make favorable loans to new businesses, then surely it may excuse in
part or in whole loan payments upon the occurrence of such stipu-
lated conditions as maintaining local operations for a specified period
of time.
But wait!
There are special problems with loan forgiveness packages.
These problems begin with state constitutions, which may well restrict
this form of business development subsidy.414 Loan-forgiveness incen-
tives also face a potential problem under the dormant commerce
clause because courts may view loan forgiveness as akin to constitu-
tionally suspect tax forgiveness.415 Both loan-repayment waivers and
tax-payment waivers, after all, operate to excuse the local business
from meeting a monetary obligation otherwise owed to the govern-
ment. Critics also might paint the loan forgiveness tool as especially
objectionable on the ground that it is more easily hidden from poten-
tial objectors than such "high-visibility" subsidies as outright grants of
land or cash.416
These arguments, however, fall short of bringing loan forgiveness
plans within the sweep of the anti-tariff principle. To begin with, the
making of loans involves market participation in the purest sense,417
418 See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 5, at 1019 & 1023 n.20 (citing use of "low-interest"
loans); Taylor, supra note 1, at 675 n.41 (same); see also SCHWEc ET AL., supra note 6, at 19
(noting that "49 states use [industrial development bonds] to enable local governments to
offer low-interest loans to firms").
414 See, e.g., Op. Ga. Att'y Gen., No. 95-22, at 4 (Apr. 28, 1995) ("[Ilt is beyond the
power of [the state agency] to create forgivable loans as it has in the incentive loan pro-
gram."). For a general treatment of state and local authority to encourage business devel-
opment with government financing, see David E. Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on
Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. RE,. 265, 277
(1963).
415 See supra part I.B.
416 See ScwaWEKE ET AL., supra note 6, at 52 (noting that, because a "soft loan" is "easy
money," itis "more likely .. . that the subsidy will be abused"); see generally supra text
accompanying notes 311-13 (relating high-visibility subsidies to political accountability).
417 See supra text accompanying notes 290-301.
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and affording relief from paying a loan made by way of contract is
simply not the same thing as granting an abatement of a tax. Argu-
ments against loan forgiveness based on reduced political visibility
also seem overdrawn. Government officials have to appropriate
money to make loans in the first place, and they must do so with the
recognition that such loans may never be repaid. It is also unlikely
that forgivable loans will slide by the watchful eyes of potential objec-
tors more easily than outright subsidies. The making of loans, after
all, requires substantial outlays of taxpayers' monies, and the concept
of a forgivable loan is hardly difficult for local politicians-or those
who vote for them-to grasp. In short, forgivable loans seem no less
costly to state and local governments than outright cash subsidies. As
a result, such loans should receive comparable treatment under the
dormant commerce clause.
8. User Fee Exemptions
It is a hornbook principle of dormant commerce clause case law
that a "user fee is valid only to the extent it 'does not discriminate
against interstate commerce.' ",418 In other words, the Court histori-
cally has treated user fees much like state taxes, by subjecting them to
a rigorous anti-discrimination principle.419 A serious question thus
arises as to whether user fee abatements-for example, from electri-
cal, sewage, or water charges-can pass constitutional muster when
used to attract new business development-420
In answering this question, one must recognize that local govern-
ments usually, and quite properly, provide water, sewer, and similar
services only within their own geographic confines.421 As a result, in
the typical case, when a local government gives a fee break to one
service user, it is hard to say that it is discriminating against interstate
commerce at all; it seems more accurate to say it is discriminating only
against other residents of the same locale.422
418 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1352 n.6
(1994) (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 114 S. Ct. 855, 858 (1994)).
419 Indeed, there is reason to believe that the Court has subjected user fees to even
stricter constitutional scrutiny than taxes under the dormant commerce clause. See Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1981) (suggesting that taxes are
subject to less intense review than user fees under the fourth, "fair relation," prong of the
Complete Auto Transit test).
420 See generally Taylor, supra note 1, at 675 n.41 (citing use of "reduced energy costs" as
an incentive to attract new businesses).
421 See, e.g., Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 251 & n.2 (3d
Cir. 1989) ("No court, to our knowledge, has ever suggested that the commerce clause
requires city-operated garbage trucks to cross state lines in order to pick up the garbage
generated by residents of other states.").
422 See supra text accompanying notes 388, 401.
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For at least two reasons, however, this non-discrimination analysis
cannot end the discussion. First, the analysis may miss a key point. In
particular, given the doctrinal kinship of user fees and taxes, 423 the
Court might insist that states are duty-bound to facilitate "user-fee
neutral decisionmaking" just as much as they must ensure "tax-neutral
decisionmaking. '424
Second, even if our no-discrimination analysis generally safeguards
water-and-sewer-type user fee waivers, this analysis will not apply when
a state or locality voluntarily makes a service available across state
lines. Assume, for example, that a NewJersey governmental authority
that picks up solid waste agrees for a price to handle waste generated
in New York by metal fabricators. Assume further that, as part of an
inducement package offered to a competing fabricator to locate in
New Jersey, the authority for three years waives-50% of its ordinary
waste pick-up charges. Does the user-fee reduction for the in-state op-
erator-which now clearly discriminates against its out-of-state com-
petitors-violate the donnant commerce clause?
This case reveals the tectonic tension between the Court's states-
can't-discriminate user-fee jurisprudence and its states-can-discrimi-
nate market-participant decisions. 425 The complex questions that re-
sult from these competing principles warrant-and have received-
extended treatment in a separate article. 426
That Article-which was written by one of the authors of this
piece and hereby is endorsed as essentially sound by the other-con-
cludes that the Court's user-fee anti-discrimination principle properly
reaches only state charges for access to roads, airports, and other
"channels of interstate movement."427 User-fee abatements used to
spur business development typically do not involve benefits of this ilk,
but instead involve charges for such items as power and waste services.
Affording access to these sorts of benefits-in contrast to affording
access to highways and waterways-does not involve the "essential ave-
nues of interstate trade. '4 28 Thus the fixing of user fees for such non-
transportation-related benefits ordinarily should escape Commerce
Clause challenge under the protective umbrella of the market-partici-
pant principle.
423 See supra note 419 and accompanying text.
424 See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
425 Compare supra notes 418-19 and accompanying text with supra part ll.B.1.c. See also
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1356 (1994)
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
426 See Dan T. Coenen, State User Fees and the Dormant Commerce Clause (1995)
(manuscript on file with authors).





TAx BREAKS, SUBSIDIES, AND LEGAL THEORY
Our discussion of tax and subsidy incentives raises fundamental
questions of symmetry and coherence in the law. We have recog-
nized, after all, that the economic consequences of tax breaks and
subsidies are often indistinguishable. 429 Yet if our own analysis
reaches any overarching conclusion, it is that courts applying the dor-
mant commerce clause should approach tax breaks and subsidies very
differently.430
Much ink has been spilled on why this distinction comports with
sound dormant commerce clause policy.43 1 But it may be fair to add
that the distinction flows from the very deepest wellsprings of the law.
Rudolph von Jhering wrote that "form is the 'innermost' matter of
law."432 And so the law is rife with rules centered on considerations of
form. Lon Fuller perceived the centrality of form in private law. He
explained, in particular, that law often works like language by calling
upon persons to channel their undertakings into particular forms to
render them legally efficacious.433 If a woman wishes to leave prop-
erty to the Community Chest upon her death, she must execute a
properly drafted and witnessed will. If she wants to transfer a cande-
labra inter vivos, she must either effect a suitable documentary trans-
fer or wield the formal tool of physical delivery. Only through use of
these modes of "expression" can the donor's intentions take hold and
have effect.
If form is central to the law of private transactions, why should it
not also be of significance when public bodies act? And if it is, why
should it seem strange that the public body that wishes to channel
financial benefits to in-state industry must channel its actions into par-
ticular forms? The answer is that this result should not seem strange
at all. 434
The question that remains is why courts should prefer the form
of the cash or non-cash subsidy to that of the tax exemption, deduc-
tion, or credit in applying the dormant commerce clause. Rules of
form typically serve some function,43 5 and private law principles again
help show why this is so with the subsidy form. The law of property,
429 See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
430 See supra text accompanying notes 241-46.
431 See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 120, at 479-84; Kline, supra note 306, at 370-79; Regan,
supra note 222, at 1193-94; supra part I.B.2.
432 2 Geist des R~mischoen Rechts 478-79 (Scientia Verlag Aalen 1993) (1894). The
translation comes from Robert S. Summers, Notes for Faculty Session on "The Formal
Character of Law" (Apr. 11, 1995) (on file with Comell Law Review).
433 Fuller, supra note 15, at 801-03.
434 See infra note 444 and accompanying text.
435 See Fuller, supra note 15, at 800-03 (discussing functions served by legal formalities).
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for example, generally requires the formality of delivery to effectuate
a gift.436 And the law of contracts requires that the most important of
consensual exchanges be committed to the formal medium of the
signed, written page.43 7 As Fuller perceived, these requirements of
form exist in large measure to serve a "cautionary function."43 8 The
underlying thought is that use of these formal devices will force the
mind to reflect upon the terms of the undertaking with seriousness
and specificity-and that that is a good thing for both intrinsic and
instrumentalist reasons. 43 9
So it is with subsidies. Commentators have explained that subsi-
dies differ from tax breaks for a variety of reasons. A central reason,
however, revolves around political-process based concerns of focused,
intelligible, and deliberative decisionmaking.440 Just as surely as use
of the will or the deed impresses upon the individual mind the signifi-
cance of its contemplated act, consideration of a subsidy forces the
mind of the public body to consider most pointedly the cost and con-
sequences of moving forward.441
The significance of form should not be understated. Formal cate-
gories permeate public, no less than private, law.442 Indeed, in its most
recent term, the Supreme Court emphasized that "economic equiva-
lence alone has... not been (and should not be) the touchstone of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence."4 3 Thus, in the dormant com-
merce clause field-as in other realms of law-the form in which gov-
436 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTfY, Donative Transfers § 31.1 (1992).
437 See generaly 2 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 275-300 (1950 & Supp. 1994) (discussing
history and operation of Statute of Frauds).
438 Fuller, supra note 15, at 800. Of course, the Statute of Frauds serves the cautionary
function imperfectly because (for example) even a post-contractual memorandum may
satisfy the writing requirement. Still, in the vast majority of cases governed by the Statute
of Frauds, the writing will serve a cautionary purpose. See a (noting that "any requirement
of a writing" serves to caution "one pledging his future").
439 See id
440 See, e.g., Kline, supra note 306, at 371, 374 (noting that "[w]hat distinguishes state
spending programs from protectionist regulation is the form... by which local residents
are preferred," and subsidies are "visible, direct and recurring costs to the state checked
through both the political process and the state budget").
441 This theme is pursued at length in Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the
Dormant Commerce Clause (work in progress, manuscript on file with the authors). In.
particular, the author explains why these values properly inform the formation of constitu-
tional rules and rules derived from the dormant commerce clause in particular.
442 Consider, by way of illustration, the differing precedential significance of holding
and dictum in judicial writing, and of published and unpublished judicial opinions. Of
course, the Constitution of the United States requires public bodies to act through certain
pre-established forms, such as bicameral action, precisely to avoid adoption of "oppressive,
improvident, or ill-considered measures." Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947-48 (1983).
443 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1381, 1344 n.7 (1995).
This point is explored in depth in Walter Hellerstein et al., Commerce Clause Restraints
on State Taxation AfterJefferson Lines (1995) (manuscript on file with the authors).
CORAELL LAW REVIEW
emnment pursues its objectives may well have critical significance. The
strong distinction drawn here between subsidies and tax breaks reso-
nates with this palpable, but often overlooked, truth at the root of all
law.
CONCLUSION
All major issues of government policy ultimately seem to become
questions of constitutional law. The burgeoning use of local business
incentives ensures that constitutional challenges to these programs
will increasingly find their way into the courts. Indeed, the onslaught
already has begun.
The most promising avenue for attacking these programs under
the Federal Constitution lies in the dormant commerce clause. In this
Article we have offered an overarching theory of how the Commerce
Clause interacts with both state-tax and state-subsidy incentives.
Although our approach is not above criticism, we believe it is superior
to proposed alternatives. First, our synthesis does not jettison
Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, better than any previously identi-
fied alternative, our approach tracks both the letter and spirit of the
Court's business-incentive decisions.
Second, our synthesis avoids extremes. State business incentives
will neither stand nor fall en masse under our analysis. In particular,
we embrace a middle-ground position on the constitutionality of state
tax incentives, which rests on the sensible difference between tax
structures that effectively coerce in-state activity and those that merely
encourage new investment in the state. Other proposed approaches
either denude the Court's precedents by essentially giving states carte
blanche to construct discriminatory tax incentives or wipe off the
books virtually all tax incentives in contravention of deeply rooted as-
sumptions. Either result presents grave difficulties, and our approach
steers clear of both of them.
Finally, our synthesis recognizes and reflects the Court's long-
standing insistence that tax breaks and subsidies are constitutionally
different. Under our approach, states will channel business incentives
into the form of subsidies. They should. The use of subsidies, as we
have explained, serves the salutary end of focusing state deci-
sionmakers-and the voters to whom they are accountable-on the
costs and inequities that business development incentives can
engender.
In assessing state business incentives in future cases, the Court
will have to deal-as it often must-with judgments about imponder-
ables. We presume neither to predict the direction the Court will take
in future cases nor to declare that we have solved every problem busi-
ness incentives will present. We have, however, constructed for the
[Vol. 81:789
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Court's consideration a coherent and comprehensive structure for an-
alyzing these issues built firmly upon the Court's own past
pronouncements.444
APPENDIX: PROCEDURAL ISSUES RAISED BY CHALLENGES TO TAX
INCENTIVES AND SUBSIDIES
We have seen that business-development tax incentives are often
open to constitutional challenge. 4 5 Similarly, attacks on subsidies will
sometimes succeed.446 Prospective challengers of business-incentive
programs do, however, face a range of procedural and remedial diffi-
culties. In this Appendix, we introduce some major problems.
A. Tax Incentives
In light of the apparent vulnerability of state tax incentives to suc-
cessful constitutional attack, the question arises as to why more of
these incentives have not been challenged.4 7 The answer may lie in
potential litigants' perceptions that their victories in this arena are
likely to be Pyrrhic. In other words, a successful attack on a state tax
incentive may result in elimination of the tax incentive for those previ-
ously favored by the legislature rather than extension of tax benefits
444 After this Article was drafted, we became aware that Peter D. Enrich of Northeast-
em University School of Law had drafted another article on the same topic. Peter D.
Enrich, Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives
for Business, tARv. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 1996). Both our article and Professor En-
rich's article are in quite close agreement on the center points. We both conclude that
there is a substantial class of tax incentives, of which income tax credits constitute typical
instances, which cannot withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny. And we both recognize that
there is another substantial class of tax incentives, of which property tax abatements and
sales tax exemptions constitute typical instances, which can be distinguished from the first
class in ways that make the precedential arguments for unconstitutionality less compelling.
The principal differences between the two articles involve their focus. Our Article is
addressed largely to the substantive criteria that govern-or ought to govern-the constitu-
tionality of state business development incentives, and it explores the implications of those
criteria for particular types of business development incentives, including subsidies. Pro-
fessor Enrich's article devotes more attention to the normative question whether such in-
centives are desirable and to standing and related questions as to who will and who can
raise the challenge to these incentives. The differences in focus of the two articles do lead
to some divergences in Professor Enrich's and our conclusions about which types of incen-
tives will-or should-survive Commerce Clause scrutiny.
Professor Enrich and we are in full accord on two points, however: first, the articles
generally reinforce and complement one another; second, both articles should be read by
anyone seeking a fuller understanding of the constitutional restraints on state business
development incentives.
445 See supra part I.B.
446 See supra part II.
447 Although there have been some challenges to state tax incentives, see cases cited
supra note 139, taxpayers have barely scratched the surface of the vast array of tax incen-
tives that appear to be susceptible to constitutional attack. See, e.g., supra text accompany-
ing notes 73-83, 207-13 (listing a number of state tax incentive provisions).
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to all similarly situated taxpayers.44 8 It is certainly difficult, for exam-
ple, to imagine a court extending the benefit of an unconstitutionally
discriminatory sales or property tax exemption to all taxpayers,
thereby eliminating the tax altogether from the state's tax structure,
rather than abolishing the exemption for the favored class of taxpay-
ers. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that the remedies for un-
constitutionally discriminatory tax incentives need not always, if ever,
be that draconian. There are, in any event, fruits of victory apart from
obtaining the particular tax benefit on a prospective basis.
With regard to some tax incentives, such as income or sales tax
credits confined to those who have engaged in a particular type of in-
state activity, the credit or deduction could be extended to all taxpay-
ers who engage in that activity, regardless of whether they engaged in
the activity in the state. This result would not substantially erode the
income or sales tax base. In fact, courts in several cases have fash-
ioned remedies in just this way-that is, by extending the favorable
tax treatment to all taxpayers engaged in the favored form of activity,
whether they pursue it inside or outside the state.44 9
Even if a taxpayer is not successful in obtaining the advantage of
the tax incentive in question, its invalidation may well inure to its eco-
nomic benefit by creating a level playing field between the taxpayer
and its in-state competitors that enjoyed the tax benefit in the past.
Indeed, it is this consequence of invalidating the tax incentive that
provides the essential justification for judicial intervention under the
dormant commerce clause, namely, to safeguard the "free trade" pur-
poses underlying the clause by prohibiting statutes that "provid[e] a
direct commercial advantage to local business."450
448 See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 455 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1984)
(striking discriminatory corporate income tax credit provided to Florida-based air carriers
rather than extending credit to all carriers), appeal dismissed sub nom., Delta Air Lines, Inc.
v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State ex
rel. Allen, 315 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1982) (striking tax reduction for gasohol produced in
state rather than extending reduction to all gasohol); Giant Indus. Arizona, Inc. v. Taxa-
tion and Revenue Dep't, 796 P.2d 1188 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (striking gasoline tax deduc-
tion for ethanol-blended fuel manufactured in state rather than extending deduction for
all ethanol-blended fuel).
449 For example, the New York Court of Appeals on remand from the United States
Supreme Court in Westinghouse held that the appropriate remedy was to extend the tax
credit to income generated by DISC shipments regardless of the state from which the ex-
ports were shipped. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 470 N.E.2d 858 (N.Y. 1984). See
also Comptroller of the Treasury v. Armco, Inc., 521 A.2d 785, 791-92 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1987) (extending favored treatment of DISC dividends to all DISCs, where statute uncon-
stitutionally limited favored treatment to DISCs with 50 percent or more of their taxable
income in state); Northwest Aerospace Training Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 1995
WL 431184 (Minn. T.C.July 18, 1995) (extending exemption for sales tax on receipts from
lease of flight equipment to all leases, where statute limited favored treatment to leases
made to lessees with economic presence in state).
450 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
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Finally, it is now established that when a taxpayer is required to
pay a tax that is subsequently held to discriminate against interstate
commerce under settled principles of Commerce Clause adjudication,
the Due Process Clause guarantees the taxpayer "meaningful back-
ward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation 451 of
property. Thus in many-although not all-cases, the taxpayer will
receive a refund of the discriminatory taxes it has paid in the past,
whatever remedy the court, and ultimately the legislature, may fashion
for the future. As the Court has observed, " [t] he State may... choose
to erase the property deprivation itself by providing [the taxpayer]
with a full refund of its tax payments."452
The state may also "reformulate and enforce the... [t]ax during
the contested tax period in any way that treats [the taxpayer] and its
competitors in a manner consistent with the dictates of the Commerce
Clause."453 Thus the state might require payment of back taxes by
those who received favored tax treatment under the unconstitutional
tax incentive, thereby retroactively eliminating the discrimination. In
the real world, however, the practical and political difficulties of fash-
ioning any retroactive remedy other than a refund (as well as legal
difficulties presented by federal and state strictures regarding retroac-
tive legislation) make solutions that require back-tax collections un-
likely. Accordingly, taxpayers who successfully challenge state tax
incentives under the Commerce Clause are likely, at a minimum, to
be rewarded for their efforts with tax refunds, assuming they have in-
voluntarily paid taxes under the unconstitutional regime and do not
run afoul of enforceable procedural limits on obtaining such
recoveries.
B. Subsidies
Subsidy cases, like tax-break cases, will raise a range of remedial
issues. Perhaps the most interesting set of issues emanates from the
"de facto tax rebate" approach to subsidies that we have identified as an
organizing principle in this area of law.454 The problem arises be-
cause specialized procedural rules apply to cases involving the consti-
tutionality of state tax laws. In particular, the federal Tax Injunction
Act455 generally channels into state court any suit to "enjoin, suspend
or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State
451 McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31
(1990).
452 Id. at 39.
453 Hd at 40.
454 See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
455 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
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law."4 56 Similarly, in Fair Assessment in .Real Estate Ass'n v.- McNary,45 7
the Supreme Court relied on considerations of "comity" to require
claimants who seek damages for state-tax-related constitutional viola-
tions to press their cases before state tribunals.458
The question that presents itself is whether these restrictive doc-
trines applicable to state tax cases will carry over to state subsidy cases
in which relief is sought on the ground that the subsidy operates as a
discriminatory defacto "tax rebate." Providing an answer to this ques-
tion presents a challenge that will call for statutory and case law analy-
sis more probing than the few words we offer here. Those who
consider subsidy-related litigation should recognize, however, that the
applicability of these limiting "tax" doctrines to their cases will turn in
large measure on two key variables.
First, whether the subsidy is challenged on "rebate-likeness"
grounds may well affect the outcome. Other lines of attack may be
launched: that the subsidy is improperly coupled with a downstream
restraint;459 that the particular subsidy creates so much market distor-
tion for so little cost that the rule that generally safeguards discrimina-
tory subsidies should be deemed inapplicable;460 or even that our
entire theory is wrong, so that out-of-staters may challenge all local
subsidies-regardless of their linkage with any tax-on the ground
that they "discriminate[ ] against interstate commerce."461 In all of
these cases, the challenge to the subsidy is unrelated to any tax; thus
the limiting rules applicable to constitutional tax cases should not and
will not apply.
If the case rests on the claimed tax-rebate-likeness of a challenged
subsidy, however, the applicability of the Court's tax doctrines may
turn upon a second variable: the relief the challenger seeks. In West
Lynn Creamery, for example, the Court struck down the tax-and-subsidy
program "as a whole."46 2 In such a case, procedural rules applicable
in state tax cases apply because the tax itself is at issue.
What if the challenged subsidy is severable from the tax it alleg-
edly offsets and the sole relief sought is a prospective injunction of
456 Id. See also 2 STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS
§ 18.3(a) (1990); 17 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAGTICE & PROCEDURE § 4237
(2d ed, 1988 & Supp. 1996); William L. Taylor, Section 1983 in State Court: A Remedy for
Unconstitutional State Taxation, 95 YALE L.J. 414, 417-18 (1985).
457 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
458 Id. at 116.
459 See supra text accompanying note 323.
460 See Benjamin C. Bair, The Dormant Commerce Clause and State-Mandated Preference Laws
in Public Contracting: Developing a More Substantive Application of the Market-Participant Excep-
tion, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2408, 2423 (1995); Regan, supra note 222, at 1196. But see Coenen,
supra note 120, at 478-79.
461 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1682 (1994).
462 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2215 (1994).
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subsidy payments?. The Court might say that such a suit is indistin-
guishable from one challenging a state tax law so that the Tax Injunc-
tion Act applies. The policies underlying the Act, however, cut in the
other direction. This is so because, when litigants seek to enjoin fu-
ture payments of a subsidy, they in no way endanger the state's "collec-
tion of revenue... with consequent damage to the State's budget."463
To the contrary, if the litigant is successful, funds in the state treasury
will be augmented because the state must not make future subsidy out-
lays.464 It has been said that the Tax Injunction Act is inapplicable
when "the suit does not seek to enjoin the collection of taxes [but]
challenges only the unequal distribution of state funds."465 This de-
scription fits an action brought solely to enjoin further subsidy
payments.
Serious risks to the revenue-protecting goals of the Tax Injunc-
tion Act will arise, however, if the litigant sues not to enjoin future
payments of a subsidy, but to require extension of the subsidy to out-of-
state businesses. Here, a grant of the requested relief will deplete
funds in the state treasury. Thus, the state will argue that tax doc-
trines built on safeguarding state fiscal autonomy should operate to
channel these suits into state courts.4 66
This argument probably should fall. To begin with, many consti-
tutional challenges to state programs threaten state fiscal autonomy
without triggering the Tax Injunction Act or the "comity" exceptions
to the general rule of federal-court jurisdiction over constitutional
cases.4 67 School-desegregation and prison-condition cases provide
striking examples. s8 States may argue that school and prison cases
are fundamentally different from cases in which litigants seek the ben-
efit of a "de facto tax rebate"46 9 they assert they have been discriminato-
rily denied. Such, rebate cases, the states may say, fall comfortably
463 California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 410 (1982) (quoting Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 128 n. 17 (1971) (Brennan,J., concurring and dissenting)).
464 See, e.g., WRIuHT r AL., supra note 456, § 4237 n.19 (citing cases for rule that Tax
Injunction Act does not block federal actions that allow, rather than prevent, collection of
a tax).
465 Levy v. Parker, 346 F. Supp. 897, 904 (E.D. La. 1972), affd mem., 411 U.S. 978
(1973).
466 SeeWright et al., supra note 456, § 4237 n.18 (citing cases that apply the Tax Injunc-
tion Act to suits in which litigants want to effectively expand the group benefitting from tax
exemption or credit, thus reducing tax collections).
467 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1994). Section 1331 gives federal district courts origi-
nal jurisdiction when federal questions are presented. Section 1343 gives federal district
courts original jurisdiction over civil rights cases.
468 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977) ("Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), permits federal courts to enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to require-
ments of federal law, notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state
treasury.").
469 See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
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within the special rules applicable to tax cases (and are indistinguish-
able, in particular, from cases involving claimed entitlements to tax
exemptions or credits470 ) because the whole theory of the challenger
is that the subsidy operates in effect as a tax break.471
The difficulty with this line of reasoning is that it tends to equate
a tax rebate that really is a tax rebate (because, for example, it is char-
acterized as a rebate by state law and administered by and through
state tax officials) with a subsidy said to be unconstitutional on the
ground that it operates like a tax rebate. In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc.,472 for example, the Court struck down a minimum milk price law
made applicable to nonresident producers because it operated as the
"equivalent to a rampart of customs duties" by denying out-of-state
products a price advantage earned by way of more efficient opera-
tions.473 In other words, a state's non-tax law was deemed invalid be-
cause of its practical kinship to an unlawfully discriminatory tax. No
one would suggest, however, that the Tax Injunction Act applied in
Baldwin. The same principle, we suspect, should cover a challenge
directed at a subsidy, even if the challenge rests in whole or part on
rebate-likeness grounds.
Consider a present-day challenge by an out-of-state hulk proces-
sor to a subsidy like the one involved in Alexandria Scrap.474 In such a
case, the challenger might well rely on a variety of arguments: that
the market-participant exception should be overruled and the hulk-
processing incentive struck down as impermissibly discriminatory; 475
that the subsidy diverts so much business to in-staters at so little cost
that an exception to the market-participant rule should apply; and
(perhaps) that the subsidy operates as a defacto tax rebate of a license,
gross-receipts or income tax. This challenge to what is in essence a
state subsidy ought not to be forced into state courts by exceptional
doctrines designed to deal with state taxing programs.
Even if federal courts find the Tax Injunction Act and the McNaty
"comity" principle inapplicable in subsidy cases, the practical
problems that confront the challenger of a subsidy are not at an end.
The successful challenge of a state subsidy, for example, may well enti-
tle a proper plaintiff to "meaningful backward-looking relief."476 As
470 See supra note 466 and accompanying text.
471 See WuGHT E-r AL., supra note 456, § 4237 nn.17-18 and accompanying text (noting
that "the Tax Injunction Act applies even when the effect of the suit will relieve the tax-
payer's burden only indirectly").
472 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
473 a at 527.
474 See supra notes 254-62 and accompanying text.
475 See Bair, supra note 460, at 2419 n.61 (collecting authorities critical of the market-
participant exception).
476 McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31
(1990); see also SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONsTrrrTiONAL TORTS 375-76 (1995) (discuss-
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we have seen, such relief will almost always take the form of money-
damage payments.477 If such relief is sought from the state itself, how-
ever, it almost certainly is not obtainable in federal court because of
the Eleventh Amendment.478 The effect of this rule will be to channel
virtually all subsidy actions that involve requests for retrospective relief
from the state itself into the state courts.479
If the plaintiff successfully prosecutes a "backward looking relief'
case against the state, must the court award attorneys fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988?480 The answer is no if the only relief obtained is back-
ward-looking money damages. This is so because section 1988 fees are
not recoverable unless the plaintiff prevails under section 1983, and
section 1983 does not support a claim for money damages against a
state.48 1 In the ordinary case, however, the plaintiff will not seek only
retrospective monetary relief; rather, the plaintiff will couple the
claim for money damages, brought directly under the Fourteenth
Amendment, with a section 1983 claim for declaratory and prospec-
tive injunctive relief against state officials under the principle of Ex
parte Young.48 2 These remedies are ordinarily available under section
ing impact of McKesson). Note, however, that states may argue that subsidy cases are differ-
ent from tax cases for purposes of this principle, given the Court's derivation of due-
process rules in McKesson from the notion that an "exaction of a tax constitutes a depriva-
tion of property." 496 U.S. at 36. Of course, the subsidy challenger may respond to the
state's argument, in part, by saying that the defacto rebate nature of the challenged subsidy
establishes that the challenger has been subjected to the discriminatory "exaction of a tax"
within the meaning of McKesson.
477 See supra note 452 and accompanying text.
478 See, e.g., Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (generally barring suits in federal
court designed to recover money damages from the state); see alsoTaylor, supra note 456, at
418 ("The Eleventh Amendment bars federal district courts from entertaining actions seek-
ing retroactive relief against a state."). A possible counterargument is that, because the
later-adopted Due Process Clause itselfis the source of law that "obligates the state to pro-
vide meaningful backward-looking relief," the Eleventh Amendment principle of Edelman
somehow is trumped in such a case. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)
(finding that Congress can abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity through exercise of
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power).
479 Notably, these considerations are not present if the taxing authority is a local gov-
ernment because such units are not immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh
Amendment. See generally PAUL M. BATOR ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1172-73 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing the different treatment
of state agencies as opposed to local or municipal governments under the Eleventh
Amendment). Moreover, even if the Eleventh Amendment does require initiation of the
suit in state court, the Amendment does not preclude review of the final state court judg-
ment by the United States Supreme Court. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 26-31.
480 See generally NAHMOD ET AL, supra note 476, at 391-431 (discussing fee awards under
§ 1988).
481 National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 2351,
2355 n.5 (1995); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68-69 (1989). Again
the rule is different if the defendant is a local government. See Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (deeming local governments "persons" within the mean-
ing of § 1983).
482 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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1983, and obtaining them entities the plaintiff, as a general rule, to
attorneys fees recoverable from the state treasury under section
1988.483
Does some exception to this general rule apply in subsidy cases
involving tax-rebate-likeness challenges? The state will say yes, relying
on National Private Truck Council v. Oklahoma Tax Commissio 48 4 for the
proposition that state courts need not award section 1988 fees in tax
cases if state law affords an adequate remedy for the underlying consti-
tutional violation without reference to section 1983. This principle
should control, the state will say, because the challenger's essential
claim is that the subsidy is an unconstitutionally discriminatory defacto
tax rebate.
This argument brings us full circle. The special exception to fee
recoveries in constitutional tax suits derives from the special protec-
tions afforded state tax programs by the principles underlying the Tax
Injunction Act and McNary.48 5 We have already suggested that those
tax-related principles should not extend to suits involving challenges
to state subsidies.48 6 If we are right on that point, it should follow easily
that the principle of National Private Truck Council does not apply in
subsidy cases either.
The remedial questions we have considered hardly exhaust the
range of practical problems litigants will confront in mounting consti-
tutional attacks on state subsidies. State-specific procedural and limi-
tations rules, for example, may block otherwise available recoveries. 48 7
States may even be able to limit recoveries-particularly of attorneys
fees-by declining altogether to open their courts to section 1983
claims. 488 A full examination of these issues is left to others. Enough
has been said to alert practitioners to the many procedural pitfalls
that await any challenge to state subsidization on dormant commerce
clause grounds.
483 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690, 693-700 (1978).
484 115 S. Ct. 2351 (1995).
485 See id at 2354-55 (discussing McNary's holding that "Congress never authorized fed-
eral courts to entertain damages actions under section 1983 against state taxes when state
law furnishes an adequate legal remedy").
486 See supra text accompanying notes 455-64.
487 See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
488 See National Private Truck Counci, 115 S. Ct. at 2355 n.4. See generally Bator et al.,
supra note 479, at 495-500 (discussing obligations of state courts to enforce federal claims).
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